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ABSTRACT OF TTIESIS
The 1aw of gamlng and wagerlng contracts 1n
New Zealand l:as a long and complex hlstory whlch
pre-dates the blrth of thls natlon by almost two
centurles. The Gamlng Act 1908 (N.2.) 1s a con-
solldatlng statute, but ss.69, 70 and 71, the
enacttnents havlng speclflc appllcatlon ln thls
area, fall far ehort of provldlng a complete code
of the law. Engllsh statutes enacted ln the relgns
of Char:Ies II (1554)t, Anne (f7ro)2 and 1'11111am IV
(rB351l have always been, and contlnue to beln force
1n thls country, and lndeed, thelr survival here
has been more complete than 1n England where many
of thelr provlslons have been exelsed by the process
of leglslatlve repeal.q The New Zealalrd law of
gamlng and wagenlng contracts ls very much a
L. 16 Car. rr, e .7 ( 1664 ) .
9 Anne, c.14 (1710).
5 & 6 w111. Iv, c.41 (1835).
Provlslons ln the Acts of 166\ and 1710
were modlfled by the Act of 1835 and
those that were untoucired bY that
modiflcatlon were nepealed ln England
by the Ganlng Act, f845 (B & 9 Vlct.,
c.109), And the second sectlon 2 of
the 1835 Act was repealed bY s.I of
the Garnlng Act, L922, but none of those
repeals were carrled lnto the New
ZeaLand law.
z.
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product of the Bngllsh experlence for the Engllsh
enactments ln force here are 1n turn supplemented
by New Zealand provlslons whlch have been largely
copled from Engllsh Gamlng Acts of 1845t and 1892.6
But the New Zealand Leglslature has not been com-
pletely lacklng 1n lmaglnatlon. Sectlon 7I of
the Gamlng Act 1908 (N.2.) has no counterpart
1n the Engllsh statutes, and sectlons 69 and 70
of the New Zealand Act both contaln subtle, but
slgnlflcant differences' to thelr Engllsh equlv-
alents.
However, although New Zealand law 1n thls area
1s modelled on that of England, there the slmllarlty
ends. Engllsh 1aw 1n exlstence and appllcable to
the cireumstances of the Colony of New Zealand on
the 14th of January 1840 was declared to be 1n
force ln New Zealand by the Engllsh Laws Act,
1B5B (N.2.). That Act d1d not, howeven, appry
subsequent Engllsh enactments, and substantlal
reforms to the law of gamlng and wagerlng contracts
effected by the gamlng Act, 1845 (U.K.) were not
adopted tn tlew Zealand untll the colonlal Gamlng
and Lotterles Act was enacted fn fBBt. The
Engllsh Act of 1845 replaced the gamlng contract
provlslons of the Act of Anne (f7fO) and repealed
all but those securltles pnovlslons of that Act
that had been modlfled by the Oamlng Act, 1835 (U'K.
5. lilotably s.1B of the Gamlng Aet, 1845(B & ! V1et., c.I09).
The Gamlng Act, 1892 (55 Vlct., e.9).6.
III
Thus, vrlthln a perlod of flve years from the
lnceptlon of the colony, New Zealand was applylng
nngttsn gamlng laws that were more than two
centurles old whlIst the Engllsh Courts were
faced wlth the prospect of construlng a brand
new Act. Thlrty slx years later the colonlal
leglslature adopted verbatlm the contract
provlslons 1n the Imperlal Act of 1845. tsut by
an appanent over-slght the colonlal draftsman
falIed to effect the substantlal repeals of the
Acts of 1654 and 1710 the Engllsh Act had done '
But that was only the flrst of the eolonlal
er:rors. A further Engllsh Act tn tB9Z7 was
copled and enacted by the cclonla1 leglslature
1n 18948 but wlth an appendage that demonstrated
that the lrlew Zea1and. leglslature had not fu1ly
understood the full lmport of the Engllsh measure.
Thls created dlfflcult1es of lnterpretatlon whlch
were only compounded by a further error of the
draftsman of the fBBf Act when he mlstakenly
copled s.6 of the Bettlng Houses Act 1853 (U'K')e
lnto s .34 of the former Act wlthout rea11s1ng the
slgnlflcance of dolng so. The 1894 Act also
lntrodueed what 1s noi.r s .71 of the 1908 Act, a
provlslon the reason for the enactment of
whlch has remalned unexplalned to the present day'
7.
8.
Ib1d.
s.2 of the Gamlng Aet, 189q.
g 
. 16 & 17 Vlcr. , c.119 ( 1853) .
rv
When a consolldatlon of the Colonlal Acts
was effected by the Gamlng Act 1908 the law of
gamlng and wagerlng contracts was already ln a
state of conslderable confuslon. That confuslon
was, of course, carrled lnto that Act, but lt d1d
not end there and lndeed can be sald to have
g:a1ned a new dlmenslon when, as recently as 1970'
the New Zealand leglslature enacted the lllega}
Contracts Act.
The New Zealand law of gamlng and wagenlng
contracts 1s largely a produet of mlsunderstandlngs
and errors that oceurred when leglsIatlve attempts
were made to re-enact and effeet modlflcatlons of
the Engllsh statutes 1n thls country. In thls
wonk the wrlter seeks to ldentlfy the polnts of
departure and to flnd a ratlonal basls for the
law of gamlng and wagerlng contracts and thls
lnvestlgatlon proceeds 1n the context of a
recognlsed need for proposals for reform. To
thls end, ln chapters I and 2 the soclal cllmate
1n whleh the Acts of 1664, 1710, 1835 and 1845
are enacted, and thelr purpose and scope, 1s
1dent1f1ed. In chapter 3 the ease for the prop-
osltlon that the Acts of 1664, 1710 and 1835 are
1n force 1n New Zealand ls made out and thls 1s
followed 1n chapter 4 by an attempt to explaln
the motlvatlon behlnd the enactment of the
colon1al Acts of 1881 and 1894. Included ln
thls chapter ls an outllne of the dlfflcultles
lnhenent ln both the Language of these Acts, and
the constructlon applled to them by the Courts.
Chapter 5 le devoted to ascertalnlng the actual
scope of the Law of gamlng and wagerlng contraets
ln New Zealand today and 1n the penultlmate
tchapter the lmpact upon, and the lrnpIlcat1ons
for that law, of the lllegal Contracts Act l-970
1s dlscussed. Each sectlon 1s, where approprlate,
accompanled by speclflc proposals for reform, and
those proposals are brought together 1n surimary
form 1n chapter 7,
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CHAPTER 1
THE AcTs oF c}iARLEs II (1554),
ANNE (17lO) AND TIITLIAM IV (T8351
[1.01] Gamlng (or Gambllng)r and i'fagerlng (or Bettlng)2
Garnlng has been deflned as:
!i... playlng at any game [whether of chance
on st<111 and whether lawful or unlawfullfor stakes that 1s to saVr for money or
moneyts wonth, to bg obtalned by the wlnnen
from the loser ...t't
l,Iagerlng, on the other hand, 1s a qulte different
speeles of aet1vlty, an accurate descnlptlon of
whlch cannot be shortly stated. And whll-st 1n
later chapters 1t w111 be neeessary to examlne the
1egal elenents of wagerlng and bettlng ln some
1. Toe terms ''ganlngt' and lrgambllng" are lnvarlablytreated as belng synonomous and they w1IL be so
regarded 1n this wonk. For lnterestlng comment-
arles on the usage of the terms see Oakes v. 
.
t61l 1n i'[eathe
331, 333-th-e use of the terms was accuratelyldentlfled by Salmon J.1n the eomment ri...Gamtng
or, to use. a more popular equlvalent, ganbllng
meang . . .tt
2. The terms ftwager?r and, flbetrr are often used synony-
mously but thelr meanlng can vary aceondlng tothelr use 1n partleular statutes. See €.g. 4
HalsburyIs taws of England (4tn ed.)p.Jrpara.1.Thedlstlnctlon alluded to there 1s not lmportant ln
New Zealand where the terms lrbetl and "wagerl' are
used lnterchangeably. It wllL be demonstrated 1nlater paragraphs that lt ls, howeven' lmpontantto dlstlngulsn between a wager (or bet), and a
wagerlng (or bettlttg) eontract
Edwards tt918l tlz.L.R,7\6: Futleti vEU- (1905)24-Il7t.n. 753: Marshart v: ffi-(r905T-25' N.z.L. L19IUJ N.Z.IJ. ,T116', rLer . !'oqry- l9u) )Z -T17.t.n t ll . @-(r995T -5 ' R.; atheret[-Tlfi[TzglbE-f1925 ] I'1. z .L.R.
Per Salmon J. 1n Weathered, v.Fitzglbbon, note 1,
at p.333; and see@ v.d5'6FEFT9-031 2I(.8.
428- and iur"then eaffiffido voTlTT-alsburyts
Laws of England (llth ed. ), p.4,para.2,ffft,Egf.? 1.
3.
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[1. 01]
detallt for present purposes a wager rnlglrt be
sufflclently descnlbed as arlslng when:
". ,. two persons, pnofesslng to hold opposlte
vlews touchlng the lssue of a future uncertaln
event, nutually agree that, dependent upon
the determlnation of that event, one shall
wln from the other, and that other" shall pay
or hand over to hlm, a sum of money or othergtake. 
" 
5
Thus, and generally speaklng, where the partlelpants
1n a game of cards (or any other game) hazard money
on the nesult of the game they are ganing, wh11st
bystanders who hazard thelr fortunes on the nesult are
bettlng or wagerlng on the game. But a wager need
not, of eourse, be on the result of a game, and nor
need the contlngency necessanlly be, as liawklns J'
descnlbed 1t, a I'future uncertatn event"i lt sufflees
1f the partlclpants have rlsked thelr stakes to the
accuracy of thelr memorles or knowledge of the detalls
of a past event.
4. Especlally ln the contextpost, chapt.4 .
Per Hawklns J, 1n Car.llll
BaLL Cornpany [1892]E-3-.
of wagerlng contracts,
v.Carbollc Smoke@5.
[1.02]
It.oe1
liagerlng and Gamlng 1n England
Although wagerlng and gamlng have long been
popular pastlmes of manklndl there 1s clear evldence
that ln seventeenth anci. elghteenth century England
thev were partlcularly wldespread, extravagant and
rulnous practlces . Blackstone ldent,lfled ganln€5 as:
'... an offence of the most alarmlng nature;
tendlng by neeessary eonseguence to promote
pub11c ldleness, theft and debauchery among
those of a lower class: and, among persons
of a superlor rank, 1t hath frequently been
attencted wlth the sutlden ruln and desolatlon
of anclent and opulent fanr1l1es, 8B abandonedprostltutlon of every prlnclple of honour and
vlrtue 
" 
and too often nath ended 1n self-
murder. tt 2
AnC ear11er, Charles Cotton, wrltlng ln 1674r3 also
conplalned about the extent of wagerlng and gamlng
ln hls t1me. He ldentlfled a class of gamesters
(ne called Rooks) who made 1t thelr professlon to
1. The unlversallty and antlqulty of gambllng ls the
subJect of an lnterestlng account 1n the flrst
chapter to the Hlstory of Gambllng ln England'
John Ashton (1398).
Blackstone, Conmentanles, book IV, p.171, flrstpubllshe<l ln L769.
The (lonpleat Gamester. Parts of thls book were
1n fact publlshed anonymousLy ln 1669 under
various tttles such as rrThe l'llcker Nlchedrr,
and 'iThe Cheate of Ganlng Dlscoveredr'. See
also Rlchard Seymoun, Compleat Gamester (173q)
which drew heavlly on Cottonf s boolt.
2,
3.
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fleece the young gentlemen, cashlers and apprentlees
1n gamlng houses and c1ubs. T'hese places he
called rrhellsi' and 'rordlnarVS", and speaklng of
thelr occupants and theln lrablts he wlstfully
observed:
rr.. 
. an ordlnary serves ag a nursery forTyburn; for 1f any one w111 put hlnself
to the trouble of observatlcn, hB shallflnd that there ls seLdom a vear whereln
there are not some of thls gang [of Rooksl
hang as preclous Jenels 1n the ear ofTyburn. Look baek and you w111 flnd agreat many gone. already, God knows how manv
are to fo]Iow. "'
Cotton oescrlbes the gambllng dens of that tfune
as places of contlnuaL drlnklng and brawllng where
the dlfferenee between the rlch and poor hung slmplv
on the throw of a d1ce. They were places where
men l-ost thelr estates and won them agaln, but
eould not be eontent untll they had lost them agaln
lrrecoverably. But the extent and nature of
ganrlng ln Cottonts t1me, and the lmpresslon 1t
made upon hlm, are best measured by hls colourful
descrlptlon of gamln€r ltself . iie descrlbes 1t as:
tt... an enchantlng wltchery, gotten betwlxt
ldleness and avarlce: an ltchlng dlsease'that makes sone scnatch the head, whllst
othere, as lf they l{ere bitten by a Taran"
tu1a, are laughlng themselves to death:
or 1astIy, lt 1s a paralytlcaL dlstemper,
4. Ib1d., 8t p.3.
[1.02 ]
ttwhlch selzlng the arrn the man cannot choosebut shake hls elbow. It hath thls 1I1pnopenty above all other vlces, that 1t
nenders a man lncapable of proseeutlng any
serlous actlon. and makes hlm always unsat'-
lsf1ed wlth h1s orrn condltlon; he 1s
elther ltfted up to the top of mad Joy wtth
successr oF plunged to the botton of despalr
by mlsfortune, always 1n extremes, always 1n
a storm; thls mlnute the gamesterrs
countenance 1s so serene and calm, that one
would tlrink nothlng eould dlsturb lt, and
the next mlnute so stormy and tempestuousthat lt threatens destructlon to ltself and
others; and as he ls transported wlth 
"'loywhen he r,rtns. so loslng he ls tossed upon
the bllLows of a hlgh swelllng passlon, t111
he hath lost sleht of both of sense and
reason. tt 5
So extenslve was garnlng durlng the seventeenth
century that 1n 1714 Theopbllus Lucas was able to
wrlte a book on the l1ves of the gamesters .5 
"'trlthfew exceptlons, the gamesters who attracted h1s
attentlon ended thelr l1ves ln the most wretehed
eircumstances, Iftany by thelr own handg' Thelr
backgrounds r.{ere varled, however-. some comlng from
rleh, m1dd1e class as well as the very poorest
fam1lles. Few made thelr fortunes, and those who
d1d not, vlslted thelr rulnatlon on thelr wlves and
chlldren - as well as themselves. And occaslonally'
when every other vestlge of pnoperty and honour had
been strlpped away by a run of exceptlonaLLy bad
luck an En6J.1sh wlfe could flnd her self the stake
for p1ay. Stelnrnetz asserts tbat thene was a
Ibld., at p.I.
Llves of the Gamesters
Games and Gamesters of
(f7f4), reprlnted ln
the Restoratlon.
5.
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tradltlon of such stakes havlng been latd and lost
1n England.? And 1n support of h1s cLalm he alludes
to a remarkable case on record as havlng occurred
1n 1655 durlng the Plague of London. s Ttre story
1s too good to pass by. In that year Captaln
Dlsbrowe of the Klngts body-guard lost a conslderable
sum of money to ta notorlous debauchee, a gambler
and a bul1y, named Slr Paul Paravlelnr. When
Dlsbrowe had exhausted h1s resources Paravlcln
alluded to Dtsbrowef s wlfe and explalned, t'f
mentloned your w1fe, Captaln Dlsbrowe" not wlth
any lntentlon of glvlng you offence, but to show
you that, although you have lost your money, nou
have stlII a valuable stake left.rte The key to
the Captalnrs wlfets abode was produced and thrown
on the table, the Knlght hazardlng al1 h1s wlnnlngs
agalnst the foollsh soldlerrs dlsgraceful pledge.
When the dlee stopped ro}I1ng Dlsbrowe had lost all.
But on Paravlcln caIllng upon the formerrs wlfe to
collect he found her touched by the plague, So
a duel settled the debt and the Captalnts l1fe;
but whllst hls wlfers honour surr;lved the game
she too lost her 1lfe to the plague.
Durlng the elghteenth century gamlng took on
an alr of respectablltty 1n and around London wlth
the emergence of a number of tGentlements
7. Andrew Stelrunetz, The Gamlng Table (1E70)
Vo1,1o p.45.
Ib1d.
Ibld., at p,46.
8.
9.
C1ubs' . ro
[1. oe ]
But as Stelnmetz reveals ln hls wnltlngs
of the 'golngs onf ln these places, they were
responslbLe for the rape of many a noble fortune.
In Brooke's Club 1n St.Jamesrs Street the Lowest
stake was $50 .' a conslderable sum at that tlne
and a young gentlenan eould conrmonly expeet to wln
or lose €101000 durlng an evenlngrs play. Whlters
CIub was famous for both garnlng and bettlng. Lord
Lyttleton, wrltlng to Dn. Doddrldge 1n 1750 sald
of Whlters r
riThe Dryads of Hog1ey are at present pnetty
secure, but I tremble to thlnk that the
rattllng of a dlce-box at Whltefs may one
day or other (tf my son should be a member
of that noble academy) shake down all ounflne oaks. It ls dreadful to see, not
only thene, but almost ln every house ln
town, what devastatlons are nade by thatdestructlve fury, the splrlt of plly.ttll
But Whlters fame, oF perhaps lts lnfamy, arose also
from a record of the blzarre bets made there.
Llterally everythlng was nade the subject of a bet
and occaslonally to the detnlnent of the subJect.
Such bets became legends. For example one clay a
man collapsed at the door of l.,lhlte I s establlshment
and on h1s belng caruled 1ns1de odds wene lmmedlately
offered 
- 
was he dead or not? And when some humane
10. Dlscussed by Stelnmetz, note 7, Vo1.II, Chapter VI;Whlters and Brookers were the most fanous of the
18th century clubs, whllst Crockfordts, establlshed
1n 1827 was the most famous of them all. See also
Ashton, note 1, Chapter VI.
11. Quoted ln Stelnrnetz, Lbld., at p.L81.
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bystander proposed to bleed the poor unfortunate,
he was over-ruled beeause to do so would destroy
Ithe falrness of the bet | . The fate of the vlctlm
1s not known. But 1n a silnllar lncldent an
unfortunate walter ln a ldestrnlnster tavenn who
collapsed 1n a f1t wh1lst servlng some tyoung men
of dlstlnctlonr was denled rnedlcal asslstance:
rf.. 
. slnce, by the tenor of the bets, h€
r^Ias to be rleft to hlmself I and he dled
aeeordingly. 
" 
lt
And even murdet. was legltlrnlsed by a wager. In
1744 a I'ihlters member bet 81500 that a man
coul,d llve 12 hours under water. IIe then hlred
a rdesperate fellow' ancl sunk htm 1n a shlp by way
of experlment. l{elther the shlp nor the man re..
appeared" but undetemed the better was to find
another man and sh1p, and try agaln. 13
From all aecounts bettlng vras as rulnous 1n
EnglanC as gamlng. Durln,g the relgn of Ellzabeth
f horse-raclng flourlshed and 1s sald to have been
earrled to such an excess that nany of the nob111t.y
were rulned. th Charles II gave plates each
valued at 100 gns durlng h1s re1gn, and gave
12. These two lnstaneed are recorded by Stelnmetz,1bld.. at pp.182-183.
13. rb1d.
1l{. The hlstory of raclng ln England has beentraced 1n a two volume work by James Rlee,illstory of the Brltlsh Turf (1829). See-alsoStelnmetz anrl Cotton, supra, and John Ashton,The Hlstory of Gambllng 1n England (1898).
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conslderable encouragement to the spont 
- as he
dld to all fonms of garnbllng. Durlng the
elghteenth century bettlng on races was extremely
heavy. Lord Foley 1s sald to have Lost an estate
of 81,800 a year. and €1001000 ln ready noney at
Newnanket, Ascot and Epson, and Char.les Jamee
Fox, whose gamlng explolts are legend, squandered
a number of fortunes there. 15 The extnavaganee of
h1s bettlng ls demonstnated by two of the many
examples clted by Stelnmetz. At a Newmarket
meetlng Ln L772 he won t15,000 whllst on the
same course at a meetlng ln 1789 lre non not Less
than t50,000. And I'ox was rulned by h1s bettlng
and gamlng? So conslstent was hls lndebtedness
to the rJew money-Ienderst h1s backroom was
known as, and eaLled by hLm, h1s rJerusalem
Chamber t . 16
15. Anecdotes of Foxrg career on the eour.ees and atthe gamlng tablee are detalled by Stelnmetz,
note 7, at p.307 ff. and Vo1.2, p.355 ff.
16. Ibld., VoI. I at p.309.
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The Act of Charles II (16 car.If, e.7 (1664)).
\,olhereas wagerlng was generally lawful ln England
prlor to the 19th century rl playlng at Earnes dld not
enJoy the sane status under the law. The effect of
a successlon of statutes fron the relgn of Rlchard
fIzwas to rencler most garnlng (even of sk11l) unlawful;
whether frorn the descrlptlon of the gane,3 or the
clrcumstancesb or plaees5 tn wh1ch, or the pensonsG
by whom, the ganes were played. Butu as demon'-
strated 1n the prevlous paragraph, that dld not
restraln the gambllng lnstlncts of Engllshrnen.
I.
2,
But as later para.qraphs w111 show not all
vtagers were enforceable.
The statute 12 Rlch.II, c.6 (13E8). It did
not speclflcally Ceelare garnlng unlawful but
rather dlrected that servants and Labourers
r{epe to i'have bows and arrows and use the Bane
on Sundays and holldays and leave off all plays
of tennls or football and other games ca1led
colts , dlce, castlng of the stone, ka1ls and
other such lmportune games. "
3. For example(1738), 13
c .34, s .1.
the statutes 12 Geo.II, c.28, s.2-Geo.II, e.19, s,9 (1739),18 Geo.I1,(1744 ) .
4. For examole the statutes of 16 Car.fl, c.7, ss.2
and 3 (16511), 9 Anne, c.14, s.5 (1710).
For example the statutes 33 iien.VIII , c.9, ss.11, 12 (15I{1), 18 Geo.Ir, c.34, s.L (1744).
F'or example the statutes JJ Iien.VIII , c.9,s.16 (1541), g Anne, c.14, s.5 (1710),2t Geo.IIu c.36, s.8 (L756),
5.
6.
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Gambllng was so excesslve 1n 1561t that Charles II,7
an lnveterate gambler hlmself, was moved to enact
leglslatlon to deal wlth the rulnous conse.quences of
excesslve gamb11ng.
That legls1atlon, the statute 16 Car.If" e.7
(1664) was lntltuled "An Act agalnst deceltful,
dlsorderly, and excesslve gamlng'r, anC 1ts purpose
arrd the clrcumstances givlng rlse to 1t are clearly
revealed ln the preamble, whlch reads:
''hthereas all lawful gane,s and exerclses
should not be otherwlse used" than as
lnnocent and moderate recreatlons, and
not as eonstant trades or ea1Ilngs to
-ealn a l1vlng, of, nake unlawful advantagethereby: (2) and whereas by the lmmoder-
ate use of them, many rnlschlefs and
lnconvenlenees do ar1se, and are dal1yfound, to the nalntalnlns and eneouraglng
of sundry 1dle. loose and dlsorderlypersons ln thelr dlshonest, levrd anddlssolute course of llfe, and to the
elrcumventlng, decelvlng, eouzenlng and
debaucirlng of many of the younger sort,
both of the noblltty and gentry, and othersto the loss of thelr preclous tlme, and
7. The followlng extract from the dlary of JohnEvelyn dated 6.1.L662 ls quoted by C.H. Hartnan
1n hls lntroductlon to Games and Gamesters of
the Restoratlon at p.X.
?'Thls evenlng, aceordlng to custorn, H1s
MaJesty opened the revells of that nlght by
throwlng the dlee hlnself ln the prlvy
ehamber, whene was a table set on purpose,
and lost hts S100. (Tne year before he won
eI,500). The lad1es also played very deep.I cane ar{ay when the Duke of Ormond had won
e1,000 and Left h1m stlLl at passage, cards
and etc. At other tabLes, both there and
at ye Groom-porterrs, observlng the wlckedfolly and monstrous exeess of passlon amonEst
some losers' sorry I am that such a wretched
custom as play to that excess should be
countenanced 1n a Court whlch ought to be an
exarnple of vlrtue to the rest of the Klngdon.''
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"the utter ruln of thelr estates andfortunes, and wlthdrawlng them from noble
and laudable employment and exerctses.tt
As the preamble sug4ests, thls Aet was almed at
both dlshonest and excesslve ganbL1ng. And, trt
relatlon to the latter, the provlslons reveal a
concern by the leglslature for the rulnous practlce
of commltt1n6.. by way of mortgas€, onef s estate and
future lncome to the throw of a dlce onee a playerrs
ready money had run out. To rectlfy thls s.3 was
enacted "... for the better avoldlng and preventlng
of all excesslve and lmrnoderate playlng and garnlnpg
fon the tlme to come". That sectlon provlded,
lnter al1a, that where any player of a game, oF any
better on the sldes or hancls of those playlng:
'r,.. shall lose any sum or sums of money,
or ot?rer thlne or things so played for,
exceedlng the sum of one hundred pounds
at any one tlme or meetlng, upon tlcket
or credlt, or otherwlse, and shal1 notpay down the sane at the tlne when he or
they shal1 so lose the same, the party
and partles who loseth or shall lose the
sald monles. or other thlng or thlngs soplayed or to be played for, above the sald
sum of one hundred pounds, sha11 not 1nthat ease be bound or compelled or compell-
able to pay or make good the same. rl
And by subsectlon (3) of s.3 1t was further
provlded:
rrbut the contract and contractg for the
same, and for every part thereof, and all
and slngular Judgnents, statutes, recog-
nlzances, mortgag€s, conveyances, assurances,
bonds, bl1ls, speclaltles, promlsses,
covenants, agreements and other acts, deeds
and securltles whatsoever, whlch shall be
obtalned, made, glven, aeknowledged or
entered lnto for securlty or satlsfactlon
of or for the same or any part thereof,
shall be utterly vold and of none effect. rf
t1. 03 l
Sectlon 3 of the 1654 Act came under Judlclal
scrutlny Ln a number of cases tn the years
lmmedlately followlng 1ts enaetment ancl the 1ncl1n-
atlon of the Judqes, &s revealed ln the reports,
was to eonstrue 1t I1bera11y 1n favour of the
suppresslon of exeesslve gambllng. fn Edgebury v.
Roslndales the defendant and Fla1nt1ff ran thelr
horses agalnst eaeh other for 9100 and agreed to
run agalrr for f200 a few cays later. on an actlon
belng brought by the plalntlff ilre Court held that
the eontract was for more than i-1100 on ?ltj-ek or
ered1t", and sald:
';;',:3"" i'3::::, l;:"E"fiiffi ,'3nlilo;:' "construed 1n ilre most extenslve mannerthat can be to answer to that end.r'e
And, slmllarly 1n Liudson V. l4a11nrl0 a case where
one played, one betted on the slde and another lost
to both g1v1ng each bonds for 990 a plece, both
bonds were held vold under the statute although glven
to several persons, and although ln respect to a
game wlth one and a bet wlth another. fhe neason
for the declslon belng that:
8. (16731, 2 Lev.94.
9. Ibld., at p.94. Slm1lar.1y 1n Danvers v.@ (1569), I L6v.24TTFe-ciefendanr
won a watch and tI00 1n a match. [Ie aceeptedthe watch, and a-tlcket for the money, ln'paynent. The 1d64 Act was held to liply.
10. (L676), 1 Fneen.432.
"... the Judges
as extenslvely
of gamln*. ti tl
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wLll construe thls statute
as may be for suppresslng
But ln H111 v. Pheasantr2 whllst the clrcumstances
were slmlLar to those 1n Edgebury v. Roslndale the
Judges were unable to reach agreement. The
defendant lost 980 to the plalntlff at gamlng at
one slttlng and gave a bond 1n that amount. He
also agreed to meet and play agaln two days ln the
future. At that meetlng he lost a further €,60.
Ihe lssue was whether the bond was avolded by the
statute. Wlnham and Atklns JJ. were of the vlew
that the Act applled there belng a ".., fraud
apparent to elude the statuteil.rs North C.J. and
Ell1s J. were, however, of a contrary vlew and
dlstlngulshed E9gebury v. Roslndale as a case
where €100 plus another race for e200 on rrtlek
or credltt'was the amount lost by the defendanb.
In H111 v. Pheasant on the other hand, ?t most only
880 plus another meettng to play was lnvolved, the
truo amounts belng lost at two slttlngs.
Wh1lst these cases demonstrate that the Courts
were prepared to adopt a constructlon of the
statute that was partlcularly favourable to the
reallsatlon of the leglsLatlve lntent ag
11, fb1d., at p.432. The prlnclple ln Hudson v.
Malln was -apprfeO ln Nbell v. Reynolilf58O),
Tffi'w.185,- Lut cf . sffipe 
";-ffifffi-( 1697 ) , 
-
5 Mod.351.
12. (L675), I Fneem,200.
13. Ibld., at p.200.
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revealed 1n the preamble 
-lt 1t was too narrow 1n lts
scope to achleve lts declared obJect of suppresslng
'rexcesslve gamlng?r. A prlnclpal deflclency 1n thls
regar,d was the fallure of the Leglslator to reaLlse
that fortunes are reratlve one to the other and where-
as a loss of tL00 to one man may prove to be exeesslve,
to anothen lt may not. rs Indeed, a poor man mlght
gamble away hls whole estate on ittlek or credlttl
wlthout reachlng the fl100 l1mlt. A1so, the 11m1t-
atlon of the appllcatlon of the Act to bettlng or
gamlng on "tlck or credlttt was partlcularLy unfort-
unate as the shameful case of Flrebrasse v. Brett16
clearly demonstrates. Slr Baz1l Flrebrasse rtfe1l
lnto play?r wlth the defendant and Slr l.Illllam Russell
after a dlnner at hls home and lost to then g90O 1n
ready money, whlch the defendant Brett, sueceeded ln
taklng away wlth h1m. S1r Bazll, belng somewhat
lnflamed wlth w1ne, then brought down a bag of
gulneas contalnlng about C1,500. Brett won that
also, and had 1t 1n hls possesslon when lt was selzed
from h1m by Slr Bazll and h1s servants as he was
Ieavlng. S1r Bazll brought an lnformatlon agalnst
Brett for playlng wlth false dlce but Brett was
acqultted. He then brought an actlon 1n trespass
agalnst Brett and prayed for rel1ef agalnst the debt.
14. In Pgpe v. St.Legen (1691{), Carth,3ZZ however,the Count was noF prepared to apply the Aet wherethe plalntlffrs cla1n related to a sum of money
won on a wager as to the rules of backgammon.
The statute touched onl_y the chance of play,
not the rules of play.
15. Seleet Comrnlttee on Gamlng Report, 20th May 1844,p.V, where thls llnltatlon ln the Act 1sdlscussed.
16. (16871, 1 vern.489.
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But the Court, whllst expnesslng strong dlsappnoval
of sueh excesslve gamlng, found no grounds for declar-
1ng tl:e play unlawful.
But perhaps the most substantlal flaw 1n th1s,
and subsequent gamlng statutes, was thelr fallure to
recognlse the force of "honour'r ln the lives of
gentlemen 
- and the lack of lt 1n the 1lves of those
who, l1ke vultureso hovered over the fortunes of the
former .- with dlce 1n hand. Seetlon 3 of the Act
of 1664 contalned a provlslon that the wlnner of any
amount wlthln the statute should forfelt treble the
value thereof, one molety golng to the K1ng, the
other to the lnformer. But as Blackstone observed,
wlth reference to thls provlsion:
t'Yet lt ls proper. thaL laws should be, and
be knotrrn pub]lcly, that gentiemen may
conslder what penalties they wllfu11y 1ncur,
and what a eonfldence they repose 1n
sharpersi lvho, 1f successful ln p1ay, are
certaln to be pald wlth honour, oF, lf
unsuccessful, ha';e L'6 1n thelr power to be
st111 grea'r;er gal.ners by lnformlng.ttlT
Thls so called Ihonoul'r ;ras apparently an extrenely
strong force 1n the Llves of n-lny garnblers . Tacltus,
wrltlng of the anelent [ierman; and the extent to
whlch they were bewltehed, vrlth the sp1r1t of gambllng
sald:
f'They addlct thcmselves, to dlce (whlch 1s
wonderful) when sober, and as a serlous
employment; wLth such a mad deslr"e of
wlnnlng or Ioslng, that, when strlpt of
everythlng e1-se, they w111 stake at lastthelr llberty and thelr very selves. The
L7. Commentarles, Book IV, p.172.
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'rloser goes lnto a voluntary slavery, and
though younger and stron.qer than hls
antagonlst, suffers hlmself to be bound
and so1d. And thls perseverance ln so
bad a cause they call the polnt of honour:
ea est 1n re prava pervlcacla, 1ps1
Alludlng to thls Elackstone cynlcally suggested:
"One would almost be tempted to thlnkTacltus was descrlblnq a modern
Ensllshmant'le
Andrew Stelnmetz tefers to some amuslng anecdotes
1n the llfe of Charles Janes Fox, wh1ch, beneath
the humour, convey at least an funpresslon
part that honour was expected to play 1n
affalrs:
of the
a gamblerfs
rr...Fox had a gambllng debt to pay to S1r
John S1ade. Flndlng hlmself 1n cash, after
a lucky run at Faro, h€ sent a compllmentary
card to the Knlght, deslrlng to dlscharge
the clalm. Slr John no sooner saw the
money than he ealled for pen and 1nk, and
began to flgure. tidhat now?r crled Fox.
t Only calculatlng the lnterest, I replled
the other. rAre you so?r coolly reJolned
Charles James, and pocketed the cash,
addlng - tI thought 1t was a debt of honour.As you seem to conslder 1t a tradlng debt'
and as I make lt an lnvarlable rule to pay
my Jew-credltors 1ast, Vou must walt aI1tt1e longen for your money. I !.. 0n
another oceaslon he won about [E000i and
one of h1s bond-credltors, who soon heard
of h1s good luck, presented hlmself and
asked for payment. rImposslble, 81rrl
replled Fox; fI must flrst dlscharge my
lB. De !tor. Germ.
Commentarles,
19. rb1d.
c.24; clted 1n Blackstone,
Book IV, p,L72.
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t'debts of honour. I lhe bond-cnedltor
remonstrated, and flndlng Fox lnflexlblet
tore the bond to pleces and flung 1t lnto
the f1re, exclalmlng 
- 
tNow, s1r, your debt
to me 1s a debt of honour. r Struck by the
credltor's @, Fox lnstantlypald the money . t''o
Ttrls ldea of a gamlng debt as a rdebt of honour'
was hardly calculated to ensure the attalnnent of
the obJectlves of the Act of Charles II, Indeed,
ln the absence of provlslons creatlng speclflc
penal offences of excesslve gamlng, &D element of
rdishonourr was lnherent ln any resort to or use
of the shleld provlded by the Act.
The Act of Anne (9 Anne, c,14 (1710)).
[he fallure of the 1554 Act to slgnlflcantly
suppress gamlng was recognlsed 1n the preamble to
the Act whleh followed 1t, namely the statute 9
Anne, c.14 (1710), entltled rrAn Act for the better
preventlng excesslve ancl deceltful gamlng. " l The
preambl-e read:
"tWhereas the lavrs now 1n force for preventlng
the mlschlefs whlch may happen by gamlng'
hath not been found sufflclent for thatpurpose; therefore for the further preventlng
of all excesslve and d.eceltful ganlng, b€ 1t
enacted...tt etc.
20 . ftre Gaming Table, Vo1.l at p . 320-321.
L. Interestlngly enough lt was found necessary toprovlde, by s.9 of the Act, that 1t should not
extend to prevent gamlng 1n any of the Queenrspalaces durlng her resldence there.
Thls Aet took a much
gamlng than d1d the 1564
supplemented rather than
1eg1slatlon. 2 Tbe flrst
lnter a11a, that
[1.04 ]
more rlgorous stand agalnst
Act and, 1n so do1ng, 1t
replaced tbe earller
sectlon of the Act Provlde"^,
t'... all notes, b111s, bonds, Judgments'
mortgages, or other seeurltles or convey-
ances whatsoever, glven gnanted, drawn, of
entered 1nto, ot executed by any person
or persons whatsoever, where the whole or
any part of the conslderatlon of such
conveyances or securltles, sha11 be for
any money or other valuable tnlng whatso*
ever, won by gamlng or playlng at cards,dlce, tables, tennls, bow1s, or other game
or games whatsoever, or by bettlng on the
slcles or hands of such as do game at any of
the games at'oresald, or for the relmburslnf-r
or repaylng any money knowlngly lent, or
ad.vanced for such gamlng or bettlngt
aforesald, or lent or advaneed at the tlme
and place of such p1ay, to any person orpersons so garnlng or bettlng, as aforesald'br that shall, durlng such play, so play
or bet, shalI be utterly vold, frustr?te,
and of none effect, to all lntents and
purposes whatsoever; any statute, law,
or usage to the contrary thereof ln any
wlse notwlthstandlng. . .rr
The terms of the Act, ln relatlon to the nature
of the games to whlch 1t applled were, Ilke 1ts
preeursor, comprehenslver 3 and lt applled to games
of sk111 and chance allke. It appI1ed, for
2.
3.
It d1d not expressly repeal the statute 16 Car.II, c,7s but tlearly superseded the secunltlespr6vlslons. See Howard A. Street, The Law ofbart"e-(igEZl, p.379, note f, and at p.380.
Per Lord Ablnger C.B. 1n Dalntre-q v. Hutchlnson
?ib42j, -rii-t{. "a-',,r. 8l ; sleffireuu-GFr9"Il_-
3 Stark 1.
Ir. o+ 3
example, to a dog courslng matchrb crlcketrs horse
raelngr6 and foot races.T But 1n relatlon to money
lent or advanced for bettlng or gamlng the sectlon,
wh1Ist avoldlng ihe securlty, left open the
funportant questlon as to the status of the contract
of loan. In Youn€! v. Mooresthe vlew that found
favour wlth the Court was that:
!r. 
. . as the statute hath made all
securlbles for money won at play vo1d,
a'fortlorl all panol contracts of thls
sort are vold; and 1f the money had
been pald to the platntlff, the defend-
ant, or any other person, mlght have
recovered treble the sum and costs, sothat thls cannot posslbly be a debt..."'
In BarJeau v. Walmsley|0 however, an actlon brought
by the plalntlff to reeover 120 gulneas he had
4.
5.
Dalntree v. Hutchlnson 1bld.
Walpole v. Saunders (18q5),
.Iffi".@(1248), 7 D. & R. 130;1 i{1ls , 220.
6. Goodburn v. Marley. 2 Str.1159i Hyams v.ffi1ne IT9'D'8-T z K.B.696, 7of
Parker v. ALcock (f8311, 1 You. 361.
(L757), 2 WlIs.67; and supported 1n
M'Klnn611 v. Roblnson (rB3B)' 3 M. & 
'nl' 4slt'
7.
B.
9, Ib1d., at p.67-8.
10. (1746), 2 Str,L2U9. S1rn1larly ln Alclnbrook
v. H411 ( f 765; , 2 l^Ills .309; M'Ailester v.
naa6-(1800 ), 2 C?*p. 438 ; noEfrs'6ffiIaqg(1760), 
_t w.nr.a34; v,rettennffitlood@3),1 Esp.IB.
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lent to the defendant to enable blm to contlnue
1n a game of ! gulnea a tlme toss succeeded, the
Count belng of the vlew that:
". . . thls was not a case wlthln the Act,for there 1s not the word contract, &s ln
the Statute of Usuny: and the word
securltles, as lt stands 1n thls Act,
must mean lastlng l1ens upon the estate.
The Parltament mlght thlnk there would
be no great harm ln a parol contract,
where the credlt was not 11ke to run veryhlgh; and therefore conflned the Act tolvrltten se eurltles . it u
Thls confllet 1n the cases caused a deal of
uncertalntyl2 as to the scope of the provlslon and
although the welght of authorlty favoured the vlel
ln BarJeau v. Walmsley a furthen Act 1n 1835t3
and a dectslon of the Court of Exchequer, Apple-
garth v. Colleyr{ ln }Bll2, subsequently slvung the
welght of Judlclal oplnlon ln favour of the vlew
expressed 1n Young v. Moore.
11. Ibld., at p.1249.
12. Per Rolfe B. 1n Applegarth v. Colley (1842),
10 t{. & Id. 723, ffi-
13. The statute 5 & 6 W1lL.IV, c.4t, s.1. (Tne
Gamlng Act, 1835). It repealed so much of
the Acts of 1664 and 1710 as made the rrnote,
b111r or mortgage ... absolutely voldt' andprovlded lnstead that they trshould be deemed
and taken to have been made, drawn, accepted,g1ven, oF executed for an 111ega1 conslden-
atlon, rl
14. Note 12; approved 1n Moulls v. owen [1907]1 K.B.T46; - -Saxby v. F[fE6n-t19091T K.B:20E:garlt_qn H t\e??) 
-_-2 K.8. 15 3, but cf .2 Q.8.63 , 79 .
e--. r. Lfrl.lilIiard t1955 l
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However, the Court 1n BarJeau v. Wa1rnsley
could be exeused for bel1ev1ng that trltten secur-
1t1es encumberlng estates were the prlnelpal concern
of thls leglslatlon for the flrst sectlon also
provlded:
ti. 
. . that where such mortgages, securltles,
or other conveyances, shalL be of lands,
tenements, or heredltaments, oF shall be
such as encumber or affect the same, such
mortgages, securltles or other conveyanees 
'shall enure and be to and for the sole use
and beneflt of, and shal1 devolve upon suchperson or persons as should or nflght have,
or be entltled to such 1ands, tenements,
or heredltaments, 1lr case the sald grantor
or grantors thereof, or the person orpersons so encumberlng the same, had been
naturally dead, and as 1f such morfgages,
securltles, or other conveyances, had been
made to such per:son or persons so to be
entltled a.fter the decease of the person
or persons so encumberlng the same; . . . "
The purpose of thls provlslon was, of course, to
provlde pnotectlon fon helrs-at-Iaw and next-of-k1n
whose suceesslon was Jeopardlsed by an lneumbents
r:false sense of honourrr, But lt also sever"ely
penallsed wlnners or lenders who took such Eecur-
1tles, 1n complete dlsregard of the expectatlons
of those ent1tled. fhe severlty of thls penalty
and the nature of the evl1 the provlslon sought to
combat ls well lllustrated by the elrcumstances and
the declslon ln the case of Parlcer v. Alcock & Others
declded 1n 1831. t5 Parker, lD September 1824 engaged
to run a foot race agalnst one Metcalfe, for one
m1le, for tI000, belng 8500 a slde. Parken d1d
not have the money but persuaded two others to
15. (1831), You. 361.
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provlde the necessary flnanc1al backlng. He also
managed to persuade them, lrt thelr own names, and
on behalf of thenselves and Parker, to place bets
on the race 1n London' These amounted to S4r37t.
The race was runr and Parker lost' wlth the conse-
quence that he and hls backers became llable to oay
an amount of nearlv [5000. On the day the race
was run, Parker executed to h1s backers a Conveyance
by way of mortgage for securlng to them the paynent
by hlrn of 92000 and lnterest. The conveyance was
made ln case they should 1ay slde bets on the race
on Pankerts account to thab amount. There was a
further race 1n whlch Parker made some galns, but
he was lndebted to dlvers other persons 1n large
sums of nonles qulte apart from the 11ab11lty he
lncurred for the staice and bets on the footrace,
anC the followlnE year he resolved to rneet h1s
l1abll1t1es by enterlng lnto an arrangement vrlth
h1s two backers, The arrangement lrras that they
should oay Parker the sun of f3000 and that he
should, 1n conslderatlon of that amount and the
balance of the account respectlng the footraces o
convey h1s lnterest 1n hls estates to them. Thls
he dld 1n August 1E25. However' ln 1831 the
lnfant, and eldest soil of Parker, f1led an equlby
8111 1n the Court of Exchequer statlng, lnter a1la,
that by vlrtue of the staiute 9 Anne e.14:
t'tire 
. . . nor'tgage and the conveyance r upon
the executlon-thereof, enured to and for the
use and beneflt of , and devolved upon "'.
lfrfm] i and that he was entltled to thebeneflt of the same mortgage, and the sum
of €,2000 and lnterest thereby secured, lD
the same manner as 1f the mortgage had been
made to hlm ..."16
16. Ibld., at p.365"
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The defendants put Ln a genenal demurer rrfor want
of equltytr but Lord Lyndhurst L.C'8. heldn lnter
al1a, that not only were the montgage and the
conveyance w1th1n the words of the Act but also
that the pla1nt1ff was entltled to an account of
rents and proflts of the estabe ln addltlon to a
declaratton of h1s rlqhts.lT The demurrer ivas
dlsnlssed.
If the 1aw reports can be relled upon as any
gulde, lt would seen that the Statute of Anne was
only lnfrequently lnvoked although the wrltlngs of
Ashton, Blackstone, Cotton and otherstB suggest that
the practlce of encumberlng estates to satlsfy
gambllng debts was both frequent and rulnous. The
provlslon was subsequently repealed, wlthout
explanationrte ln 1835r4 but 1ts d.emlse may well
]-7, The lnterest was an estate 1n fee s1mple. The
lssue as to whether the nortgagee was entltled
to the return of the 92000 advanced for bettlng
was not resolved, Lord Lyndhurst L.C.B. holdlng
that lt rvas not necessary that an offer to repay
the amount should appear on the face of the
b111, although ltthe Court may decree 1n that
resp6ct what 1t slraII tl:lnk proper.'r (Ib1d.,
at P.371) '
18. Supra, para.l-02; partleularly see Blackstone
who complalned 1n h1s tlme that "... 1t ls the
gamlng 1n hlgb l1fe, that demands the attentlon
of the llaglstrate; a passlon to whlch every
valuable conslderatlon ls made a sacrlflce ...tt
Cornmentarles, Book IV, p.171! and Street, note 2,
suggests at p.386 that 'r. . .mortgages werefrequently glven as security for gamlng debts. "
19. The 1835 Act appears to have been passed wlthout
debate and the proceedlngs ln Comnlttee are not
on reeord; see note 20,
20. By the statute 5 & 6 W111.IV, c.4tr s.3(Ttre Gamlng Act, 1835),
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have been due to a reallsatton by the leglslature
that blood 1s lndeed thlcker than water, tti that the
rifalse sense of honour'? that caused the parents ruln,
probably also persuaded the expectant ch1ld that
fam1ly honour and poverty were worthler obJects than
the protectlon afforded h1m by the Acf'
The 11-rn1ts of the flrst section of the Act of
1710 ln relablon to securltles for loans for bets
were recognlsed 1n In re tttt"*, 
"x 
p"otu Pyk""
where 1t was held that there was no obJectlon to
Ioans to pay debts whlch had already been made and
lost. The object of the provlslon was to dlscourage
Ioans for bettlng ancl once the rnlsehlef was done, the
bet havlng been rnade and the money lost, a loan to
the loser to enable h1m to pay was an enforceable
debt. Thus, could honour be preserved and perhaps
the splrlt of the Act avolded. z
In relatlon to securlties for money or valuable
thlngs won at play or by wagers on games the 1710 Act
v1rtua1Iy superseded that of 1554. And, the deflc'-
lency ln the earller Act that had left the poor
exposedzs was renedled by provldlng that all such
securttles etc. trere vold, regardless of thelr va1ue.&
2L. (1878), B Ch.D. 75\.
22. In In re Llster, ex parte Pyke Hessel M.R.pre structlont' because
tt was a penal statute. fb1d., at p.757,
23. By the S,100 I1mlt, whlch effectlvely conflned theprotectlon afforded by the Act to the r'1ch and
mlddle class.
24. s .1.
But certalnly the most
provldeo by s,2 of the
al1a, that:
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effectlve protectlon was
Act whlch provlded, lnter
"any person or persons lvhatsoever, who shallat any tlme or slttlng, bY playlng at cards,dlce, tables, or other game or games what-
soever, op b.y bettlng on the sldes or hands
of such as do play at any of the games
aforesald, lose to any one or more person
or persons so playlng or bettlng, 1n the
the whole, the sum or value of ten pounds,
and shaIl pay or dellver the same, or anypart thereof, the person or persons so
1os1ng, and paylng or dellverlng the same,
shall be at llberty, w1th1n three months
then next, to sue for and recover the
money or goods so lost, and pald ordellvered, or any oart thereof, wlth
costs of sult .. .tt
Thls provlslon, r^rh1lst not speclflcally
deelarlng bets or games for amounts of f,10 or more
llIegal, effectlvely pnevented aetlons to recover
w1nn1ngs. 0r as Hovlard A. Street suggests, lt
??had the practleal effeet of maklng such clalms
uselesr.tt25 And, 1f a loser was not mlndful to
recover hls losses wlthln the stlpu]ated tlme the
wlnner was sbl11 at rlsk because by the same seetion
lt was also provlded that ln such a ease:
". . . 1t shall- and rnay be lawful to and for
any per$on or persons, by . . . aetlon or
sult to sue for and reeover the same,
and treble the value thereof, wlth costs
of sult agalnst such wlnner or wlnnet:s. . . t'
By s.5 of the same Act 1t was further provided
that a person wlnnlng more than 910 at any tlme or
slttlng should be I1abIe on convlctlon on lndlctment
25. See note 2, at p.369.
or by lnformatlon to forfelt
of the sum or sums of money,
won.,.n
[]-. r:t.1
nflve tlmes the value
or other thlng so
It vras these provlslons that pronpted the aetlon
ln Smlth v. i&n!,* a case whlch ultlnatety ereated
pressure for a Select Commlttee on Garnlng 1n 1844. 27
ilowever, 1n splte of these apparently strlngent
provlslons 1t was not clear whether the 1710 Act
barned the recovery of wlnnlngs exceedlng 010 but
not exceedlng 9100 t'rhere the loser had not pald clonn
hls money at the tlme. If the money had not been
pald down and lt exceeded C100 at one tlme or slttlng
s.1. of the statute f6 Car.II, c,9 rendered the
wlnnlngs lrrecoverable, If, on the other hand the
money was pald down 1t eould be recovered by the
loser wlth treble the value thereof under s.2 of
the statute of Anne. But there was sonethlng of
a Lacuna ln the leglslatlon because 1t Cld not
speelflcally deal wlth the half-way house sltuatlon
where the money was nelther pald down at the tlme
nor a securlty glven 1n respect of tt. And, thls
lssue lilas an lmportant one because lf between fl10
and eL00 1n wlnnlngs at one tlme could be recovered
by actlon a gamester could effectlvely frustrate the
purpose of the leglslatlon. That 1s, by taklng
nelther the money nor a securlty and glvtng credlt
on the understandlng that the money won was to be
pald at some tlme 1n the future. Thls dl}eruna
was to glve rlse to a confllct ln Judlclal op1n1on.
25, See post, Chaptet 2.
27. rbld.
It.rt4i
rn Brlstow v. Janesm bne rlqht bo reeover hras preferred.,
the court holding that s .2 of ilre lT10 Act merely 6:ave a
statutory rlght to recover whlch dll. not rencler tire actlon
on the gamlng contract ex r1el1ctg. ^ior*ever ln Dalntree
v. liutchlnson8 and rhorpe v. colenan30 tne contrary vle'l
found favour. rn the forner case Loz''j Ablnger rerd tirat
an agreement to pay r-100 on the result of (or default 1n)
a courslng mateh .,,las not recoverable because:
''... Tre very obJeet of the contract r,,,as tcl r.r.akethe defendant pa'/ tirat bet wnlc,:, belng f or a
sum of above r,.-,JO , the Act Lntenried to cro:r1blt,
and consequentJ_;7 rendered 11lega1. T'hat beLnqso, 1t ls a contr.act rrr5lch cannot be
enforeed. ...r"31
-,rlo1fe ts polnteci to.s.5 of the Act of 1710 wllch provl.Cecl
tl:at any person r{ho snall at &ri.rr ens tlme .,r1n more than
i10 vrltirout fraud was llab1e to forfelt flve tlnes the
amount ti:ereof . i^e i,ras of t.:e vlew ttrat thls provlslon
was penal 1n nature anc that, tSerefore . bi:e contract ,r,as
1l1egal and could not be enforcec. 32 Althouqh the vlerr,
1n Dalntree v. iiutchlnsqq 1s preferable the authorlttes
23. (tTgT), T r.R.2sT.
note IC.
29 . irrote 3.
30. (16451, 1 C.B. ggc.
Co11ey, note 12.
3f. Ibld. 
" 
at p.99.
32, Ibld., at p.10C.
Slnnllar1y 1n FarJeau v. galg!.lgf
And see s1n11arly Applegart"h v.
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remaln lneonclus1ve. 33
A further dlfflculty roltn s.2 of the 1Tf0 Act
was 1n deterrnlnlng l',rhether the amount won in contra.
ventlon of the sectlon r,ras i,ron at ,'any tlne or
slttlng''. * Thls requlrement ]raC earllen glven nise
to some uncertalnty after the Act of Charles ff,3s
but 1t was overcome ln pp.rt 1n 17ltq r{hen, bV the
statute 13 Geo.II, c.34 1t:^ras crovlded il:at any
person r,rlnnlnE or loslng at play or bettlng at any
one tlme tire sum or value of i10 or wlti:ln 24 hours
tire sun or value of 120 comrnittec't an o?fence and
was llable to a flne of flve tlmes the value of the
siln so Fron or i,ost.s And, b'/ s.g tf any person offend-
lng agalnst the sectlon "'cilscovered'' any otirer person
so offendlng, he lras entltled to be dlscharged and
lndennlfled frorn all oenaltles. Tnus gar:nlne or
wa,iers wlthln ti:e meanlng of the l|l0 Act trhlch
amounted to or exceedec F.zO ln 24 hours were l}lega1
and unenforceable ruhether at one slttlne or not.37
33. In Appleqalte v. Colley, note LZ" at p.732, F_olfe
.ts vlas of the vlevr ilrat ', . . . t.1e statute of Anne .ln connectlon wlth tne 5 A d ir1ll.Iv, c.4t mustbe talren to avold all contracts for the paymentof money won at pla.y. ,'
34. See, for exampl€, Bones v. Booth (l-TT}) , 2 V.81. 1225 ,
35. !"9, f9f eI?T?le, Eogebry.2 Lev,94. Iltll v. F6Fa-sarff
36. Seetton 8, The Gamlng Act,
v. Roslnda_le ( f 673; ,( 1575-J;TEeem .2oo'.
174It.
37. s.11 of tire statute 16 Geo.II, c.34 legalisedhorse raclng fon plates or prizes of t:50 or
upwands and ilr1s provlslon g;ave rlse to consl_Cer.
able controversy as to whether the Acts of charlesII and Anne_?ppl1ecl to such prlzes) see Street,
note 2. pp. 370 .373.
[1...r5J
[1.05] tne Gamlng Acr, 1635 (5 & 5 ',t111.1\r, c.41 (1835))
The nost dlff1cu1t problen arlslng out of the
Acts of 1664 and 1710 concerned tne status of
securltles avolded by those Acts after tirey had
passed lnto the hands of lnnocent thlrd oartles. At
flrst 1t vtas thought that the lnnocent holder mlght
enforce the securlty. fn Hussey v. Jacob I the
plalntlff sued on a b111 for L21 gns he obtalned ln
satlsfactlon of a debt lncurred b:/ the drawer ln a
game of hazard. The players irad played upon tlck
and credlt wlthout ready money. The defendant
pleaded the Act of Charles II, whllst the plalntlff
argued that 1t would endanger the credlt of b1lls of
exchange to the detrlment of the publ1c trade of
Sngland - both donestlc and forelgn lf they could
be defeated by sucn a collateral natter. But Cirlef
Justlce Holt-. whlIst reJectlng the appIlcab111ty of
that contentlon bo the facts of the partlcular case,
sald:
''. 
. . as to the lnconvenclency concernlngtrade, there can be none ln thls partlcular
case because the b111 ts g:one no furtherthat to the flrst hands, (vLz) to the hands
of the plalntlff Hussey who won the money:
and so no damage ffil-here accrue to anyperson but to h1m who 1s certalnly a person
vrlthln the statute. But 1f thls b111 had been
negotlated and lndonsed to any other personf'or value recelved, then lt rnleht have
another conslcl.eration. t' 2
Judgment nas ascordlngly entered for the defendant.
I. (1696), Canth .356.
fb1d., at p.357.2.
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In tsorcyer v. Bampton,3 however, a dlfferent vlew of the
matter 
'ras taken. The pralntlff lrrought hls actlon on
several promlssory notes glven by the defendant to one
John church for money advaneed by church to the cefend-
ant to enable hirn to game wltn d1ce. Church had
knowledge tnat the money was to be used to that en<l.
3ut when he. Chureh, endorseci ilrem to the plalntlff for
a fu11 and valuable conslderatlon tire pIa1nt1ff was not
prlvy to, and nor d1d he have anv notlce that, the notes
were glven for money lent for the purpose of ga:"nlng.
f!:e eourt was of the vlew that tlrough lb lvas of sorne
inconvenlence to an lnnocent man, s.l of the Act of
Anne prevalred and tnu. b1I1s r{ere vold,b and the state-
ment quoted above by liolt c.J. was excressly referred to
for the purpose of dlssentlng from 1t.s 
_gow.yel v.
Ban1glon settleC the lalv on thls questlon. Securltles
avolded by statute were vold even 1n the hands of
lnnocent tnlrd partles . In 18,35 ilre flrree sectlon
statute 5 & 5 u111.IV, c.41 was passed to remedy the
lnJustice of tnls nlle. That statube provlded that sio
much of the Acts of 1664 and 1710 as avolded any note,
b111 or mortgaEe was repealed, ancl 1t enacted that such
notes,, bllls or mortgages should. lnsteacl, rbe deemed
3.
4.
tr
( 1741 )
rb1d.
2 Str .1155.
The statement of Holt C.J, 1n }lussey v. Jacob 1s
also alluded to by Lord l,lansflATl-fi- LowdTiialler(178I), 2 Dougl .736, 743 where he sald:-t'Ng!r, ds to_ganlng5, the case of Lowyef v. tsampton lsa dlrect and solemn authorlty. ffiFGclslon-:fr-as
after two arguments, and Lee., Chlef Justlce,
observed. that what Lord Holt had sald, ln Hussey
v, Jacob, vras extra-Judle1a1, and that he hffi seen
a report, wi:ere1n notiee was taken, that all thelearned part of the tsar wondered at 1t.'
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and taken to have been made, drawn, accepted, glven, of
executed for an ll1ega1 consid.eratlont. By sectlon 2
of the 1835 Act lt was also provlded that 1f any person
who had nade. drawn, gj-ven, or executed any such note'
b111, oF mortgage, were eonpeLled by any lndorsee'
hoIcler, ot asslgnee, to pay tire aniount of money secured
bylt..hewasdeemedtoiravepaldonaccountofthe
person to whorn the seeurlty was orlglnally glven, and
could recover that amount as a debt uue and. owlng bv
that person to him. It w111 be necessary to return
to thls statute ln a later chapter6ln orcLer to tdentlfv
and explain some problens of lnterpretatlon that arose
after a further Ganlng Act was enacted ln 1t45.7 But
1t 1s convenlent to alluCe at thls polnt 1n a general
$ray to a number of matters that helo ldentlfy the scoce
of, and po11cy behlnd, the 1835 statute.
A curlous lacuna appears 1n the 1835 Act ' For
.,shllst 1t purports to remed.v the lnJustlce to lnnocent
holclers for value of securltles avolded by t|e Aets of
charles II and Anne, 1o fact the only securltles
referred to 1n the Ganlns Act 1835 are btlls '' notes and
mortgages. As Street suggests rq the statute has been
lnterpreted,, and :rnot n'lthout a show of authorlty , 4s
applylng to all the seeuritles embraced by the Act of
Anne . That ls, to b1Ils, notes and mortgages e as :'re11
as "bonds, Judgrnents, or other securltles or
conveyances whatsoever,'.s But the better v1ew, aS
o.
7
X
9.
Post, chapter 7.
The Statute, B & 9 Vlct. ' c.109, Tire Gamlng Act, 1845'
The Law of Garnlng (1937 ) at p.361 '5.
sectlon 1 of the Act of Anne. see also s.3 of the
Aet of Charles II.
Lr'u2.1
Street explalns, 1s that the Act should be eonflned
to 1ts express terms. r0 However the 1835 Act appl-les
only to securltles given 1n clrcumstances wlthln the
Acts of Charles II anC Anne. Thus . whllst seeur'"
ltles glven for debts lncumed 1n gamlng or bets on
ganes are lncluCed, stralght vlagers are not.u And
the Eames embraced by the Aet are those enumerated ln
the Aet of Charles fI.12
The
of 1835
Hyams v.
securlty
the Act
general purpose and effect of s.1 of the Act
was ldentlfled bir Fletcher Moulton L.J. 1n
Stuart K1ngr3 when he salC, speaklng of a
1n the form of a cheque ln that case r that
of IE35 deelared that such securltles:
''. 
. . lnstead of belng vold, should be Ceemedto have been glven for an lIIegaI eonslder -
atlon. Thls amendment of the law lby theAct of 13351 protected lnnocent holders for
value, whlle lt left ttre partles to the
transactlon and any hold.er taltlng such a
cheque wlth notlce of the nature of the
10. The term tblIls' ln
lncLude eheques e see1 K.8.746, qqt@rq
11. Because, lt w111 be recalIed, the Acts of 1664
and 1710 concerned themselves only wlth gamlng
and bets on the sldes of the hands of thoseplaylng.
!2. That ls, those enumerated ln the Act of 1664 ancl1710. Tirey lnclude : cards, d1ce, tables, tennls ,bowles, sklttles, shovel-board, cockflghtlng"
horse races. dog raees, foot races, tt...or other
game or games whatsoever." See VoI.10 HalsburYts
Laws of Eng1and, ( 3ro ed. ) p . 179 , note E' and
Vo1.4 of the 3rd edltlon p.77, note 2.
13. [1908] 2 K.8.596.
the 1835 Act does, however.
e.s. i,Iou11s v. Orven IfgoZ]
v. erress Tf9 221-87 .t.
[].06 J
i'or1g1nal conslderatlon 1n the sameposltlon as thev h.ad been under theltatute of Anne'.'t rh
And s.2 of the Act of
that the amendment to
as Vlscount Blrkenhead
1835 was deslgned to ensure
the laio effected bY s.l was ,
r5
explalned 1n Sutters v. Brlrtgs-:
the rule that
recover from the
hlrn 1n relatlon
Act of Annel."t'
-0... wlthout Preiudlce tothe loser of a bet could
;vlnner the arnount pald bY
thereto [under s.2 of the
[1.c5] Concluslon on the Acts of Charles II (1654) "
Anne (1710). and I'i111"IV (1835)
Tkre early statutes generated a conslderable
volume of l1t1gat1on whleh, unfortunately, too often
add.ed to uncertalnty rather than clarlty 1n the 1al^r.
The easesj as well as the confuslon, are well
14. Ibld,., at p.714: and see the almost ldent1ca1
statement to the same effeet by the same LordJustlce 1n l{ou11s v. Owen" note 10 at p.762' and
Bankes L.J.-ffi-ey v.-EaTo r-\920) 2 K.8.346, 355.
And see also FIFE- v. Fas (1855)' 2)1 L.J.
Q.8.293, 295 r^rT-ere the-friFd'en of proof 1n casesfalllng under thls sectlon 1s explalned. Lqfd
Campbell C.J. said, whel'e fraud or 1llegal1ty
ls establlshed-, there 1s ri. . . a presumptlon of
law that there was no conslderatlon ... Thlspresumptlon must be rebutted b-y the holder[of a Cheque] showlng afflnrnatlvelv that he gave
value But when there 1s a mere absence of
eonslderation no sucil presttmptlon arlses, ancl
therefore there ls no occaslon for the plaintlff
to rebut 1t. "
15. Ltgzzl A.c.1.
16. Ibld.. at p.11.
Ir.sr]
docunented by lloward A. sbreet.r tsut 1n thls work,
the wrlter nas concentrated only on those cases that
are helpful 1n conceptuallsing the broad po11cy
obJectlves. the operatlon of, anci the cleflelencies
inherent 1n trre statutes of charles rr anc Anne.
The conternporary lmportance of t:ese Acts and those
of 1835 ano the later Act of r,345 urltt ener{le more
clearly 1n later paragrapirs, where the extent to
:thlch these statutes harre appllcatlon to i.iew zealanci
l:iegerlnp: and Gamlnq Laws ulll be examlned.
llut the essentlal feature of tire Acts of ]'56rl
ancl 1710 t.ras thelr nollcy obJeetlve ,shLch., os
expressed 1n thelr tltles. l*ras to prevent
excesslve garnlng an<l p'ovicle relief froro 1ts conse--
quences to l-osers. rn each Act not only were the
contracts anC securltles caurirt b:r thenr rendered vold
anc unenforceable, but 1n add1t10n the wlnners or
asslgnees, etc. lrere subJected to certaln penaltles.
The 1ntent1on." t-:erefore, was elearly to render the
1ega1 obl1g;atlons unenforceable ln order to put dow'
gamlng rather thair to slrnply relleve the courts of tnelndlgnlty of trylng dlsputes arl.sing out of gamlnr
ancl rvaqerlng. iiut even as lnstruments for the
suppresslon of ganlng ilrey -,irere far fron suecessful
because lt Ls elear from the vrrltrngs of tire irlsto:.1ans
of gamlnS ln l,.ng1and already nentloned that garnln$
was very prevalent after those Acts. ilut perhaps, as
tslar:kstone observecr. :
l_. Law of Garnlng (1932).
[r. o5 I
i'. 
. . caneful, lras the leglslature beento preve,nt thls destruai-tve rifce: whlahnay shqw that our lavs agalnst Salufnf----are not so deflelent, as oureel.ves ailAour' &{aglstrateE :.n p.iitrine ihoJe lalsln execut.lon. i,!
Eut wh1lst lavrs agalnst ganrng may have been
sufflclent 
- tf enforeed 
- nelther" the Aote of 1s64
or L710 pr.ovleled any real protectX.on agaf.nst the
destrr.retlve effe,et of bettlng.s onLy bets on those
g'arres speclf,lefl 1n the Aets were by statute rend-ered
unenfort:eable so that except ln so far as the Juerges
were ab,Ie to enplotr eUl.table rsubterfug,es, eontrl_
vaaces and evaslons'''r to avol_d lt, most "/rager6 werB
enforceable I'n the g,ourts. Irlot surprlslngly, the
'Legi.stratu:re Ln the 6aini.ng A,ot n .1945, adopted nor€
sweeplng languag'e tn 1te pnovlsron idealln€ wi.th
r6,48!1n,9 and wagerlng eontraets.
2.
3.
4.
ComlnentarieE, Book
Because they o,ntry
ofi $f,1118:S.
Pen Lord. :C,anpbell
fV, p.trI3-.4.
appLi"ed to gan-es and bets
1nIioT#-" (rs48),
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CI{APTER 2
TiiE GAI'iING AcT, 1E45
A.t
The Acts of 16d4 and 1210 dld llttte to suppress
fanlng Ln En,qland. fn the earI./ years of the l9tir
eentury gamlng and wagering reached almost epldenlcproportlons. Trirltlng ln 1870, Andrerv stelnmetzl salcl:
:i,to natlon has exceeclerl ours ln the pursultof ganlng. fn forrner tlmes anO yel notmore than 30 or tlO years ago - the passlonfor play was predominant amonq tfre nlgfrestclas.ses.
Genlus and abiIltles of the hlghest orderbecame 1ts votarles: and the *reoy"iri*"",of the laws agalnst Eambllng were the flrstto fal1 under the temptatlon of thelr breaeh !Thg splrlt of. Eambling per"vaded ever:/ infertororder of soclety. The gentleroan was" u-rt".ruto l.ts lndulgence; the ierchant and themeeiranlc were the dupes of 1ts f*ief"i"Vprospects; lt enqrossed tire cltizen and"oeeupled bhe rustle. Town and country becarnea prey to 1ts despotlsm. ?here was siarcelyan obscure vlllage to be found whereln thlsbe:r1tc:rlnf t;asi11sk f,ld nob e>.erc1se 1tspoi,r'ers of fasclnatlon and destructfon. --
Gamlng 1n England became rather a sclencethan an amusement of soclal lntercou".". Therdoctrlne of chances' was studled *iin-i"assldutty that would have done frJ"o"r-'tobetter 
-subJects, and calculatlons wJre-rnaoeon arlthnetlcal and geornetrlcal prlneiptes,to determlne the degiees or prouiblii;;-attendant on ganes df nlxed itfff and Lhance,or even on the fortultous throws of dlce. Ofcourse, 1n splte of aLl calculatlons , ifr""u
1. The Gamlng Table (r879;, vo1.r.
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'were mlserable fallures - frlghtful }osses.The polLte gamester, l1ke the-'Javage, d1dnot scruple to rrazar"d the dearest inierestsof h1s fam11y, or to bnlng h1s wlfe andchlldren to poverty, nlseiy, and nufnl.,
By 1820 there were estlmated3 to be upwarcls of 5ogarnlng houses and clubs - or ,;IlelLs '' as they vrere
commonly called - ln London a10ne,. and there was agraduated scale of establlshment to cater for the
needs of all from the hlgnest peers of the Realn
to the Ior'rest hl4hwayman, burgran and plckpocket.f
stelnmetz asserts that :;thousands upon il:rousands ;
were rulnecl ln these establlshnents 1n ilre vlelntty
of st.James?s squane, and the vlctlms came from a1r
walks of l1fe. He eonclucles;
'It was gambllng, and not the burdens of thelong war, nor the nevulslon from wan to peace,that made so man.v bankruptcles 1n ilre fein,years. succeedlng tire Eattle of triater100. rtlras the plunderers at gamlng tables that fllIedthe gazettes anc rnacle iire gaots overflow wlth sonany vlctlms. i's
But not alL were losers: Crockfordrs Club,
establlshed 1n L82Z and undoubtedly the most noble
of the ga'bllng rheLlsr .- netted 1ts owner a fortune.
Indeed lt rnade Cr:ockford, a flshmonger. lnto a
2.
3.
4.
fb1d., at
Ibld., at
rb1d.
Ibld., at
pp.24"-21.
p.122.
q pp" I2B'9 
.
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m1LI1ona1re.6 tsut at rvhat cost to others? some ldea
of the nature and extravaganee of ganbllng at the
beglnnln6; of the 19th centurv 1s provlded by the
fo1lo'v1ng notlces from the rornlng post quoted 1n
Jobn Ashton's book:
"5 Apr11 1305. The sum latel-y lost at playby a lady-of hlgh rank ls varj_ously staleO'.Some say 1t does not amount to r:rore tiranf.20c.000, r,.rrrlre others assent that 1t 1s 11ttreshont of ETC},0l0. Her Lord is very unhappyon the. occas-lon. and 1s st11r undecicea rvitnrespect to the best node to be adoptecl 1n ir,"unfortunate preClcarnent 
. 
;t
'30 June 1806. The Marquis of FI- --*d. 1s saldto lrave been so sueeessful at play, tirlsseasonr &s to have cleared nborOOb. rfr. Earlof E.---e nas l.ron upwards of g5O"OOO. 
.i"a"-ofarI deductlons. a htgnt Rever6no 1s'statJo iobe anonqst those uho ire mlnus on thl_soccaslon. ;t
E July 
-1305. A certaln iioble .{arquls, vrhc hasbeen very fortunate, thls season., 1n fifs ga*inespeculatlgll, had a run of 111_1uck last ,reeL.At one. slttlng h1s Lordshlp wis-mlnus no ressa sun than thlrteen ti:ousand^ pouiTETr
15 Juty 1B0d, The noble t4arqu1s, who hasbeen so- great 
- 
a galner thls ,d.ror, &t hazard 
"never pla;rs wlth anyone, from a pniflcE,ffi,
con'none+'r_ nlilrout hivlng ilre siaxes flrst lalclon TE T;b'e. iris ronashlp was ii"rffio"r-;;',ered as a 
_qgqe car{, but, horo, hls flme 1sestabllshed-ffi-Ene c1rcumsi.n""" of hlshaving clearecl 
"r.35r000, after eeAuctfne allh1s losses for the lasi stx moniG:;t"-
And these are only a few of the hund.reds of examples
clted by Ashton.
Stelnmetz, note 1 at pp.The Hlstory of Garnbllh.qClrapt.5.
185-7. And see Ashton"1n Ensland (1898),
h
T. Ibld., at p.92.
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rn 1822 the Leglslature macle a half*,hearted
attenpt to lnterfere by enactlng the statute 3 Geo.fV,
c,1I4 ln rvhlen keepln.g a conmon gamlng house was
deslgnated an tageravated mlsdemeanourr pur:lshab1e
by lmprlso:rnent :'rlth irard labour. Anrl by a later
statute, the pollce Aet, 1839 e & 3 V1ct., c,42,)
s.48 the pol1ee i,rsre given powe' to forclbly enter
such premlses for the purpose of selzlnq lmplements
and evlctenee of gamlno. The propnletors and thelr
asslstants 'r{ere, by the same A.ct, llable to penaltles
varylng from a flne of c10o to lnprlsonment nlth hard
labour for a perlod of up to s1x nonths. But theseprovlslons were of 11ttle effect. occa,slonally
prosecutlons were brought. Ashton draws on aquotatlon fron fhe Tlnes CateC Januany 24 1933 fn
lrthlch the trlal of four ganlng house keepers 1s
refe*ed to.8 The prosecutton forr-owed uDon a
cornplalnt that a senvant had stolen h1s employeris
money and lost C120 of 1t ln ;:The He1ls ln the
Qua.drant . In that case ZZ such places were alleged
to have been operatlng ln st.James{s partsh. And
tuiillst the poIlee had managecl to close two of then,
three nelr ones rrac ocened ln the same t1me. so thelr
nunbers lncreased, rather than red.ucecl. The defencl .
ants in t!:at case went to Ja1r, but as defence counsel
lamented they were onlv sma1I operators:
''!{e would advlse the parlsh offlcers [whobrought the orosecutlon] to qo to Crockfor.dts,not far dlstant from the houde ln questio.,
nhere tirey woulcl flnd lord.s anC peens oi therealm at play. r's
8. Ib1d.
Iden.
." ot p.133.
f t ,1r l
5ut the Parlsir offlcers dltr not heed counsel?s
aclv1ce. l0 And. the f iiellst of London contlnueci to iueatoer
a storn of oub11c protestlbor a further ten years
10. Crocirford matntalned the proprletorshlp of h1s clrtt;
untll t84C" at ruhlch tlme ire retlred. The clubItottered to 1ts fa1I? sho:tly after, and the
premlses beeane The i,Iel11nqton Restaurant.Stelnnetz, note. !rVol.II, at o.136.
11. As:rton. note 5, ln chapter 9, ouotes extenslvelyfrom da11y pa)ers and per1ocl1ca1s at ti:at t1ne"
?hev deser.lbe the horror of the ?iiells! 1n qulte
un:llstakabLe language. For example, the followlnp'
descrigtlon aogears 1n Frazerr s llagazlne. Aucust
1E33: Tne qenerallty of the nlnor ganbllng houses
are kept b;'r crl ze-.flghters and. otirer desperate
ciraracters. iv;ro bu1ly and hector bhe more tlmld out
of thelr money .|:y decldlnq that bets irave been lost
when, 1il fact, tire:r have treen ivon. 3read.-. cheese
and beer are supplled to tne Fla-vers, and a glass
of q1n ls irancled, when calleo for. gratls. To
tlrese nlaces thleves resort, and such other loose
characters as are lost to every feellng of
bonest./ ano shane: a tabl-e of thls nature 1nfu1l operation 1s a terrJ flc slgnt: all the bad
passl-ons appertalnlng to the vLclous propensltles
of manklnd are oortrayeC on the countenances of
the plavers. An assenbly of the most horrlble
demons could not exhlblt a more appa1l1ng effect:
recklessnesg and desperatlon overshadotrl every
noble tralt whlch shoufd enllShten the countenance
of a irunan belng. ilan:/, 1tr thelr d.esneratlon,
strlp themselves, on the spot, of thelr clotLres,
elther to stake agalnst money or to pledge to tr:e
table keeuer ior a trlfle to rene'w thelr play: an<l
many lnstances occur of men golng home half naked,
havlng lost thelr all. They assemble 1n oarties
of frorn forty to flfty persons, who probably brir:',
on an averaFe, each nlglrt, from one to twentv
s:r1l1lnp;s to 91ay :'r1th. As the noney ls lost theplayers depart, 1f they eannot; boruow or beg
more: and thls goes on so:rretlnes 1n the wlnter
,seagon, for forrrteen to slxteen hours 1n success -
1on: so that fnom 100 to 140 persons may be
caleulated to v1s1t one ganbll-n table ln tire
course of a nlght'r'(IUtd. , at pp.137-4. )
la " )21
unt1l the revelatlons 1n the case of Snlth v. Bond, P
and the 1e5_'lslatlve actlon that followed lt, flna.l1y
sealed thelr Coon,
[2.02] Smlth v. iiond
Alihough the Acts of Cirarles I1 (1654) and Anne
(f7fO) rnrere unnltigated fallures as lnstrurnents for the
suppresslon of excesslve Samblrng, bhey dlcl ult1nately"
and 1n an lndlrect vray, contrlbute substantlally to
bhe clv1llsatlon of gamlne 1n England. But the dlrect
notlvatlon for reform lvas crovided by the actlon
brousht ln Snlth v. Bond. I
In 181{2 the Parlsh of St,George, lianover Square,
was Iltera11y s',^larmLne wlth fiambllng rhel-lst. Prlor
to that year the parlsh offlcers had trled, but had
been qulte unable to put bherin dowu.z One such estab-
llshnent r'ras tire Tlnor St.Jaraes?s Club captalned.,
frorn all accounts, by a gentleman named tsond. But,
as Ashton descrlbes those premlses:
12. The actual garnlng ease was never reported, but see
snnlth v. B_g4d (1843;, 1r M.& lt.326 and 549.
1. foe ease ls not reported, but John Ashton 1n theiilstor;r of Gambllng ln England (1898) alludes to
the clrcurastances of the case at pp.t39-140. And
see supra, para.I, note 12.
2, The lion.Rlchard l,layne, Co:runlssloner of the Metro-polltan Pollce tolct the Select Commlttee on Gamlng
on 28.2.161t4, para.163, p.15, l{lnutes of Evidence,
that tire pol1ce haC been qulte unable to persuade
resldents 1n the parlsh of St.Jarnes?s to eome
forward ancl glve evldence agalnst gamlng houseproprletors and thls i:ad rnade pollce actlon
agalnst such establlshnents extremely dlffleult.
12.02)
". . . there was not the least pretence for
cal1lng lt a club: anybody 'vrent there toplay wlth frardlV the formallty of a flrst
lntroductlon. '.'
In an atternpt to brlng thls establ-lshment down
the parlsh offlcers resolved to brlng a qul tan
aetlon agalnst Bond ln relatlon to certaln Losses
suffered by some of h1s cllents. Thelr deslgn was
facllltatecl by Thomas Srnlth, a dlsgruntled ex-
emoloyee of iiondtsb t^rho was able to descrlbe to
Lord Ablnger and a speelal Jury at ltilddlesex how
BonCrs establlshrnent dld a thrlvtng tracle at the
tables '- espeelally at Freneh Hazard. One rtsredell
had lost [200, eir Fltzroy Stanhope [500 the ltlarquls
of Conyngharn S5C0 on each of two separate occasions,
Lord Cantalupe S400, and other nobiemen and gentle'
men varlous sums. t s The actlon was brought by Smlth
agalnst liond under s.2 of the Act of Anne (171'l).
That ls, to recover the money the house had won at
play fron these people, ancl ttreble the value
thereofr. fhe form of the counts ln the plalntlffrs
deelaratlon read as follows:
''A.13. [tfrat 1s the nobleman or gentleman
who lostl, ln the parlsh of St.George,
Iianover Square, 1n the county of Mldd1esex"
by playlnn wlth the defendant at dlce, &E a
certatn garne called French hazard, lost to
the defendanto at one slttlng, contrary to
the statute, and the defendant [l]ond, the
keeper of the clubl won of the sald A.B.
tlre sum of g.?CT r rqhlch sald sum of money
?
4.
iiote I, at p.139.
Peter Cloves, a better of twenty
alluded to thls 1n hls evldenceSelect Cornrnlttee on Gamlni, note
i{ote 1, at p.139.
years standlng.
befone the2,at p.156.
5.
f a ..,\_'lLZ.JlJ
'the sald A.B. then and there pald to and the
same was then and there acerued to theplalntlff , who suecl for h1rnself and the poor
-of the sald parish of St. George, llanover
Square, to r-ecelve of the defendant the sald
sun of money so lost, ancl treble the value
thereof . tto
unfortunately Lorcls conyngham and cantalupe and
llr stanhope decllned tlre opoortunlty to oubllcly
dlsclose thelr losses, - and t[e1r gambllng lnstlncts -
but ln all ot|er respects the actlon was successful.
The Lord C[1ef Baron entered Judgment agalnst Bond 1n
the amount of Ca,50?. Thls amount was not hlgh when
conslclered ln terms of the proflts the evldence dls''
closed Bond haC rnade from the losses of others, but a
flrm precedent had been set. The parlsh offlcers now
had a weapon they could use aqalnst gaming house
keepers. For the future, a ganing house proprletorrs
croflts from wlnnlngs mlght lncleed measure but a thlrd
of n1s losses.
fne declslon ln Smlth v. Bond prompted
actlons of a slmllar klncl and' in 1844 the
Lords sou6:ht tl:e concurrence of the House
1n an rActlons for Gamlng Dlscontlnuance
3111 was entltuled:
further
House of
of Commons
B1I1 | . Thls
'An Act to dlscontlnue certaln Actlons underthe Provlslons of several statutes for the
Prevention of Exeesslve Gamlng' and to preventfor the future ifru u"lttg1ng oi such Aetlons .''8
o.
tr
x
Detalls of the eounts are reported 1n(rBu31 11 I{. & t:I. 549.
They ctlcl not appear and glve evldence.
Journals of the liouse of Comntons (1E44), VoI.99,
o.24 .
Smlth v. Bond
lz.ozl
The Blll was accompanled by allegatlons of fraud
1n the brlnglng of such actlons, and even of vexatlous
lltlgatlon. e Indeecl, Smlth v. Bond. was a case of the
former k1nd. Under s.17 of bhe statute 1 & Z W111.IV,
c.39 (f83f) an attorney could be ordered by a Court or
Judge to d1sclose, 1n wr1t1ng, the professlon,
occupatlon, or quallty and place of abode of the
pIalntlff 1n an Actlon. A fallure to do so was a
conternpt of the court, Such an order was obtalned
ln Smltl v. Bond, and the plalntlff, Thomas Sm1th,
had hls attorney f1le an account 1n whlch he, Smlth,
was descrlbed as "... an artlst, and resldes at No.32
Chappel Street, Grosvenor Squaret'. Bond dlscoverecl
that these partlculars were false and he subsequentlv
sought an attactrment agalnst Srnlth for thls fraud on
the Court. l0 Such was the frequeney on lncldence of
tnls type of occurrenee that the }Iouse of Commons sought
an account from the Courats of the lnstances upon whlch
thls occurred.ll The reeords clo not, however, dlsclose
to what effect.
The Actlons for Gamlng Dlscontlnuance B11l dld
not, or at least d1d not 1n1t1ally, achleve a1l lts
framers hopecl for. It met wlth opposltlon and amend-
9. rbld.
10. smlth v. B_gnd (1843 ) rr u, & l,I .326. The actlon was
Eno-heht affist tha pla1nt1ff whlIst the statuteplaced the obllgatlon - and punlshment for contemptfor fa11lnE to honour 1t - upon the attonney. The
court consldered the plalntlff would be Llab1e 1fhe wllfully rnlsled or eaused h1s attorney to f1le
a false account 
- but dld not f1nally declde thepolnt. Chlef Baron Pollock thought the ends of
Justlce would be sufflclently served by d1s-
charqlng Snlth but wlth an order that he meet the
costs of Bondts appllcatlon.
11. Note B.
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nnlnt 1n the House, so that when 1t dld subsequently
recelve the Roya), Assent, 1t pttrported only to stay
proeeedlngs under the relevant provlslons of the Acts
of Charles II (1664) and Anne (f7fo) for a perlod of
three months. u
On the 2nd July 1844 a further Actlons for Gamlng
Dlscontlnuance 8111 was lntroduced lnto the House, 13
the purpose of thls 8111 belng to extend the perlod
by whlch proceedlnge had been etayed by lts pnedeeess-
or. Thls 8111 succeeded, rs but not wlthout some
lnterestlng and reveallng slde lssues. After the 8111
was lntroduced Charles Henry Russell, a so11cltor,
petltloned the House to be heard agalnst 1t belng
passed.rs A vote was taken on whether Russell?s
pet1t1on, and evldence, should be referred to a
Commlttee on the 8111. But obJeetlon was taken to
the votes of Lord George Bentlck, the Member for
Lynn and Mr Gregory, the Member for Dublln.16 They
were, 1t was asserted, defendants 1n some of the
Actlons to whlch the BlIl referred. Ilowever Lord
George Bentlck assured the House that, assumlng the
8111 was passed, he would not plead 1ti and Mr Gregory
replled that he had never been served wlth any pro-
cesses 1n any of the sald actlons. Consequently
both votes were allowed.
t2.7 & I
13. Note
14. 7 & I
f5. Note
t6. rb1d.
V1ct., c.3 (1844).
B, at p.451.
Vlct., c.58 (1844)
13, at p.467.
, &t p.486.
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The cLr"cumstances that prompted the Actlons for
Clanlng Dlscontlnuance Act are revealed 1n the errldence
of a solleltor named James Thomas Russell17 before the
Select Commlttee on GamlnE ln July 1844' Those
chcumstances also explaln why 1t was found deslrable
to repeal s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710) when the
Gamlng Act of 1845 was enacted. ro
The soI1c1tor, Russell, clalmed 1n hls evldence
that he had acted 1n hls professlonal capaelty for a
party who was brlnglng common lnformer actlons under
the Act of Anne (1710) agalnst wlnnlng ganblers. He
sald that he was Leavlne h1s offlce one nornlng when
the party, (whose ldentlty he refused to dlvulge as
belng a rnatter upon whlch he was sworn to secrecy)
enqulred whether qul tam actlons could be brought under
s.2 of the Act of Anne (f7fO) to recover noney won
(and trebl-e the value thereof) by bettlng on horse
races. Russell obtalned counsel's oplnlonls and
subsequenbly advlsed the enqulrer such actlons could
be brought. He was then lnstructed to conmence pro-'
ceedlngs; the unknown cllent statlng that hls obJect
was solely to prevent excesslve gamb11ng. The
Commlttee" however, obvlously d1d not belleve RusseIl.
He was questloned closely about a robbery he and h1s
17. Tlre Charles i{enr.y Russell who petltloned the House
of Commons to be heard agalnst the Actlons for
Gamlng Dlscontlnuance 8111 was eald by James Thomas
Russel-l to be hls brother (tn hls evldence before
the Se1ect Cornnlttee on Gamlng, note 2, 8tn JuIy
1844, para.95B, p.145 ) .
18. By s.15r Garnlng Act, r84l (8 & 9 vlct., c.109).
19. Because he entertalned some doubt whether bets on
raclng were wlthln the Act. Smlth v. Bond was
brougrrt 1n relatlon to lossesm gan-T French
hazard.
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brother were suspected of belng lnvolved ln. e lils
answers to those questlons 'r.'rere unsatlsfactory. He
admltted hls brother t{as clted as plalntlff 1n the
qu1 tam actlons and accordlngly was to recelve a
pnoportlon of any money so obtalned. But he trled to
explaln that by sarrlng:
'. . . Havlng determlned to brlng these actlons,the necessary thlng to be consldered was,
where we could flnd a plalntlff wlth whori there
would be no chance of the defendants endeavour-lng to compromlse or tamper wlth hlm. It
then occurred to me I mlght make my brother
the plalntlff . I llnew h1s character $Ias already
so talnted that merely brlnglng these actlons
could not 1n any way lnJure hlm, and at the
same tlme he was a oarty I knew they 
--could
not lnduce to stop thesb actlons
Russell later sald he d1d not know tire name of the
mysterlous cl1ent lnstructlng h1n. He clalmed the
latter tkept 1t rnost studlously' from h1m, although he
endeavoured on a number of occaslons to ascertaln 1t.
But the strong lnference behlnd the I1ne of questlons
dlrected at Russell was that he, Russell, and h1s
brother, havlng been unsuccessful at robbery, then
20. An anount of 8,2000 and S900 ln securltles and lrank
notes were stolen from the Berkley Club 1n St.James'sSquare. It comprlsed the bank for sames carrled on
there. Some of the property was found ln Russellfspossesslon. H1s brother, Charles Henry Russell was
suspeeted of belng a panty to the cr1me. There
were flve pages of questlons dlreeted at Russell onhls and h1s brotherrs lnvolvenent 1n thls affalr.(Mlnutes of the Evldenee before the Seleet Comml'
ttee on Gam1n6, 1bld., note 2e Etn ;uty 1844,
paras . 1011 'I177 , pp . 14 B.-152 ) '
2L. Ibtd., at para. 1121, p"155.
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turned thelr hand to maklng a buslness out of qul tam
actlons. A number of euch actlons had been, or were
about to be conmenced by h1m uhen the Actlons for
Gamlng Dlscontlnuance Act, 1844 (No.1) was enactecl-
One such actlon was brought agalnst a Mr Harry i{11122
to recover a penalty for wlnnlng a bet of fl3000 on a
horse.-race. That bet was for 820,000 to 93000 agalnst
a horse called Gaper. The horse lncldentally belonged
to Lord George Bentlck. H111 subsequently sought, and
obtalned refuge behlnd the Act. A further actlon was
brought agalnst Lord Egllntoun for undlsclosed bets r 23
and four such actlons were brought by Russell agalnst
the m1lllona1re-owner of Croekfordrs Club: -' for about
i800"000.24 A further actlon was agalnst Lord George
Bentlek. Asked r.uhat he had sued the noble Lord for
Russell coo1ly repl1ed, "upwards of 9100 , C00. " 2s l'i1th
that revelatlon the Commlttee dlreetLy proposed to
Russell that lt was hls actlon 1n polnt of fact I but
he agaln denled 1t. And 1ater. the followlng questlon
wlth the answer 1t el1e1ted appear 1n the transcrlpt
of the evldence:
22. [h1s, and the subsequent actlons were adrnltted
by Rrissell 1n hls evldence, lb1d., at pp.154"'155.
23. Fussell sald 1t was proposed to rlsk €5000 to
e6000 on the actlon agalnst Lord Egllntoun whlch
suggests the amount lnvolved was substantlal.
24. Crockford gave evldenee before the Conmlttee and
gave thls estlmate of the amounts 1nvolved.
!{lnutes of Evldence, 28th March 1844, para.2813,
at p.1.80.
25 , I'lote 17 , para. 1112, Bt p. 155 .
[2.02 ]
Chalrman: liDo you belleve that the person
who ls brlnglng these actlons, upon your
Oath, ls only brlnglng the actlons for thepurpose of preventlng excesslve gamlng, oF
do you thlnk he 1s looklng at all to part
of the !renaltles?r'
RusseIl: riI have no hesltatlon ln saylng
that he ls noht looklng for part of thepenaltles. I should mentton that tlre orlglnallntentlon of thls party, 8s I be11eve, lnbrlnglng these actlons, was merely for thepurpose of suppresslng the systern' and ln the
course of our lnqu1r1es lnto these oases we
dlseovered the proof by whlch a large Sum of
money mtght be made by brlnglng these actlons,
so that the party mlght not only put down the
system but make lt exceedingly profltable tohilnseLf. It was a speeulatlon that struck me
mlght be very lucratlve to h1rn. I had seen
the Report ln the Tlmes of the Bth December
1E42, three or f'our Days after Smlth and Bond
was tr1ed, 1n whlch the edltor of the nel{s'
paper reconmended 1t to Ftartles, &s a proflt-
able s.peculatlon, to brlng qul tam dctlons
agalnst those partles, statlng that such
speculatlon would be profltable to hlmself
and the P'ubl1c beneflted, and 1t--unEed on
Feople to brlng these .--.cf lons. " 6
Although 1ne1dental1y the consequence of the
sonmon lnforrner actlons was to suppress gamb11n8,, oo
lntoLerable sltuatlon had also presented ltse1f.
Known gamblers l4tere belng harrassed by opportunlsts
wl0h t1ttle other lnterest ln the proeeedlngs than
the galn to be made from them. And apart from pro-
ceedlngs openly brought the comrnon lnformer actlon
also presented a real opportunlty for blackmalL.27
Wlnnlngs of S20r000 and more were not uncommon" and
26. Ibld., para.1L67, dt p.159.
27. lriote 24, para.26t1li." at p.173.
speclf1ca1ly eIa1m he had been
AJ.though he dld not
bIacknalled.
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a threat to seek that amount plus treble the value
could prove qulte rulnous even to a man of sub -
stance. And on top of that $ras the unsavoury
publlclty that acsompanled such actlons. crockford
advlsed the sel-ect commlttee that he hlmself had
endured such a threat 1n 1824. He sald:
?rA nest of lnformers came about me, and
wanted to take f,20,000, and then 
€LOrOOO,
and f met 1t ln court, and they would not
meet me, and so 1t was all over.',a
It was not surprlslng therefore that these
recovery and penalty provislons of the 1210 Act
were repealed when the Gam1n6 Act of 1845 was
enacted. And the motlvatlon for that reform arose
out of the case Smlth v, Bond.
The speculatlve splrlt that pervaded the buslness
and soclal 11fe of elghteenth century England also
brought wlth 1t an lncrease 1n wagerlng. vlrtually
anythlng and everythlng that could be r,cas made the
subJect of a wager. I rn rB44 the seleet commlttee
on Gamlng observed:
28. rb1d.
1. John Ashton, The Hlstory(f8gg) devoies a ehapter
wagers. (Chapt.12)
of
to
Gambllng ln England
extraordLnary
I2.03 l
j'In the last century the practlce of bettlng
was much more common 1n thls country than 1tls Dow; bets about disputed facts and uponfuture events were thlngs of dal1y occurrence,
and a wager was proverbla]Iy known to be an
Eng;lishwIy of settltng a eontroversy.t'2
The perslstenee of thls speeulatlve tralt 1n the
Engllsh eharacter dunlng the perlod ls well lllustrated
by an amuslng anecdote re-told by Ashton. s In the
course of a debate ln the House of Cornmons Mr Pulteney
charged S1r Robert l,Ialpole wlth n1s-quotlng lloraee.
Thre Prlme Mlnlster wagered that he had not done so:
the odds were settled, and the C1erk of the House vras
prevalled upon to adJudlcate. He declded the matter
1n favour of Pulteneyts assertlon upon whlch S1r
Robert tossed a gulnea across the floor of the }iouse.
Mr Pulteney graclousty pocketed h1s wlnnlngs and wryly
observed tthat 1t was the flrst publlc money he had
touched for a long tlme t . No place was too sacred or
occasion too lmportant to avold the dlstractlon of
such trlvla.
There was, however, an ugly slde to wagerlng as
there was to gamlng. The extravagance reflected 1n
wagerlng 1n England has already been alluCed to. s
ft was as rulnous as gamlng, especlally durlng the
17th and 18th centurles when the rsport of klngsl
provlded opportunlty for gross speculatlon by noble
and conmon fools al1ke, James Rlce unwlttlngly
2.
3.
4.
Report of the Select Commlttee on Gamlng, 20tb
May 1844, p.V.
Note 1, at p.155.
Supra, chapter 1; para.2, chaPter 2,
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attests to thab ln h1s two volume work on the hlstory
of the Engllsh turf. s And whllst that toplc 1s
beyond the scope of thls work 1t cannot be passed by
wlthout recordlng a pantlcular, and furthen aggra.-
vatlon of whlch a wrlter ln The Quarterly eornplalned
1n 1834. He sald:
"Doncaster, Epsom, Ascoto and trIarwlck, and
most of our numerous race-grounds and race-
towns, ane scenes of destructlve and unlver-
saI gambllng among the lower orders, whlch
our absurdly lax pollee never attempt to
suppress; and Vet, wlthout the sllghtest
approach to an lnproperly harsh lnterference
wlth the pleasures of the people, the Roulette
and E.0. tables, whlch plunder the peasantry
at these places for the beneflt of travelllng
shar"pers ...tt6
Stelnmetz made a slmllar observatlon of race meetlnEs
at Newmarket. There:
"Every obJect that rnet the eye was encompass.-
ed wlth ganbllng 
- 
fron the arlstocratlc
RouEe et No1r" Roulette" and Hazard. down to+Thlmble-r1g, Tosslng, and Tommy Dodd. Every
hour of the day and nlght was beset wlthgambllng dlverslfled: ln short, gambllng must
occupy the whole man, op he was lost to the
sport and sp1rlt of the place. The lnhunan-1ty of the cock-plt, the lnlqultous vortex
of the Hazard table, employed each lelsur:e
moment from the race, and elther swallowed
up the emoluments of the vlctonlous fleld,
or sank the Jockey st1l1 deeper 1n the gulf
of nuln. 't 7
5.
6.
7.
(r879;.
Quoted by Andrew Stelnmetz, The Gamlng Table(1870), VoI.1, p.133.
Ibld., Vol,II, p.35ll*5.
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There was, 1n addlt1on, a.nother soc1al1y harrnful
slde to wag5erlng that d1d not occur wlth gamlng. It
arose as a consequence of thougirtless speculatlons
on the prlvate affalrs of others. l,Jhllst wagers
\^rere enforceable 1n the Courts of Justlce, lntlmate
and personal matters ln the l1ves of lnnocent thlrd
partles could be exposed to the pub11c gaze by the
slmple expedlent of maklng thern the subJeet of a
wager. The wrlter ha.s not dlscovered any cases
where a wager and lts enforeement were dellberately
used as a devlce for lnvadlng the prlvacy of another
person;8 but lnstances certalnly occurred where such
In Coxe v. Ph$]lBg Q7?9), C.T.Hard.23B aflcEfEfous aET-'^ras eonstrueted for the purpose
of ralslng an lssue that an lnnocent tlrlrdparty sa1d. was lntended to rburden h1m wlth
aettons I . The plalntlff sued on a promlssory
note glven to h1m by the defendant to whleh
she pleaded she was marrled to a nan naned
Mu11man, The plalntlff sald the marrlage was
vo1d, the defendant sald it was good, Mullman
complalned the actlon was flctltlous and
lntended to harm h1n. Lord Hardwlcke C.J.
upheld lvlullman's rlght to cornplaln and the
complalnt for '...though the verdlct, lf lthad passed agalnst h1m, could not have beenglven ln evldence agalnst hlm, not belng aparty to the su1t, V€t 1t 1s a preJudlce to
a man to have the report of a verdlet that he
1s marrled 1n thls way lt 1s lncumbent on
Courts of Justlce to keep the streams of
Justlrse elear, oF they w1ll be made use of
as means of scandal. '' (Ibld. ) The sameprlnclple would protect lnnocent thlrd partles
where wagers were construeted for the sarMpurpose. See e.g. Lord Mansfleld 1n Dtr_Costa
v. Jones lnfra.
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lnvaslons were a shamefuL consequence.e Llrnltatlons
on such actlons were lmposed by the Courts. l0 But
they r{ere not always effectual 1n protectlng lnnocent
partles as the extraordlnary case of Da Costa v.
Jones lt shows .
1t'
and
were
Da Costa v. Jones $ras, as Lord Mansfleld descrlbed
a case whlch ttmade a great nolse all over Europe"r2
one 1n whlch the proceedlogs r and the way they
conductedrwere t'a dlsgnace to Judlcatu""tt.13 It
9 . Dl!-ellurq v. Goldsmlth ( 1815 ) ,f C"rnp .152 (a bet onffiEffirty or--frornan) and Da Costa v. Jones (1778)lnfra., (a uet on the sex of [Tiillfri-persffi]-wereperhaps the worst of the l1tlgated wagers. Wa1pole
refers 1n a letter to a bet of thls nature whlch
does not appear to have found 1ts way lnto the
Reports. I'Dec.1!, 1750. There has been a droll causeln Westmlnster HalI: a man lald another a wagerthat he produced a person who should welgh as much
agaln as the Duke [Cunberland]. When they hadbetted they recollected not knowlng how to deslre
the Duke to step lnto a sca1e. They agreed to
establlsh hls welght at twenty stone" wh1ch, however,
1s supposed to be two more than he welghs. One
Brlghtrwas then produced, who ls slnce dead, and
who, actua11y, welghed forty*two stone and a ha1f.
As soon as he was dead, the person who had lost,
obJected. that he had been welghed 1n hls clothes,
and though 1t was lmposslble that hls clothes could
welgh above two stone, they went to law. There
were the Dukers twenty stone bawlerl over a thousand
tlnies;but the rlghteous law declded agalnst the
man who had won.rr (Quoted 1n Ashton, nobe I atpp. 157-8)
10. Infra.
11. (1778) , 2 Cowp ,729.
12. Ibld.3 at p.735.
13. Ib1d,, at p.735.
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arose out of a wager between two lndlfferent partles
a surrgeon and a broker and underwrlter as to the
true sex of the famous transvestlte, the Chevaller
DtEon. rf [he Chevaller had formerly been Anbassador
to England and Russla from the Court of France and
h1s conduct and dress, both 1n England and France,
had prornpted speculatlon as to h1s true sex.15 The
partles entered lnto thelr wager 1n 1771 and the
surgeon brought hls actlon before Lord Mansfleld and
a Jury Ln 1777. At the hearlng counsel for the
defendant obJected that the pla1nt1ff ought not to
resover as h1s cl-alm was founded on a questlon tencllng
to the lntroductlon of lndecent evldence. Lord
Mansfleld over*ruled the obJeetlon - but later
regretted that he had done so. When the defendantrs
counsel subsequentl,y moved to arrest Judgment on the
obJectlon upon the record, the learned Judge sald:
14. The Report records that the bet was made on the
4tfr 0ctober 1771 vrhen, lrr conslderatlon of theplalntiff then and there paylng hlm the sun of
75 gns. the defendant undertoolt to pay the plalnt-lff S300 1n case the Chevaller should at any tlmeprove to be a female. And 'tthere were othergeneral accounts fon money lent, noney Ia1d out
and expended for the use of the defendant, and
money had and reeelved by the defendant to the use
of the plalntlff.'t Ashton states the total amount
lnvolved 1n the cla1m was €700 and 1t arose from
a wager 6 years pnlor to the actlon 1n whleh thebroker 'irecelved premlums of flfbeen gulneas per
cent., for every one of whlch he stood engaged to
return one hundred gulneas, whenever lt should beproved that the Chevaller DrEon r,ras, actually, a
vroman. tr Ibld. , at p .159.
15. An account of the Chevallerts adventures and the
extraordlnary events that prompted h1m to adopt
the l1fe style of a woman are detalled 1nAntonla Whlters translatlon of Menolrs of theChevaller D'Eon, (1970).
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;iI or^rn I was sorry, that the answer glvento ttre obJectlon rnade at the trlal ... had
been so hastlly glven way to by me. I was
sorry that the nature of tlre actlon had not
been more fu1ly eonsldered. I was sorryfor another thlng tirat the wltnesses who
were subpoenaed had not been told they nlght
refuse to glve evldence lf they pleased.ilut no obJectlon was rnade on thelr behalf by
the counsel f or the defendant, nor d1d an:y of
themsel-ves apply for protectlon, or hesltateto answer. f have slnce heard that many of
thern were confldentlal Dersons, servants, and
others employed ln the way of thelr professlon
and buslness , Had anv of them demurued, 1t
would have opened the nature of the actlon.
That two m.en by 1ay1ng a $rager concer"nlns athlrd person, mlght compel hls nhvslclans.
relatlons, and servants, to dlsclose what
they knerv relatlve to the subJect matter of
that wager, would have been an aLarmlng pro-posltlon: the bare statlng of lt vtould have
startled. Indeed, the obJectlon belng put
upon the general crude ground of the cause
leadlng to lncl.ecent evldence, and not upon
tire speclal nature of thls case, dld not
strlke *". t; 16
And he later concluded:
"... the present case ls lndecent 1n ltself-
and manlfestly a Eross lnJury to a thlrdperson therefore, ought not to be
enclured . '' 17
16. Note 11, at p. 734.
17. Ib1d., at p.736. Bet$reen these two statements
he sald: ;iUou1d a Court of Justlce trv a i{aEerthat an unmarrled woman has had a bastard? i.iouldyou try that? I^Iould 1t be endured? Most un-questlonably 1t would not. " Ibtd., at p.735.That was exactly the wager ln Dltchburn v. 0o1d-
sm1th, note g, 1n 1815 and as frnA-ffif1e1d'-predlcted" lt was not endured. The Court nefusedto hear the matter.
The Rule for ar"restlng
Jones was made absolute:
t2-031
Da Costa v.
was after the
damage was done.
The lncredlble clrcumstances and proceedlngs 1n
thls case can, 1t 1s suggested, only be explalned 1n
terms of recognltlon at that tlme of a certaln m1s-
coneelved honour" 
- 
and perhaps even soelal_ respect -
ab1llty accorded sueh wasers at that tlrne . l,ihy,
for example, dld a surgeon and a brolcer even bother
wlth such an actlon?t8 It was not notlvated by ma11ce
agalnst the Chevaller beeause tne Court accepted
that 1t was a falr and bona flde wager entered lnto
'wlthout the smallest lntentlon of affectlng the
Cheva]ler DtEon 1n the sllghtest degreet.re The
answer 1s probably, at least on the plalntlff's part,
that he regarded the wager as an honourable trans-
actlon, and one upon whlch he should entertaln no
scruple about pIeadlng. Lord Mansfleld expressed
abhorrence at the transactlon, botb durlng and after
the tr1al, and regretted that the partles had not
settled 1t outslde the Courts of Justlce. But he
suggested to the Jury any lndecency 1n the proeeedlng
arose rather from the unnecessary questlons asked of
wltnesses tiran from the case ltself . And the Juryrs
d1lernma, he lnstructed them, was slmply to declde
who had won the wager. The evldence glven was as
18. The amount S700, s&V of course have motlvated lt.The terms of the wager suggested by Ashton meanthat the pla1nt1ff must have pald the broker ln
excess of 100 gns. a sum whlch he was no doubt
anxlous to recover 1n vlew of the evldence lre
then possessed.
19. liote 11, at p. 731.
Judgment 1n
however, that
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extraordlnary as the case 1tse1f, The pr1nclpa1
wltnesses for the plalntlff-. (who asserted D,Eon was
a woman) were, of all people, a surgeon who had
attended the Chevallen, and a certaln gent'leman, M. de
l'Iorande,20 The surgeon stated that 5 years prevlousry
he was summoned ln h1s professlonal capaclty to
examlne the Chevaller as tshet laboured under a d1s-
order twhlch rendered an examlnatlon of the affllcted
part absolutely neeessaryt. The Chevaller was, h€
asserted, certalnly a woman. IvI. de Morandets evldence
was Just as compelllng:
"He swore that, so long ago as the 3rd JulyL774, the ChevalLer DrEon made a free d1sclos,
ure of her sex to the wltrress. That she had
even proceeded so far as to dlsplay her bosom
on the occaslon. that, th consequence of thlsdlselosure of sex, she, the Chevaller DtEon,had exhlblted the contents of her female
wardrobe, whlch conslsted of sacques, pettl-
coats. and othen hablllments calculated forfemlnlne use. That, on the sald 3rd day ofJuly 1774, the wltness pald a mornlng vls1tto the Chevaller DtEon, and, flndlng her 1nbed, aceosted her 1n a style of gallantny
respectlng her sex. That, so far from belng
offended wlth thls freedom, the sald Chevallerdeslred the wltness to approach nearer to herbed, and then pernltted h1m to have manualproof of her belng, 1o very truth, a woman.,t2l
It 1s dlfflcu1t to 1mag1ne. that, lfl ordlnary
clrcumstanees, Lord MansfleId could have falled to
understand the nature of the case (as he later clalmed)
when thls evldence was unfoldlng. ft ls suggested
20. The evldenee glven
Ashton, note 1, at
2I. Ib1d., at p.160.
at the trlal ls
pp.159-162.
recalled by
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that hls apology to Cheavller D'Eon, for that ls what
lt was, glven on the motlon for arrest of Judgment"
was the product of reflectlon and hlndslght. It
followed seven months after tr1al2 - durlng whlch
tlme the tgreat nolser all over Europe of whlch the
learned Judge spoke was taklng p1ace. The wager,
that noble Engllsh expedlent for I settllng a contro-
versyr had brought dlsgrace on lts most enthuslastlc
patron. And the eourts had provlded the venue for
1t so dolng. fhls case, 1ts facts and the proeeedlng,
made a mockery of Engllsh Justlce. And 1t dld not end
wlth the tr1a1. Counsel for the defendant called no
evldence, and made no attempt to dlsprove the plalnt -
lffrs assertlon that the Chevaller D'Eon was a woman.
Indeed he, ln effect, eonceded the polnt, and conflned
hlmself to allegatlons of fraud based upon the
conslderatlon that:
"... the p1a1nt1ff had taken advantage of h1sellent, belng ln possesslon of lnteIllgeneethat enabled hlm to lay wlth greater certalnty,
although wlth such great odds on h1s slde;that the plalntlff, at the tlme of laylng the
wager, knew that the Court of France treated
wlth the Chevaller, as a woman, to grant her
a penslon; and that the Freneh Court must
have had some strons elrcunstances to finblbe
that ldea...t'23
22. The tr1a1 conmenced on the lst July L777, the
motlon to amest Judgrnent on Sat., 31 Jan,L778.
23. Idem. Lord Ivlansfleld replled to thls argument by
exampllng a wager made 1n h1s own presence about
the dlnenslons of the Venus de Medlcls for t1O0ln whlch one party dlsclosed he had actually
measured lt hlrnself; the other retortlng that he
had also done so. There was, he dlrected the Jury,
no fraud ln that; Ashton, note 1 at p.161.
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Lord !{ansfleld too, seems to have personal-Iy
eoncluded that the Chevaller LiIa$ a woman. He care-
fu1ly avotds, 1n }11s Judgnent on the motlon for arrest
of Judgment, ldentlfylng the Chevaller DtEon wlth
elther sex. But he does make the follow1ng lnterest-
lng observatlon:
t'We then come to the present case, whlch 1s
shortLy thls: Here 1s a person who appearsto all the world to be a man: 1s statecl upon
the reeord to be tMonsleur Le Chevaller DrEonr
has actecl 1n that eharacter 1n a varlety of
capaeltles' and h4s h1s reasons and advantages
1n so appearlng. t'2*
The Jury brought 1n a verdlct for the plalntlff
and thus accepted hls evldence that the Chevaller
DrEon was a woman. Yet on Df Eonf s death ln England
at Bloomsbury at the age of 83 1n 1810 lt was observed
that he was, wlthout a shadow of a doubt, @!t5
Da Costa v. Jones was, 1n almost every partlcular,
an lncnedlble case. The wager, the soclal standlng
of the partles, the proceedlng, the evldenee, the
verdlct and even Lord Mansfleldrs aoology, read almost
as some f1ct1onal account or some eolourful creatlon
from a Jesterrs imaglnatlon. And the flnal revela-
tlon on the chevallerrs death operated only to turn
the whole proceedlng and lts coneluslon lnto a
rldlculous farce.
24 . lfote 11, at pp . 735-6 .
25. There r*as so much speculatlon as to the Chevallerrs
sex that no less than flve distlngulshed persons
vlewed the body and certlfled h1s sex. Meinolrs
of the Chevaller DrEon, note 15 at p.311.
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But whllst the case ltself 1s not rlch 1n legal
prlnclple,thelessonltteachesJustlflesthe
extended treatment accorded 1t here. If establlshes,
1n a rather glarlng lvay, the undeslrablllty of the
courts 1nvo1v1ng themselves ln adJudlcatlng on specu*
latlons between persons wlth only a tr1v1aI lnterest
ln the subJect matter 1n dlspute. It also bears
wltness to the lmposs1b11lty of the courts achlevlng
anygreaterprospectofcertalntylnthelrconcluslon
sl:ouldtheyattempttodoBo:thanhavethepartles
to the wager themseLves. A polnt whlch, as later
paragraphs show, d1d not eseape the notlce of the
Select Commlttee on Gamlng 1n f844 '
[2.04] TLre Attltude of the Courts to Actlons on Ua
As a consequence of the earlY
restrlctlons on games and garnlng,
were unenforceable 1n the counts.
statutesl Placlng
most gamlng contracts
2 Partles to gamlnr
Before the Act
1.
2.
Supra, para [1.03].
Thls ls, of eourse, a generallsatlon' Ttrere 1e a
Iack of-conslsienci ln the early cases. Howard A.Street, Law of Gaming (fgEZ) eoncludes that elalnsfor wlnnlngs on games were not uncommon ln earlytlrnes al.though the reeords have not survlved.(s"i- se" sn"ruEE v. - coreuacrt 
.(1691): ?-Vent ' 1-75' )in Da Cosffiones@Ta, when expresslng concern
oveFThE-E;'rorc6eEf_11ty of wager"lng eontracts,
Lord Mansfleld made the tnterestlng comment:ltl,lhether lt would not have been better pollcy to
have treated aI1 wagers orlglnally as garnlng con-
tracts, and so have held them vold, ls 
-now too]ate t6 dlseuss. . .,' rlrhls ease 1s clted ln HaIs"
uuryts Laws oi-Ungland (4th ed.) VoI.4, p.8 a!
auifrorfty for the pnoposltlon that at eonmon lawtA gamln! contract,--nbwever, appears always to have
Oee[ uneiforeeable.t' However, as 1t 1s not clear
[ 2.04 ]
contracts vrere, therefore, restrlcted 1n thelr legal
remedles by bhe prlnelple expressed 1n the maxlm
1n Larl dellcto potlor est condltlo possldentls: the
courts w111 not asslst a pla1ntlff who eannot make
out hls ease ". . . otherwlse than through the medlum
and by the a1d of the 111e;ga1 transactlon to whlch he
was hlmself a party''.3 Thls restrlctlon on bhe
enforceablllty of gamlng contraets dld not, however,
apply to wagers I and they were, ln prlnclple, enforce-
able 1n the courts,
In the l-atter half of the elghteenth century,
however, the Counts actlvely sought to dlscourage5
actlons on garnlng and wagerlng contracts and many were
struck down as belng unenforceable because they were
from the Judgnent whether Lord Mansfleld was speaklng
of gamlng contracts before or after leg1s1at1on
passed ln 1710 and 1745 (dlscussed supra, chapt.l)
whleh eertalnly prevented such actlons 1n respect
to the recovery of wlnnlngs of t10 or more at any
one slttlng, the authortty 1s far fnom concluslve.
Fer Mellor J.
Q.B. 3og, 314.
1n Taylor v. Chester (f8691, L.R.4
4. Except of course wagers on the slde of the hands
of those pIaylng, suDra, chapt.1.
Even, Wlndeyer suggests, by forclng sueh cases to
the bottom of the 11sts. The Law of 'lolagers , Gamlng
and Lotterles 1n Australla (1929 ) at p.10.
He does not, however, refer to any sources on thlspolnt although, as subsequent paragnaphs demonstrate'lt 1s perhaps a falr lnference to be drawn from the
attltude of the Judses. And 1n Egerton v. Brownlow(1853) 4 H.L.c.l, Ll4 Parke B. ba;erGd th66tt.. 
. the Counts had been .. . astute, even to an
extent borderlng upon the rldlculoug, to flnd
reasons for refuslng to enforce them.rr
5.
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contrary to publlc po11cy.6 But even thls devlce dld
not whoIly prevent these dlsputes frorr taklng up the
tlme of the courts and complalnts were frequenbly
made by the Judges agalnst actlons on wagers- In
Henkln v. GerssT a wager was la1d ln the amount of
€300 on how the courts would declde the lssue as to
whether a person eould be Iawfully held to ball on a
speclal or1g1na1 for a debt under i40. The report
rer:ords that:
ilLord Ellenborough requested to see the
record; and havlng perused lt, he threw lt
down witfr much dlspleasure 
' 
saylng, - I
certalnly w111 not try thls cause. . . I s1t
here to declde polnts of law that arlse
1nc1dentaIly before me, not to state my
oplnlon upon any questlon submltted to me
from ldle cur1os1ty... If any 1ega1 questlon
could be ralsed ln thls manner for Judlclal
6. rn Jones v. Randall (1774)' 1 cowp'37 appears the
earfffi cLeffiement of thls prlnclple belng
applled 'co wagers. The wager was upon ilwhether
a deeree of the Court of Chancery would be
reversed or not on appeal to the House of Lords. "
The defendant entered lnto the wager to protecthlmself, as the appellant 1n the ease before the
House of Lords, fnon the consequenees of an
adverse Judgment. Lord Mansfleld held, however'that as the wager was not contrary to prlncloles
of norallty or sound pol1cy lt was enforceable.In Gllbert v. Sykes (1812), 15 East, I50 a bet
on TEeT,e or-Wreon Bonaparte was held to be
unenforceable as 1t mlght tend to encourage
assasslnatlon - or even weaken the patrlotlsm
of a Brltlsh subJect. A bet to malntaln
bachelorbood for sl.x years was held unenforceable
1n Hartley v. Rlce (1808), t0 East.22 as were
speilllffins o[-Te pubIlc revenue Atherfold v.
eEara-(tig8j 2 T.n.6io; the result bffifonsETE v. Hearn (f785), 1 T.R.56; lhe chastlty of
a-lvofran Dlffib'urn v. Goldsmlth (1815), 4 Camp,L52',
and the sffi-trrrr@ v. Jones(supra).
(1810),2 Camp.40B.7.
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I'determlnatlon, the lnconvenlence would be1ntolerable., and I conslder the attempt
exifemely l,ndesent. " I
A partlcular complalnt was that actlons on wagers were
consumlng the valuable tlrne of the courts. In a case
ln 1811 Mansfleld C.J. complatned:
ifldhlle we were oecupled wlth these 1dledlsputes, partles havlng large debts due to
them, and questlons of great magnltude to try 
"were grlevously delayed. "e
And 1n the same year an actlon brought on a t{ager on
a cock-f1ght exasDerated Lond Ellenborouglr who
expressed the vlew that lt tended tto the degradatlon
of Courts of Justlcet. He went on:
"It 1s lmposslble to be engaged 1n ludlerouslnqu1r1es of thls sort, conslstently wlth thatdlgnlty whlch lt 1s essentlaL to the publlc
'r,velfare tha! a court of Justtce should alwayspreserve. ttlo
[2.05] Report of the Select Commlttee on Gamlng (1E44)
As prevlously lndlcated the establlshnent of the
8. Ib1d., at p,409.
9. Huqsey v. Crlckitt (f8tt),3-eamp.15B;f
10. g_qulreq v. Whlsken ( 1811) ,Tmrp. i40,:f4F
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Select Commlttee on Ganlngt followed the need for
leglslatlve lnterventlon to put an end to the opport-
unlst qui tam actlone brought by corunon lnformers
after Smlth v. Bond.2 However, although that was
clearly the motlvatlon for the Select Commlttee, that
1s not altogether apparent from the Qrder of Refere.nce
whlch l'.ras:
'i... to lnqulre lnto the exlstlng statutes
agalnst ganlng of every klnd; to ascertalnto what extent these statutes are evaded;to conslder whether any and what amendments
should be rnade 1n sueh Statutes' and to
report thelr oplnlon thereupon to the l{ouse. " 3
[he Commlttee speclflcally alluded ln lts Report to the
faet that any lnqulry lnto the suspended qu1 tam
actlons was outslde the scope of ti:e Order of Refer'
enee. But lnterestlnglv, and although 1t clalmed not
to have carrled out such an lnqulry, the sollcltor
Russell was ln fact subJected to qulte rlg5orous cross
examlnatlon on the matter of hls suspended qu1 tam
actlons. Indeed, he eventually found 1t necessary to
seek refuge behlnd a clalm of professlonal pnlvllege'+
Suprae para.l2.02J. The notlon for the Seleet Conm-lttee was noved on t4th February 1844, Just 4 days
after the Actlons for Gamlng Dlscontlnuance 8111(No.1) 1844 rvas lntroduced lnto the House. Journals
of the liouse of Commons (181{4 ) Vol.99 , pp.24, 31.
Supra,
I.
2.
3. P.II of the Report of the Select Comrnlttee onGamlng, 16th February 1844.
l^lh1ch the Commlttee, lnclclentalLy, appeared reluc'
tant to grant. Paras. 150 8-1.523 of the ltllnutes of
Evldence/. The Select Commlttee subsequently ob
talned Counselrs oplnlon whlch upheld RusseLl's
rlght to refuse to dlselose communlcatlons madeto h1n by h1s cIlent,
/ ot 15th JulY 1844
4.
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the transcrlpt of the evldence glven before
tlre Select Commlttee on Gamln€i runs lnto almost
100 pages of close type, wh11st the Report ltself
occuples only 6 pages.s And although the recornmend-
aLlons 1n the report are brlef and ln very general
terms, they are partlcularly constructlve.
The Comrnlttee thought tlrat many of the earller
statutes on gamlng and bettlng were obsolete, and
'unsulted to the splrlt of bhe aget as belng qulte
at varlance wlth the hablts, manners and oplnlons
of the 19th century,6 In partlcular the vlew was
expressed that the practtce of wagerlng was so
deeply rooted 1n the hablts of the natlon at that
tlme ttrat the lmposlblon of pecunlary penaltles (by
qu1 tam actlons or otherwlse ) was repugnant to the
general feelings of Engllshmen. And thls was parti
cularly so 1n relatlon to any purported applleation
of the Act of Anne (f?fO) to bets on horse races.
Bub the eontlnued legal adJudlcatlon of wagers was
dlssented from. The Report reads:
?tThe Law of England conslders ?ragers 1ngeneral as legal contracts: and the wlnner
of such a wager ean, therefore, enforce hls
clalm in a Court of Law.
The l.avt of Scotland 1s dlfference 1n thls
respect; and the curts 1n that part of the
Unlted Klngdon have he1d, tthat they were
5. Recommendatlons made totilne durtng the course
are brought together 1n
20th May f8q4.
Ibld., at p.IV.
the House from tlne to
of the Commltteets lnqulry
the f1nal rePort of the
6.
t2.05 l
rilnstltuted to try adverse rlghts, and not
to rleiermlne slliy or lmpertlnent doubts
or enqulrles of persons not lnterested 1n
the matters 1n questlon:t and they have
deeided tthat thelr proper functlons are to
enforce the rlghts of partles arlslng out
of serlous transactlons, and not pay regardto sponslones ludlcrae t .
The Scoteh (s1c) Courts have, thereforee
decllned to take cognlzance of c1alms for
money won by rr&B€rs: and ]rour Commlttee
reeotnmend tlat [rre Law of England should 1n
thls respect be asslmllated to the practlcelnScotl-and.Ifprlvatelndlvldualschoose
to make .iagers wlth eaeh other, there seems
to be no goocl reason why they should beprevented from dolng so, or why they should
be punlshed for so dolng' but nelther, oB
the other hand, does there seem to be any
sufflclent reason why the valuable tl-me of
the Courts of Law should be consumed by
adJudlcatlng dlsputes whlch may anlse
belween lndlvlduals ln consequence of sueh
wagers. Such dlsputes appea]' to- be of the
nature of prlvate dlfferences, whlch, not
turnlng upbn the eonstructlon of any lavr or
statutd, Lre matters for prlvate settlenent
rather ifran for legal adJudlcatlon; and
such dlsputes must frequently 
-1!vo1ve the
statement of a varlety of tr1fl1ng detalls 
'l1ttle sulted to the dlgnlty of a Court of
Law, and as to whlch sueh Court could have
no pecullar competence to Judge ' t'7
It was accordlngly reconmended that:
". . . the Courts of Law should be entlrely
relleved from the obllgatlon of taklng cog*
nlzance of clalms for money won by wagers of
any k1nd. Persons wagerlng together should
be left to take thelr chance as to gettlng
from the party wlth whom they have w?geredthe money whlch they may have won. "o
7.
B.
Ibld.
Idem.
, at pp. 5-6.
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Itro speclflc recomnendatlons to the same end were
made ln relatlon to garnlng eontracts. But as the lavr
then ln exlstence rendered nost gamlng contracts
lllegal and unenforceable, one can only assume that
tlre cornmlttee consldered that the status quo 1n that
regard was to be malntalned. But the statutes
lmposlng penattles for playlng at games 'were cr1tlclsed.
and thelr repeal recommended; - prlnclpally because
those laws were of a polltlcal eharacter the motlve
for whlch had long ceased to ex1st. AIso many of the
games prohlblted were eonduclve to heal-th as wel} as
amusement.e However, the keeplng of eommon gamlng
houses came under attack and the Report lndlcates the
Commltteets pleasure 1n observlng that 17 gamlng houses
ln the Metropolltan Po11ce Dlstrlct had, a few days
prlor to the 20th of l4ay 1844, been closed by Pol1ee
ra1ds. l0 Gambllng booths on race courses lrtere also
crltlctsed as belng an undeslrable accompanlment to
raclng, but the followlng lnportant observatlon was
made wlth regard to raclng generally:
;tYour Commlttee would be sorry to aopear to
dlscourage horse -rac1n61;. that sport has long:
been a favourlte one of all elasses of theBrltlsh Natlon both at home and abroad, andlt has been systematlcally encouraged by the
Government by means of numerous plates annuallvglven by the Crown to be run for, wlth a vlewto the lmportant obJect of keeplng up, bY the
competltlon of prlvate lndivlduals, and wlthout
any other eharge to the Governnent, an lmproved
bneed of horsei tnroughout the country'"rr
9. Ibld. , Bt
lC. Ibld. , at
11. Ib1d., at
p.rv.
p.VIr.
p.VIII 
"
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The Sel-ect Commlttee on Gamlng placed horse
raclng on a dlffenent plane to all other forms of
gamlng. The above quotatlon appears at the end of
the Report and thus.. I suggest, quaLlfles the earller
observatlons made ln relatlon to transactlons ln tire
nature of wagerlng contracts or ganlng on honse races
that gave encouragement to the sport. Tttls lnter-
pretatlon of the Select Commltteets lntentlon 1s re.
lnforced by 1ts earller observatlon that the Act of
Anne (f7fO) should not operate to cateh or penallse
transactlons arlslng out of horse raclng.
fhe tenor of the Select Commlttee'8 Report was
that vlrtually the whole of the exlstlng laws of
gamlng and wagerlng requlred updatlng. And that was
to be achleved by the repeal of the earller statutes
relatlng to gamlng; the repeal of the Acts of
Charles II (1664) and Anne (1710); the enactment
of provlslons renderlng wagerlng contracts unenforce-
able 1n the Courts; and some modlflcatlon and
extentlon of laws pnohlbltlng gamlng on certaln
premlses and places. Ttrese reconmendatlons were
shortly aeted upon by the leglslature when lt
enacted the Gamlng Aet, 1845.
[2.05]
[2.06] Sectlon 18, Ganlng Act, 1845
The prlnclpal concern of the Act of 1845 was to
put down gaming housesr and most of lts provlslons
were deslgned to that end. Games of sk1'11, however,
enJoyed a change of status for, os the Select
Commlttee on Gamlng recommended, the statute 33
IIen.VIII, c.! was repealed.2 And also, by s.15 the
Act of Charles II (1664) and the penal provlslons of
the Act of Anne (1710) - that ls, so much of that
Act as was not altered by 5 & 6 hI1Ll.IV, c.413 - were
also repealed. Ttre recomnendatlon that wagerlng
contracts be rendered unenforceable ln the Courts
was glven effect to by s.l8 of the Act whlch
provlded, lnter alla:
Although bettlng houses escaped the attentlon of
the leglslature 1n 1845 they were subsequently
subJected to slmllar controls to those applled
to gamlng houses when the Bettlng Houses Act
was enaete<i 1n 1853. (re & 17 Vlct. , c.Ll9. )
By s.1, Gamlng Aet, f841. Importantly so much
of the provlslons of the Act of Jl Hen.VIII as
made the playlng of games of sklII ".. . such asbowllng, coytlng, cloy:-hcayls, half bowl tennls,
or the l1ke ...i' were repeaLed. Thus, after the
1Bq5 Act the mere playlng of games of pure sk1lI
no longer attracted penal 11ab1Ilty.
That 1s, s.1 by whlch all securltles etc.glven for garnlng debts (or bets on the slde)
survlved, but ln the form as nodlfled by theAct of 1835.
1.
2,
3.
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'rThat alL contracts or agreements, whetherby parole or 1n wrltlng, by way of-5amlng
oi' iragerlng, sha1l be null and vold; and
that no sufi shaLl be brought or malntalned
1n any court of faw or equltv for reeoverlng
any sum of money or valuabLe thlng allegedto be won upon any wager, or whlch shal1 have
been deposlted 1n the hands of any person to
ablde the event on whlch any wager shall have
been made .. . "
The pollcy of thls enactment was ! as Lush J
explalned 1n lialgh
treat:
v. Town Councll of ShelllLglclo to
".. . the ordlnary practlce of bettlng and
wagerlng lane garnlns] as a thlng of
neitral-charaeier, not to be encouraged,but on the other hand, not to be absolutelyforbldden; and 1t left an ordlnary bet a
mere debt of honour, deprlvlng 1t of all .legaI obllgatlon, uut nbt maklng lt 11legal.''5
The Act was concerned, therefore, to pender wagerlng
and gamlng contracts unenforceable - but nob lllegal.
Thus a payment by the loser to the wlnner of a bet
operated to confer a gooc t1tle to the money on the
latter whllst the former, bY tbe payment over, lost
or walved a beneflt whlch the statute conferred upon
4.
5.
(L875), L.R.10 Q.B.]02.
fbld., at
Ln Read v.
r0 4:5 .
p.109' and see
- Anderson (1882)
slmllarly Hawklns J
,10 Q.B,D.100,
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h1m.6
The general nature of gamlng and wagerlng
contraets has already been alluded to7 and 1n later
chapters lt vrlI1 be necessary to examlne partlcular
elements of these contracts 1n some detall. At thls
point, however, 1t 1s neeessary to lndleate 1n a
general w&vr the scope of s.IB of the 1Bq5 Act.
The flrst llmltatlon on the operatlon of the
provlslon ls that lt applles only to wagerlng and
gaming contracts. As to the former, as Hawklns J
explalned 1n 
-Carllf1 v. garnolfc Smoke eall t
lt is not easy to deflne wlth preelslon the narrow
l1ne of demarcatlon between wagerlng and ordlnary
contracts. Indeed, 8t best, the most satlsfactory
tdeflnltlonsf are, 1D the end, Ilttle more than
descrlptlons. The best two such deserlptlons are
those of Hawklns J hl-mself 1n the Carbollc Smoke
Ball Companye and an earller 'deftnltlont attempted
by Cotton L.J. 1n Thacker v. Hardylo The Chlef
6. Bowen L.J. 1n Brtdger v. savagg (1885) 15 Q.8.D.363,
367--8. Voldabillty Elso operates however for tlre
courts beneflt and 1t may refuse, of 1ts own motion,
to enforce payment of a bet, Luckett v. llood(1908), 24 T.L.R.517 or may stilke out a statement
of claln as dlscloslng no reasonable cause of
actlon lf the plalntlffts clalm ls for money due
1n respect of wagerlng and gamtng transactlons.
Kershaw v. Slever (1904) 
' 
2l T.t.R.40.
7 . Chapter [1.0r].
B. [1892] 2 Q.8.484,490.
9, Ibld., Hawklns Jts Ceflnltlon w1lL be exanlnedfurther ln chapter 4, when totallsator bettlng
w111 be dlscussed.
10. (1878), 4 Q.s.D.685.
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Justlce sald:
"The essence of gamlng and wagerlng 1stlrat one party 1s to wln and the otherto lose upon a future event, whleh at thetlme of the contract ls of an uncertaln
nature - that 1s to sa.y, lf ilre event turns
out one way A w111 lose, but 1f 1t turns
out the other way he wlll wln.'tlr
I{awklns J suggested 1n hls deflnltlon that the event
1n lssue between the partles must be fa future
uncertaln eventt 12 but thls cannot, r^ilth respect,
be accepted wlthout materlal guaI1f1cat1on. The
phrase 1s accurate only 1f the words r future event t
are conflned to the actual contlngency upon whlch
the nesult of the bet 1s to be declded. For example
a wager as to whlch horse vion a certaln race ten
years prevlously 1s a eontest as to the accuracy of
the memory or knowledge of the partles to lt. The
I future uncertaln event ? therefore, ls who 1s
correet rather than whlch horse 1n fact won the
race. And the runcertalntyt 1s somethlng whlch
exlsts between the partles, rather than ln fact. 13
For Hawklns J the essence of a wagerlng eontraet
was that elther party may under lt, elther wln or
Iose. And:
11. Ibld., at p.695.
t2. Note B at p.490.
13. F'or further dlscusslon on thls polnt see 18Ilalsburyrs Laws of England, (3d) p.lZ1 note (i )
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rrlf elther of the partles may wln but
cannot lose, or nay lose but cannot wln,lt ls not a wagerlng eontract . t'rr
Ttrls statement has been lnterpreted as meanlng
that not only must each party be llable to w1n or
lose, but also that there can only be two partles
to a wagerlng contract.ls It 1s, however, a polnt
of vlew that has not rvon unlversal aceeptanc€, 16
and wlll- be examlned 1n Cetall ln a later chapter.lt
Sufflce to say at thls polnt that the ldea that
each party must elther wln or lose has, 1n England,
been heLd essentlal to the exlstence of a wagerlng
contraetr rB whll-st the need for only two pantles
has found conslderable support, re but awalts con--
14. Note B at p.491.
15. Note 13 at p.170.
16. It has not been accepted 1n llew Zealand where
multlpartlte vlagerlng contracts have been
upheld. fnfra, chapter 4.
l-7. rb1d.
IB. EllesmereffivffiF; v. I^Iallace t 1929ll,ffismoker 2 Ch.1; Tote[1968] 1 a--.509.
19, RusselL L.J. 1n Ellesnere v. I.lal1ace was em-phatl-c on thls p6ffi:[. iIF salil--rTF truth 1sthat you cannot have more than two partles or
two sldes to a bet. You may have a multlpartlte
agreement to contrlbute to a sweepstakes.. . butyou eannot have a multlpartlte agreement for abet unless the numerous partles are dlvlded lnto
two sldes, of whlch one rslns or the other wlns,
accordlng to whether an uncertaln event does or
does not happen". Ibld., at p.l2; and Lord
Peanson 1n Tote Investor-s l,td. v. Smgker, sa1c1:
,'. 
. . rt hasffiltsheffiflEne
declslons that only a contract lnvolvlng abllateral chance [as opposed to a unllateral
ehancel ts a eontract by way of gamlng or
wagerlng wlthln the meanlng of sectton lBrt. NotelU aE p.520, but Lords Dennlng and Wllberforce1n the same-case_preferred to leave that polnt
openr FF.5t6, 518.
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ffu"mat1on. a
A further essentlal element of a wagerlng contract
ldentlfled by llawklns J was bhat the partles to the
bet should have no other lnterest ln the transactlon
than the stake or stakes at r1sk, In h1s vlel the
two partles to the bet:
"... mutuallv agree that, deoendent upon thedetermlnatLon of that event r one shall r,vlnfrom the other, anC that other sha1l pay or
hand over to hlme a sum of mone;y or other
stake; nelther of the contractlnc' partles
havlng atlitn e . ilffi'ere befnfi ilraTffi-Erthe maklng of-such eontract by elther ofthe partles . 
'.21
The punpose of thls element 1n iiawklns J's deflnltlon
was to enable a dlstlnctlon to be drawn between
wagerlng contracts and contracts of lnsurance. It
has been sald that tlnsuranceg are only a speeles of
wagert z but thls lgnores the motlvatlon of the partles
to a contract of lnsurance whlch 1s, to provlde
agalnst the posslblllty of loss rather than to
My enphasls
20. Ibld.
2L, Note 8 at p.q90-1.
22, Tlre authorltles 1n support of thls vlew are
collected b.y 1,1.J.V. Itindeyer, The Law of Wagers,
Gamlng and Lotterj.es 1n Australla (1929), p.95.the phrase ln lnverted conmas appears ln Eentham,Prlnclpals of Penal Lawu Part fII, Chapt.5.
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speculate for ga1n.23 A poliev of lnsurance 1s
therefore not a wagerlng eontract and ls dLstlng*
ulshable as such by the lnsured's lnsurable lnterest.
The lnterest may vany aecordlng to the nature of the
pollcy or the rlsk. In f1re, marlnee and slmlIar
23. In t{1ls_o;r v. Jones (1862), L.R. z F.x.139, an oftenquot6d6rthorlEffior the proposltlon, -biackburnJ stated 1t thus:t,I apprehend that the dlstlnc..tlon between a polley and a wager 1s thls: apo11cy ls, properly speaking, a contract tolndemnlfy the lnsuned ln respect of some lnterest
whlch he has agalnst the perl1s whlch he contem-plates 1t w1ll be l1ab1e to. . . [tne lnterestbelngl tfrat 1f the event happens the party w1I1galn an advantage, 1f 1t ls frustrated he w111suffer a loss'. fb1d., at p.150-1.
24. Transactlons 1n the form of marlne lnsuranceprovlded a form of rvagerlng 1n England 1n the18th century. The preimble to the statute IgGeo.If , c.37 TLre I'larlne Insurance Act LT4j-6
whlch was enacted to put an end to the practlce,
records: ;that the maklng assurances, lnterestor no lnterest, or wlthout further proof oflnterest than the polley, hath been productlve of
many pernlelous practlces.. 
. Ilneludlng the 1ntro..
<luctlon ofl a mlschlevous klnd of garnfng or
wagerlng, under the pretence of assurlnfi t]re rlsk
on shlpplng and falr trade.. ,tr Orlg1na1ly con-tracts of marlne lnsurance were encouraged byprotectlon afforded them at conmon law even nherethe lnsured had no lnterest 1n the cargo. If thepoIlcy tras expressly made r.lnterest or no lnter-
estr'1 I'wlthout further pi'oof of lnterest than thepo11cy ltself' ; or 'twlthout beneflt of salvage tothe lnsurer'' the pollcy rrras known ag a tp.p.i. orlronour or rrager pollcyt and was enforceabrb wltrr.-
out proof of lnterest on the part of the lnsured,the pollcy belng the proof of lnterest. At flrstthe conmon lar.v dlscouraged such pollcles but asthey ',,rere beneflclal and a convenlence to mer-
chants they r{ere enforeeable. Ttre SadLens Co. v.
Fadcoc5:and 0thers (1243) 2 ntffi tr
cne porlcy was not made p.p.l. lt was deened acontract of lndemnlty and the assured eould not
recover I,rlthout oroof of lnterest. Lucena v.Craufurd (f805), 2 Bos,& p.Ii.R.269,-Pf. po}1
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types of lnsurance for example, the pollcy 1s 1n the
nature of a contract of lncl-emnlty.2s In the case of
11fe lnsurance.6 on the other hando the contract ls
based upon an lnterest whlch the pollcy holder has
ln the 11fe assured.2T It 1s only tirls lnsurable
lnferest that cllstlnguishes lnsunance from wagerlng
cles lent thenselves to wagerlng as no proof of
lnteresb 1n the cargo .- or even lts exlstence -i.Ias
necessary. The luiarlne Insurance Act, 17\5-5 pro-hlblted p.p.1. pollcles and alL other pollcles by
way of rvagerlng and gamlng on Brltlsh Shlps and
cargoes etc. The hlstory of thls 1eg1slat1on and
subsequent Marlne Insurance Acts 1s dlscussed 22
Halsburyts Laws of England (3d ed.) pp.106-107.
25. In the case of flre lnsurance the assured must
have an lnsurable lnterest 1n the propertylnsured. The Sadlers Company v. Dadcocl<, lb1d.
26, Llke marlne lnsurance, lnsurances on the llves of
others by dlslnterested partles was sub"lectecl to
statutory control- prlor to the enactment of the
Gamlng Act, 1845. See Llfe Insurance Act, (1774).
14 Geo.IfT, c.48 1n vrhlch 1t was prohtblted to
rnake lnsurances on the l1fe or Llves of persons
where the person for whose beneflt the nol1cy was
made hacl no lnterest ln the l1fe lnsured" or to
r^rager or game on such l1ves.
?7. A rlsk of peeunlary loss to the person taklng out
the pollcy over the others I 1lfe 1s sufflclent to
€t1ve hlm an lnterest ln that l1fe, llalford v.
Kymer ( 1830 ) , 10 B. & c.7?tt; persons66Erelatlon of husband and wlfe each have an lnterest
1n each others l1ves Grlfflths v. Flem:lgg [1909]1 K.B.B05; and a creil[GFhE an ffiEffi3-t ln
the l1fe of hls debtor to the extent of the debtprovlded lt 1s an enforceable debt. These
obvtous cases ane lnserted slmply to lllustrate
the nature of the lnterest referred to 1n the
L77\ Act. The concept of lnsurable lnterest
1s a eomplex one an examlnatlon of whlch far
exceeds the wrlterrs expectatlons for thls work.
contracts. Wlthout 1t,
of lnsurance would faI1
Act, 1845 as a waFerlng
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what 1s ostenslbly a contract
wlthln s.18 of the Garalng
contract.
A clstlnctlon slnllar to that drawn between
contracts of lnsurance and wagers nust, also be
recognlsed between the latter and speculatlve
commerclal transactlons. of particular lmportance
1n thls regard a.re transactlons 1n the nature of
speeulatlons on the Stock Exchange. The larnr has
been caneful to draw a dlstlnctlon between eommerclal
speculatlons and 5lamb1tng, and the prlnclpJ.e enun.-
clated by Lord tierschell ln tg95 ln the prlvy
councll declslon of Forget v. Ostlgnyza contlnues to
operate to the present day. In that case the
appellant, a stock br"oker and member of the Montreal
stock Exchange was employed to make actuar contracts
of purchase and sale of shares on the defendantrs
behalf on eomrnlsslon. rn each case the purchase
and sale of the shares was accompanled by dellvery
and payment on behalf of the prlnclpal, but thelatterts ob.Jeet, to the knowledge of the brokerj was
speculatlon and not lnvestment. In the lowen
courts the appellants cla1m to recover the surn of
$1926.87 owlng to h1m by the respondent ln respect
of these transactlons falred on the ground that il:e
money was ourlng under a r garrnlng contract r . The
Appeal to the Jud1clal cornmlttee succeededo however,
Lord :''ors chelL L. C . sa.vtn",:
r?It may well be that the appellant r{as
aware that 1n dlrectlng a purchase to Ue
28. [1895] Lc.31g.
lz. o€,7
r?made the respondent d1d not lntend tokeep the shares purchased, but to seLlthem when, as he antlclpafed would be thecase, they rose 1n value: that h1s obJect
was not lnvestment but speculatlon. foenter lnto such transactions wlth sucb anobJect 1s sometlrnes spoken of as t gambfineon the Stock Exchange r; but 1t ceitalnly-does not folIow that tne transactlonslnvolve any ganilng contract. A contract
cannot properly be so descrlbed merelybecause lt 1s entered. lnto 1n furtherinceof a speculatlon, It 1s a 1egltlmate
commerclal transactl0n to buy a commocllty1n the expectatlon that lt witl rlse 1nvalue and wlth the lntentlon of reallrt'ga proflt by lts resale. Such deallngsare of everyday occurrence ln cofllmerce.The 1egal aspect of the case 1s the same
whatever be the nature of the commodlty,
whether lt be a cargo of wheat or the inaresof a Jolnt-stock company.'a
But lf the transaetlon 1s not a sale and pu'chase
of shares but 1s s1mply an agreement by the partles
to pay dlfferenees occurrlng 1n the prlce of shares
at a future tlme 1t ls a contract by way of wager.-
ing. * Durlng the rSth century and the specuratlve
29. fbld., at p.323.
30. Aghton v-_pqkln (1859), Z iv.R.3g4,365. Some-Elmes carled "dlfferences" or ';tlme bargalns',.Bgth partles must however lntend merely to gam*ble tn ,dlfferencesi'. rf one contemplaies a'uonaflde sale and purchase lt ls not a iracer 
"Untversal Stock Exchange v, Sl-r4chan-[igiA] n.c.cissriffi.B:,,6:"GenerlTrffifi??e ronffiaiJi. ii on r tii tn broke rswlll- not be-wagers, 
_see 
_e_.g. Tnaeker v. H;rat-(]BzB ) 4 Q. B.D. d85 iess: Foiiir"ffitlgnv. note
llj_?"u unrvereet St6cr< ffiei -"-ffiria1]""s'.ipra, e 
. osTTEnfinebroker knows h1s prlnclparG6nry speEil6t1"s.But a broker-may be an Lgent ln,a-wa^gerlngtransactlon cooper v. ueil (tgZB) zi-w.R.i59or may become a party Eo a dlfference trans-
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frenzy generated by schemes such a$ the "south sea
Bubbret' dlfference transactlons 1n stocks, and optlon
contracts, created so much mlschlef that leglslatlon
was passed to outlaw them. sl
By the slmple expedlent of not deflnlng a wagerlng
and gamlng contract the draftsman of s.1g of the
Gamlng Act, 1845 was able to exclude the element of
chance 1n many buslness and eommerelal transactlons
from the operatlon of the sectlon wlthout the necesslty
for detalled and compllcated 1eg1sLat1on. rn that
eontext, therefore, the sectlon can be more readlry
understood as an expresslon of the 1eg1s1atlve lntent
or pollcy, than a statement of 'the lawr. And whl1st
lnsurance and broklng transactlons provlde obvlous
exampres Justlfylng thls type of approaeh, a s1ml1ar
sltuatton ls provlded by ordlnary commerclal trans.
actlons. For exampre 1n croftan v. colgaqs the sale
of a racehorse for a stlpulated surn plus one half of
actl-on, l{ood v. Fevez (1999) ,14 T.L.R.49e; Thackerv; 
- 
$a=rgl aE-n,69fTs ro th6 evlclun"" [n" ;ii"frwlrJ- nave regard to 1n deternlnlng whether lt 1sa genulne q?1e ald^purclr"g"_ as_opiosed to a-""!"r,see In re Gleve t1q99l I 0.8.294' Shaw v. Caledon_@ (rseoi,rz "R- (cl-orffi". i q'A"ffit$x oarre ph11I1ps and r@ (1860);-
3r. ? 99o.Ir, c.8, t0 Geo.rr, 
".[]l'llown as rBarnard,sAct' . It was repealed 1n 1B!0 by 23 a i[ vf.i':;-c.28. rts applicatlon was l1m1ied-to dear.lngs'1r,publlc or Jolnt stock or other pub11c seeurltleswhlch conflned lts operatlon conslderably.W1ll1gms v. Tnye (rg5q), 1g Beav..$5.
32. (r859;, t0 Ir.C.L.R.133.
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any r{1nn1ngs 1t mlght make wlthln a speelfled perlod
1s an acceptable, and lndeed lronest node of settllng
the purchase prlce whereas 1n Brogden v. Marrlott33
an agreement r*rhereby the prlce was to be Ea00 orovlded
the anlmal trotted elghteen m1les 1n one hour w1th1n
one month - and one shllLlng 1f 1t d1d not nalsed a
cl-ear lmpllcatlon of an lntentlon to wager on the
horse?s eapaelty by the partles. The dlstlnctlon
between the two eases I1es, of eourse, slmply 1n the
lntentlon of the partles to the contraets as manlfest-
ed 1n these cases by thelr bargalns. And, ln the law
of gamlng anci. wagerlng eontracts as ln the genenal law
of contract, that lssue of faet 1s resorved by havlng
regard to the substance, rather than the forn of the
transactlon 1n 1ssue. * Thls ls partlcularly so 1n
lnsurance (and stock broklng transactlons ) as prevlous
paragraphs demonstrate, where, (as ln the case of the
former) ob;ectlve crlterla deslgnated as an rlnsurable
lnterestr supplles a worklng test by means of whlct:
the real motlves of the partles whlch may be too ob.-
seure for Judtclal enqulry are to be gauged. ss
33, I].Btq),,3^9lle.N.c.88. Slm1lan1y 1n Coombes v.DlbbLE (1866 ) , L.R.1 Exch.2llg wtrere ffirsonsagreed to race thelr horses agalnst each other,the wlnner to take them both,
34. Carl1ll v. 
_Carbo11c Srno}<e_gell Co. t1B92l 2 Q.B.trs[, trag r lTt.]ffii stlpuratlonsto the eontract see Thagkgr v. Hardy (1g7g) 4-- -
Q. B. D. 6 85 r and severa-ElffiTy orffiEFrini t"r*,Rourke v. Shonr (18561, 5 E:& B.90[. ---e
35. The vlew adopted by the learned. author ln vo1,l8Halsbury's Laws of England (3d eA) p.fZO, f;(ei:
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[2.07] The Provlso to s.18
rt w111 be recarred that an lmportant qual1fl 
-
catlon on the recommendatlons of the seleet commlttee
on Gamlng was thab nothlnE 1n 1ts report was to be
lnterpreted as appearlng to dlscourage horse raelng. l
And, 1t has also been suggestecl by the r,rrlter that
that quallflcatlon was lntended to apply also to the
select commltteers reconmendatlon that all wagerlng
eontracts should be rendered unenforeeable.2
There are, however, wagerlng contracts on horse
races whlch result 1n no tanglble beneflt belng glven
to the sport. For exampre, a r^rager on the slde of a.
race by two partles wlth no other lnterest 1n the
event but the bet, rndeed, even 1f the two pantles
were owners runnlng thelr horses agalnst each other,
the wager would promote only a rlmlted beneflt for
raclng; that 1s, raclng as an enterprlse tendlng to
encourage funproved breeds of horses.3 But subscrlp-
tlons to prlzes or plates to be won by the wlnners of
horse races or other sports do provlde posltlve
eneouragement to lmproved performances, whether by
bneedlng, tralnlng or any other means. And thls
dlstlnctlon and the pub11c beneflt that acerues from
recognltlon of 1t 1s reflected ln the provlso to s. 18
of the Ganlng Act, f845 whlch reads:
1.
2.
Supra, para. !.
Ib1d.
The factor reeognlsed by the Seleet Conrnlttee(1dem. ) as the justlrtcltlon for efving-contlnued encounagement to horse racln[.
3.
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"Provlded always, that thls enactment shall
not be d.eemed to apply to any subscrlptlon
or r:ontrlbutlon, op agreement to subscribe or
contrlbute, for or toward any plate, pr1ze,
or sum of money to be awarded to the wlnner
or wlnners of an_r' lawful 6ame, sport, pastlme,or exerclse. tt
It w111 be convenlent to examlne thls provlso ln
more deta11 1n a later chapters and it 1s sufflclent
to say at thls polnt that wh11st at flrst the courts
had some dlfflculty 1n dlstlngulshlng between trans..
actlons ln the form of wagers on the one hand and
tirose that v'rere corrtrlbutlons towards plates and prlzes
to be awarded to the wlnner on the otherr5 1t became
sebtled6 that the provlso was only:
". . . lntended to meet the case of bona flde
contrlbutlons to a prlze to be glven to the
wlnner ln some larvful cornpetltlon" but not to
money deposlted by way of wapgers. ir7
Thus a wager on a race by tr+o otherlvlse dlslnterested
betters or lndeed a wager by two owners as to whose
horse could run the fasters are not wlthln the orovlso"
Chapter 4.
See e.q, Eatlf. v. l.larrlott (1848), 5 C.B.ErB.
DlggLe v. ill$gs ( rSTZ ) , 2 Ex .D.4ZZ,
Ib1d., at p.42Er F€p Cockburn C.J.
In Ba_9!:i v. Marrlott fon example, the two partles
cleposlted thelr stakes wlth a stakelrolder to
ablde the nesult of a footrace between them.The flndtng ln that case that the transactlon
was saved by the provtso from the avoldlngpnovlslons was over.-ruled by the Court of Appeal1n Plggle v. Hlegs.
u
T.
B.
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whllst contrlbutlons to a prlze or plate to be glven
to the wlnner or wlnners are. The terms of the
provlso do not, of course, provlde a test by whlch
the demarcatlon l1ne between wagers and contrlbutlons
to the wlnnerfs prlze can be drawn. Th1s, as ln the
ease of all eontraets, rnust be drawn by the courts
accordlngly as the lntentlons of the partles as
manlfested by the terns or substance of thelr
bargaln lndlcate that the sontnact was, or was not
a contract by way of wagerlng or gamlng.
Concluplon on Sectlon 18. Gamlng Act " 1845
In respect to the 1aw of gamlng and wagerlng
contracts s,18 of the Gamlng Act, 1845, effected a
complete reform of the Engllsh law. fn thls chapter"
the pre--hlstony and general scope of the sectlon has
been 1dent1f1ed, In later chapters 1ts appllcatlon
1n partlcular cases w111 be examlned 1n more detall
and some attempt w1lL be made to lndlcate the extent
to whleh the provlslon has provlded, and eontlnues to
provlde, a ratlonal basls for deallng wlth wagerlng
and gamlng eontraets.
The 1845 Act and subsequent Engllsh statutes d1d
not have appllcatlon ln l{ew Zealand. But the 19th
century Engllsh Acts were to provlde the basls for
New Zealand law on thls subJect. The Engllsh statutes
enacted after f84l w111 later be examlned ln the con-
text of dlscussion on New Zealand statuteg. And 1n
the next chapter lt w1Ll be necessary to examlne the
extent to whlch Engllsh laws applled to the lnfant
Colony of }iew Zealand. The eoneluslon reaehed ln that
chapten makes 1t deslnable to emphaslse agaln the
three lnportant changes to Engllsh law made by the
Garrlng Act, 1845. The flrst was that lt repeal.ed
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many of the earlter stErtilt,es that had made, the
pLaylng at games - evsn galnes of sktll * unl,awful,
so that, tn regard to the ln pqnl dellcto doctnlne
antl gamlng and wagerlng cont:r'acts, 1ts scope $tas
eonsl,derabll namowed. Secondljr, by s.15 lt repealed
the Aet of 16164 and so much of the Act of 1710 as
ua"s not amended o-y the L835 Aet. And thtrdly, 1t
extended the pollcy of, dlseou:rage,ment that had
featured ln the earller Aets by avolding all gamtng
an wagertng oontrae-tg n !rhli..l,st at the game ttme
aeknowledglng the rreed, to draw 4 dlstlnctton between
wagentng and gamlng contracts and contnlbutlons or
subse l.llt-lons to Brlaes for horee ractng and sthetr
6pot3ts.
[3.01]
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CHAPTER
THE APPLTCATION OF ENGLISH
LAWS IN ITEW ZEALAND
Gener+1 Prlnclples
The prlnclples governlng the lntroductlon
of Engllsh law lnto i'un1nhab1ted" countrles
l'dlscovered and planted.r' by Engllsh subJects were
well developed and known when New Zealand became
a Brltlsh Colony ln t84O. t Those prlnclples are
stated ln the followlng observatlon of S1r !I1111am
BJ.ackstone, whlch was aporoved of and quoted by
Lord Watson, when dellverlng the Judgment of the
Prlvy Councll ln Cooper v. Stuart:2
rf lt hath been held that, lf an unlnhablted
country be dlscovered and planted by
Engllsh subJects, all the Engllsh laws
then ln be1ng, whlch are the blrthrlght
of every Engllsh subJect, are lmnedlately
there 1n force (Satt<.III .666). But thlg
must be understood wlth very many and
veny gr"eat restrlctlons. Such eolonlsts
carry wlth them only so much of the
Engllsh law as 1s appllcable to the
condltlon of an lnfant Colony: such,for lnstance, ds the general nules oflnherltance and protectlon fron personal1nJur1es. The artlflclal requlrements
and dlstlnctlons lncldent to the oroperty
1. Dlscussed at length 1n the I'lew South Wales Supreme
Court by Chlef Justlee Forbes ln 1833 ln
IrtcDonald v. Levy (f833;, 1 Legge 39, 51 ff . and
asffi-ffi E @ (1836), l Legge 7\, T6 ff .
(1889), 14 App.Cas.286, 29I; also approved by
the Privy Councll ln Jex
report p,77, 82; and-Ede
4 Burr.249\; CampbelL v.
2,
v. McKlnney 1n the sameR@an (1769),qa4 (fmfi; Loffr 65j.
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t'of a great and commerclal people, the
laws of po11ce and revenue (such especlally
as are enforced by penaltles), the mode
of malntenance of the establlshed Church,
the Jurlsdlctlon of splrltual Courts,
and a multltud.e of other provlslons are
nelther necessary nor convenlent for them,
and therefore are not ln force. What
shal1 be admltted and what reJected, &t
what tlmes and under what restrlctlons,
must, 1o case of dlspute, be declded 1nthe flrst lnstance by thelr own provlnclal
Judlcature, subJect to the declslon and
control of the Klng ln CounclL: the whole
of thelr constltutlon belng also IlabIe tobe new-modelled and reformed by thegeneral superlntendlng power of the legls-lature ln the mother eountry. t'3
In relatlon to Imperlal statutes cornlng lnto
exlstence after the tlme of dlscovery and settle-
ment by Engllsh subJects, they d1d not extend to
the Colonles unless they purported to do so
t'expresslytt; 
" or unless 1t was finecesBarlly
lmplledrtsthat they should or unless they were
adopted lnto the law of a Colony by the Colon1al
Leglslature. 6
3.
4.
Commentarles, Rook 1, p.107.
Per Lord Blackburn 1n the Lauderdale Peerage
Case (1885) fO App.Cas.69affin
v:qEergg lL92T I N.Z.L.R.-490, 495. -EE-Cra1es on Statute Law, 6th edltlon (1963)
Chapt .18.
5. Per Lord HobhouseCol-onlal Secretar
see Ke Eaoes
2 W.W.n.65, D.L.R.33r-
1n Callender Sykes & Co. v-or grl
5. Cooper v. Stuart supra, especlally at p.291.
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[3.02] The Engllsh Laws Act. 1858
In the case of New Zealand 1t wag not entlrely
clear what Engllsh law exlsted when the Colony was
rrdlscovered and plantedi'r by Englleh subJects because
the date on whlch that event took place could not be
flxed wlth any degree of certalnt,y. The reLevant
sequenee by whlch Brltlsh soverelgnty was extended
over New Zealand was that: on the l5th June 1839
the terrltory was purportedlyz annexed to the
Colony of New South Hales; on the 30th July 1n
the same year Captaln W1lllam i{obson was Commlss-
loned Lleutenant-Governor; on the 30th
January 1840 Hobson 'tdeelaned and proclalmed" that
he had, on the 14th day 1nst. taken the accustomed
oath of offlce, s In 1858 1t was held by Actlng
chlef Justlce stephen that as New zearand was annexed
to the Colony of New South Wales the Eng1lsh law 1n
exlstence and 1n force 1n New Zealand was such
Engllsh law as was ln exlstence when the Colony of
New South WaLes was settled. h Thls declslon gave
rlse to doubts whlch the Leglslature sought to
remove by passlng the Engllsh Laws Aet the sane
year. s That Act declared that:
New Zealand was not of eourse 'rdlscoveredtt byBrltlsh sulJects, and lndeed settLement was,prlor to 1840, haphazardly achleved.
I say purportedly because, as one wrlter has
obsenved, the geognaphlcal extenslons to theConmlsslon of the Oovernor of New South Wales by
whleh the annexatlon was effected, dld not ln factlncLude the whole of the tenrltory of },lew Zealand,See N.A. Foden, Constltutlonal Developments of
New Zealand 1839-1849 (1938).
The hlstorlcal sequence of events and thelrlmpllcat1ons are expounded and explalned by Foden.
An unreported case referred to 1n W1 parata v.Blshop of Welllnston (1BTB ) 3 N. z.JE;ffft)s.Frz,-rr-
The Engllsh Laws Act, f858.
T.
2.
3.
4.
5.
t 3. 031
t3.031
"The laws of England as exlstlng on thefourteenth day of January, one thousand
elght hundred and forty, shall, Bo far
as appllcable to the clrcumstanees of
the sald Colony of New Zealand, b€ deerned
and taken to have been ln force thereln
on and after that day, and sha1l contlnueto be thereln applled 1n the admlnlstratlon
of Justlee accordlngly."
The purpose of thls measure was s1mp1y to f1x
the daterrwhlch should be consldered 1n...[the]
Cour.ts as the foundatlon of the Colony".6 That
ls, the effect of that declaratory leg1slat1ve act
was to ldenttfy the date at whlch Engllsh law was
to be 1n exlstence 1f 1t was to apply ln the Colony
1n terms of the prlnclples stated by Blackstone.
The Appl1cab1llty Dgetrlne
The Engllsh Laws Aet left 1t to the Courts to
determlne, wlthout 1eg1s1atlve guldance, the
matters they should take lnto account 1n deter-
nlnlng whether any partleular Engllsh law was
ttappllcable to the clrcumstances of the . . . Colonytr.
And, as subsequent cases revealed, the determlnatlon
of that questlon was often fraught wlth senlous
dlfflcultles. But from the start the Courts
preservecl a degree of flex1bll1ty that left the
exerclse of Judlclal dlscretlon 1n guch cases
relatlvely unfettered. Some lnslght lnto thls
See note 96; The Engllsh Laws Act, 1858
reelted ln the preamble th',t; "... doubtshave now been ralsed as to what Acts of theImperlal Parllament passed before the 14th
day of January, 1840, are ln force 1n the sald
Colony..,?r and then went on to renove those
doubts by ldentlfylng the 14th day of January
1840 as the relevant date.
6.
approach anc the reason
follow1ng extract from
ln Klng v. Johnston, I he
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for lt 1s revealed ln the
the Judgment of Johnston J
sald:
I'I purposely abstaln from attemptlngto deflne the words t'appIlcablelt andI'clrcumstances'r 1n the Engllsh LawsAct, because 1t 1s lmposslble to foresee
all the comblnatlons which may arlse to
throw doubts upon thelr constructlon;
and any deflnltlon whlch may be glven
at present mlght afterwards affeet a
case whlch, 1f foreseen, mlght havepresented a ground for modlfylng thedef1n1t1on, It seems to me, however,that lt wlll be neeessary to llm1t the
terms by conflnlng them to such rrclrcum-
stancestt and such ilapplleabllltytr as
the Court can Judlclall.y notlee."'
The prlnclpal lssue 1n Klng v. Johnston was
whether s.23 of the statute 2 Geo.II, e.23 (1728)
requlrlng
b111 one
attornles 1n England to dellver a slgned
month before actlon was appllcable to the
clrcumstanees of New Zealand on the l-4th day of
January f840. The defendantts contentlon ln the
case lnvolved the proposltlon that as there were
no attornless 1n (physlcal) exlstence ln the Colony
at the relevant date, 1t could not be unged that
when persons dld conmenee buslness as attornles
1.
2.
(1859) 3 N.z.Jur. (N.s. ) s.c.9ll.
Ib1d., at p.95.
The defendar:tf s contentlon ln the ease waslllustrated by the hypothesls that 1f there
were no carrlers, or no lnfants ln the Colony
at the relevant date, and they subsequently
came, "1t could not be urged ... [tfren] tfreEngllsh Law as to carrlers or lnfants would
not &pp1y". Ibld., at p.95.
3.
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the Engllsh laws applleable to that professlon would
not apply. Johnston J. reJected thls argument as
belng founded upon a fallaclous use
t'clrcumstances" and ttappllcablerr.
say:
of the words
He went on to
ItThe nlght test of !'app11cabll1ty'i andrrclrcumgtancesrr cannot berwhether on aglven day the partlcular law could be
actually applled to any person on thlng
1n the Colony; for 1f lt were, lt mlghtbe lnslsted that 1f there d1d not happento be a b111 of exchange faIIlng due on theglven day 1n the Colony, the law of England
as to the presentment of b1lls of exchange
was not appllcable to the clrcumstances ofthe Colony on that day; and other e1m1lar
results, as lnconvenlent or absurd, would
ar1se, whleh never eould have been
contemplated...rtf
The learned Judge then went on to hold that the
enactment ln questlon was not appllcable to the
clrcunstances of the Colony because:
". . . at the date ln questlon, there not
only was no sollcltor or attorney 1n
exlstence 1n New Zealand to whom theEngllsh law could be appllcable 1n New
Zealand, but thene could not then be any
such person under the "clreunstances" ofthe Colony, 8s there was not then any
Supreme Court 1n exlstenee, and 1t requlredthe ereatlve power of the Leglslature of
New Zealand to brlng both the Court and
the practltloner lnto exlstence; and thatIeglslatlon certalnLy altered the nclrcum-
stances" of lhe Colony 1n a materlaLpartlcular. tt 5
4. Ib1d,, at
Ibld., at
p.95 
.
p.95.5.
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The rrclrcumstancest' and t'appllcabllltyrf of
whleh the Court could take Judlclal notlce was
ldentlfled 1n Klng v.Johnston as the leglslatlve
act neeessany to establlsh both the Court and the
practltloner 1n the Colony. A slmllar approach
was adopted ln New South Wales ln R v.Schoflel-d.6
fn that ease the lssue was whether the statute
18 Geo.II, e.34, s.87 was appJ-lcab1e to the Colony
of New South Wales. Thls enactment provlded, lnter
aIla, that a wlnner of o:10 at any one tlme, or.1:20
wlthln the space of 24 hours, Bt any game or wager
on a game, was Ilable to be'rfined flve tlmes the
value of the sum so won.. .; whlch fl-ne (after such
charges as the eourt shall Judge reasonable allowed
to the prosecutors...etc.) shall go to the poor of
the parlsh ..." Forbes C.J. held that the statute
was 1napp1lcab1e to the Colony of New South Wales.
He held that the lmposltlon of the penalty and 1ts
approprlatlon were not severable, and that as there
were no Iega1 poor ln the Colony there hlas:
rr.. 
. a want of some Ieg1slat1ve modlfleatlonto carry thls salutary Law lnto effect."I
The Court recognlsed that there were voluntary
assoclatlons of benevolent subscrlbers to lnstltu-
tlons for afford.lng casual rel1ef to the poor or
lnflrmed 1n New South Wales. But there were no
parochlal paupers nalntalned out of parlsh rates'
6,
7.
8.
(1838), 1 Legge 9T ,
The Gamlng Act, 17q4.
Note 5 at p. I00.
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Ievted by laiv, arrd whlch were dlstributed and
managed by guardlans ancl overseers appolnted by lay
payers as ln England.s S1m11ar1y, Stephen J ln
Ex Parte Lyons ; In re iJllsonro held that the Engllsh
bankruptc:l lal^r contaiile.. in 5 Oeo.f!, c"16 Q8z5) i.ras
not ln force ln I'lew Soubh l^traLes because the offlcers
by whon 1t was to be carrled lnto effect, 1.4.
Commlssloners appolnted by the Lord Chancellor, were
not ln exlstence there. And, 1o add1t1on, the
Colon1a1 Leglslature had not, &t the relevant date
1n 1828, authorised any Commlssloners to demand or be
pald fees. rr It requlred leglslat1ve and admlnlstra-
tlve machlnery, whlch 1n the clrcunstances of the
Colony ln 182812dld not ex1st, to carry the relevant
provlslon lnto effect. In Quan Ylck v lllndst3 a
declslon of the Hlgh Court of Australla, 1t was also
held that where an enactment Save a rlght of appeal
to a person convlcted, to a Court lo that was not 1n
exlstencels 1n the Colony of New South t'rlales 1n 1828,
that:
9. Ib1d., at p.100.
10. (t839;, I Legge 140.
lL. Ibld., at p.141-2.
L2. The relevant date belng the 25th July 1B2B by
9 Geo.IV" c,83 s.24. (fne New South Wa1es Act).
13. (1905) 2 C.L.R.345, 367.
14. The Court of Quarter Sesslons.
15. In Mltchell v.Sca1es (1907)" 5 C.L.R.405, 409,theEurF aet<ndwf??Ecd that 1t was mlstaken on
thts polnt and that there was 1n faet a law asto Courts of Quarter Sesslor'ls ln force 1n NewSouth l,iales at the relevant date. Howeven, 1t 1s
subnltted bhat the reasonJ.ng 1n QqqnJl ek v. Ulnds
apart from the nrlstake, ls goi,*. In i4ltche- ! v.Stales, on the same pr6v1s1on, the declElon iuEs
the same on other grounds.
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". . . ls . r . of ltself sufflclent to showthat the pnovlslon ... fwasl not sultableto the elrcumstances of the Colony. t,16
The reasonlng 1n Ex Parte Lyons: fn re !^I11son was
adopted by the Fllgh Court ln Quan Ylct.c v. Iilndgrz and
lt 1s submltted that the AustnaLlan declslons support
the reasonlng of Johnston J 1n Klng v. Johnston.
However, lt 1s recognlsed that the Australlan Courts
were not applylng the same test, of belng rrappllcable
to the clrcumstances of the Colony'f r &s the lriew
Zealand Court. For the Courts 1n E v.Schofleld,
Ex parte Lyons: In re W11son and euan Ylck v.Hlnds,
the test to be applled was that derlved from the
statute 9 Geo.IV, c.83 (1828) (commonly referred to
as the New South Wales Act); - the Australlan
equlvalent of the Engllsh Laws Aet, L858. That
Act provlded, lnter alla, that the laws and statutes
1n force tn England at the date of lts passlng (Z5tn
Juty 1828), were to be:
".,. appLled 1n the admtnlstratlon ofJustlce 1n the Courts of New South Wales
and Van Dlemanrs Land respectlvely so far
as the same can [reasonauiv]ro be Lpplled.''re
fi. Per Grlfflth C.J., note 13 at p.365.
17. By Bartoil J, note 13 at p.367-8.
18. The Courts construed the statute by lnsertlngthe word t'repsonablytt before the phrase t'be
?ppI1ed;r . Wlcker v. Hume ( 1858 ) , 7 H,L. C. lZ4;Quan Ylck r.@, nFr3, especially thejiid'srmenf-of ffi:IAF'Jusrlc airrritn; Jix v.
McKlnney supra, para 1, note 2.
19. S.24.
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Thus, whereas the Austrarlan Act rerated the questlon
of appIleab1l1ty spee1f1eal1y to the admlnlstratlon
of Justlce, under the New zealand Act 1t rvas slmpry
a factor 1n 'rthe clrcumstances of the . .. Colony.,
the Courts could take lnto account.
There was, 1t 1s conced.ed, a fundanental dlstlnc-
tlon betlr'een the terms of the statute g Geo.IV., c.83(ttre New South 'l,lales Act ) and those used tn Engllsh
Laws Aet., 1858. In Whlcker v. Humezo the Lord
chaneellor sald that the Australlan Act rrapplled
only to the laws regulatlng the admlnlstratlon of
Justlce ?3 But, as Grlfflth C.J. polnted out ln
Quan Ylck v. tilngsz 1n refenence to the Australlan
Act:
'?the_real questlon ln every case 1s whetherth9 [Iingllsh] law or Statute ln questlon
extends to and ls 1n force ln the Colony.',23
And, ln resolvlng that questlon, 1t was pentlnent
bo deterrnlne whether the Engllsh law under examln.-
atlon was 'tsultable or unsultable 1n lts nature to
the needs of the Colony,'r2t whlch was ancther,
20. llote 18.
2L. Ibld.. at p,149.
22. Note 13.
23. Ibld., at p.354.
24. Ibld., at pageper Lord Watson
14 App.Cas.286.
356 and per Barton J at page 370:1n Cooper v. S-luant ( 1889 ) ,293Et'-2e4:-
[3 
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and qulte lndependent questlonzs from whether 1t was
"lntrlnslcaIly lncapable of appllcatlon owlng to the
condltlon of the laws and lnstltutlon of the colonyrr,
Thus, 1n splte of thls fundamental dlstlnctlon ln
termlnoloByr the Ausbrallan courts -were stlrl bound
to conslder the sultablllty of the statute 1n issue
to the general clrcumstances of the Australlan
Colonles.
But whlrst the New .Zealancl and Australlan courts
have sought to achleve sone meanlngful crarlflcatlon
of the ''appl1cab1l1tyit doctrl-ne, the same 1s
unfortunately not true of the Canadlan courts. In
that Jurlsdlctlon the tests proposed for 1ts applle-
atlon are as vague as the term ,taopllcab1e'? 1i;se1f .
Fon example, ln l,l.akowekl v. yachlmyc 27 the construc-
tlon of s.11 of the North-'r{est Terrltorles Act,
R.S.C.1906, C.62 was 1n 1ssue. That sectlon
pnovlded, lnter alla:
'SubJect to the provlslons of thls Act, thelaws of England relatlng to clv1l and
crlmlna1 matters" as the Bame exlsted on thel5tfr ciay of July, 1820, D shall be lnforce 1n the Tenrltorles 1n so far as the
same are apollcable to the Terrltorlesr...',
25. Note 13 per Gnlfflth C.J. at p.356: and Forbes C.J.ln R v.Maloney (1836), 1 Lesgb TU, 77.
26. IblC..
27. [1917] r W.W.R,l27g, 34 D.L.R.130 (C.A.1.
28. For a dlscusslon of the hlstory of the apprlcatlonof Engllsh Laws ln the berultorles lncluded byKlng Charles II 1n the Hudsonfs Bay CompanyrsCharter', see Walker_v. Walker [1919] n.C .9hT ;Board v. BgaraT9'J9'l AT;9-55" and the annotaror, s
note to thls case 1n [1919] 48 D.L.R.Z.
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Stuart J sald that the appllcablLlty of Engllsh
statutes to canadlan condltlons under thls pnovlslon
depended not on an oplnlon as to "the1r wlsdom and
good pollcy", but rather upon an oplnlon as to thelr,tfworkablllty'ta ln the Tennltorles at the nelevant
date. And by "workab111tyil he meant workable ln
the sense that the conmon or statute law of England
was not for the colonlsts 'iobvlously lneonslstent
wlth theln new sltuatlons".30 But 1n the later case
of B v.Cyr3r the sane Judge made 1t el.ear that the
phrase 'robvlously lneonslstent t was to be under-
stood 1n a very loose sense. He sald:
"In my oplnlon ... the Counts of thlsProvlnce are not 1n every ease to be heldstrlctly bound by the declslons of theEngllsh Courts as to the state of the
Common law of England 1n fBZ0. ble areat llberty to take cognlzance of thedlfferent condltlons here, not merelyphyslcal condltlons, but the general
condltlons of our publ1e affairs and thegeneral attltude of the communlty ln reeardto the pantlcular matter ln quesilon."r
29. Ibtd., at p.147. (D.L.R. )
30. Idem., and see llalLlburton C.J. 1n Unlacke v.D&-Eson James Z8T clted by Stuant J. -E-6frffiases the wordttappilcableri has slrnplybeen lnterpreted as meanlng ilsultableii or
"properly adapted to the condltlon of the
countryrt wlthout further eLaboratlon. Seee.g. Brand v. Grlfftn (1908) 9 W.L.R,4ZT i(rgozi i n.i:R:zliitiai"' co. v. Smartt19r. .12-
31 [1917] E w.tI.R.8ll9, 29 C.c.c.TT, 38 D.t.R.601.
32. Ibld., at p.5ro (D.L.R.).
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Thus soclaI and physlcal condltlons as weLL as
publlc attltudes were relevant for determlnlng not
only whethen the Engllsh 1aw ln questlon applied in
Canada, but a1so, and assumlng 1t dld, for the
purpose of determtnlng what that 1aw was. In
Makorrekl. v. Yachln:,rc Stuart J recognlsed that by
so dolng the courts 1n canada wer4e "ln effect legls-
latlngrt33 and he added:
"If we are practlcalLy leglslatlng, t{e arereally perhaps Iegls1.at1nq for Enfiand
rather than Alberta. tt 3{
In New Zealand and Australla the exlstence or
non-exlstence ln the colonles on the relevant dates
of the leglslatlve and adrnlnlstratlve machlnery
necessary to enforce or apply Engllsh raws has been
largely deterrnlnatlve of thelr appI1cabll1ty. But
1n canada even these notlons have not been glven the
same force. In an extenslve Judgment 1n Sheppard
v. Sheppard35 1n 1905 Martln J explalned that
condltlons 1n the canadlan colonles were so except-
1onal that the exlstence of the necessary adminl-
stratlve and leglslatlve maehlnery for the apprlcatlon
and enforcement of Engllsh laws courd not posslbly be
a precondltlon to thelr app11eab11lty. If they
were, h€ explalned, every one of the convlctlons
entered ln the earry crlmlnal tr1a1s for offenees
33. Note 27 at p.l-46. (o.r,.n.)
34. rb1d..
35. (1go8) 13 8.C.R.486.
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agalnst the common law and Engllsh statutes were
1lJ.egal because, not only could a Jury not be
sunmoned on the relevant date accordlng to the
t-ormalltles presr:r1bed and essentlal for trlals 1n
Engllsh Courts, but often the requlslte number of
Jurors was not ava1lable.36 In consequence,and to
avold an absurdlty, Engllsh law and the machlnery
for 1ts enforcement were substantlally rnodlfled;
rather than held to be inappllcable ln the exeept-
1onal geographlc, cllmatlc and soclat condltlons
prevalllng ln the }tonth Anerlean Colon1es.
Strlctly speaklng, what lrtantln J sald of the
leglslatlve and admlnlstratlve machlner:y fon the
applleatlon of Engllsh Iaw ln Brltlsh columbla ancl
the i'tronth ',{est Terrltorles was also true 1n early
Nelr Zealand and Australla. Bub there 1s, however,
a dlfferent ernphasls a,pparent 1n the Canadlan
cases; an emphasls that manlfests ltself 1n a
greater w11I1ngness to appty and nodlfy Engllsh
law rather than neJect 1t as 1napp11cable. And
thls approach has been approved of for the canadlan
Provlnces and rerrltorles by the Jud.1c1ar commlttee
1n Watts v. Wattslt an oplnlon that was agaln reln-
fonced ln 1919 ln l,rtalker v.i,Ia1ker.38 The extent of
36. rbld., at p.502-8. In that case s.2 of theEngllsh Law Act (Revlsed Statutes of BrltlshColumbla c.1L5) provlded that: 'rThe ClvlL lawsof England as the same exlsted on the 1gth dayof I'lovember, 1858, and so fan as the same arenot from local clreumstances inappllcabLe, sha1lbe ln force ln all parts of Brlblsh Co1umbla. . .tt
37. [1908] A.C.573 and see also R2 \tr .rd.R. 245 , 252. v. HaII [194I]
38. Note 27 ; ancl see Boandthe sElme footnote v. Board r.eferned to 1n
the dlffenence between thls and the appnoach of the
New zealand and Australlan courts to the appllcab1llty
doctrlne ls substantlal, and materlally llnrlts the
extent to whlch deelslons on thts questlon 1n the
canadlan Jurlsdlctlon have relevance ln New zearand.
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[tfre i\lew South Walesthe obJect of the Actfor tlre adnlnlstnatlon
laws to be adm1nl-
Ig.OqJ fne App}lcatlon of partlcular provlslons
In Ruddlck v. Weatheredr Prendergast C,J. sa1d,
lnter aIla:
",r. the [Engl1sh Laws] Act was passed not
only to declare what the law was- to bedeened to be 1n the future, but also to
renove doubts as to the past... 
"2
He consldered the scope and obJect of the Ner,l south
wales Act was dlfferent to that of the Engrlsh taws
Act, saylng:
''On neferenee to that ActActl lt wlll be seen that
was to pnovlde machlnery
of Justlce, not to enact
steredtr t
J.
2.
3t
(1889 ) , T
Ibld., at
IbLd., at
N.Z.L.R.4g1.
p.494.
p.493.
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ft 1s subnltted, however, that although the
dlfference between the two Acts necognlsed by
Prend.ergast C.J. clearLy exLstsr BS Whlcker v.Humef
and Quan Ylck v.H1n<iss also show, 1t ls a dlfferenee
whlch does not neeessarlly dlstlngulsh New ZeaLand
and Australlan cases on the general lssue of appllc-
ab1}lty of Engllsh Laws. Howevere ln relatlon to
Engllsh ga.mlng 1eg1slatlon, thls dlfference ln the
expressed scope of the two Acts referred to, does
explaln, and Justlfy what may be seen as a signlfl-
canb dlfference 1n approach to an lmportant lssue
nelatlng to the appllcabll1ty of partleular, &s
opposed to general, provlslons of Bngllsh statutes
ln the two countrles; that 1s, partlcular provlslons
of those statutes, as dlstlnct from the statutes
themselves taken as a whole.
In Quan Ylek v. lllnds, Grlfflth C.J. sa1d, of
thts lssue:
". . , 1f the genenal pnovlslons of a Statute
were not unsultable to the eondltlons of
the Colony the mere fact that some mlnor
or severable provlslons could not come lnto
operatlon owlng to local clrcumstances 1s
not a sufflclent reason for denylnq the
appl1cablllty of the Statute as a whole.
On the other hand, 1f the genenal provlslons
of a Statute were lnappllcable, 1t would seemto follow that lt 1s not competent to select
a partlcular provlslon of the Statute,
4.
5.
Para,3, note 18.
Para 3, note 13,
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I'wh1ch lf lt stood alone mlght be appllc -
able, and to say that lt 1s therefore
appllcable ...tt5
In l{ew Zealand, hovrever, 1n applylng the Engllsh
Laws Act, the Supreme Court adopted a qulte eontrary
approach. In Klnq v. {g!4€l-gIt, Johnston J sald:
"I am by no means prepared to say that a
slngle provlslon 1n an Engllsh statute 1nforce on the day so often mentloned, rnlght
not be operatlve 1n l{ew Zealand, although
the whole of the rest of the statute was
obvlously and unquestlonably lnappllcab1e ;but st1l} the context may be looked at for
the purpose of testlng the appl1cab1l1ty
of the partlcular provlslon. "'
The learned Judge subsequently re-afflrmed thls vlew
of the matter nlneteen years later 1n Hlghett v.
McDonald.s In that case, after statlng that he saw
no reason for doubtlng hls earller v1ew, he went on
to say:
"f th1nk, trr deallng wlth thls questlon,
we must suppose that we have 1y1ng open
before us the whole common Law and statute
1aw of England ln force on the termlnal dayi
6. Para.3, note 13 at p.364. He re.afftrmed thls
vlew 1n tdltche]! v.Scales pare.3r note 15 at p.41I, a Jffi-Snenfwlt6 ',sh-:[Eh Barton J 1n the same
case 'rentlrelytr agreed. (p.414 ) . Isaacs J 1n
M1tche11 v. Scales preferred to express no oplnlon
onEe-rnattil-See also M1l1er v. MaJ or 11906 ) ,4 c.L.R.219; cf . Deloherv@stee Co.(1904) 1c,i.n.z8t--
Para.3, note 1, at p.96,
(1878) 3 N.z.Jur. (N.s. ) 102.
7.
8.
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"and of that great body of law, everyprovlslon luhlch was then appllcable to
the clrcumstances of the Colony ls to be
deemed to have been solemnly adopted andleglslatlvely declared to be the law of
the Colony by the Leglslature of the
Colony at a tlne when 1t had been fully
empowered by the Imperlal Parllament to
make 1ts own 1aws. And 1t seemg to methat wlth respect to the statute 1aw of
England the questlon 1s not whether the
whole of a partlcular statute, oP chapter
of a statute, can be applled 1n the Colony,but whether the partlcular enactment, duly
lnterpreted and construed by the context
and the preamble of the Agt, 1s capable
of belng applled or not."e
In Hlghett v.MaeDonald the lssue for the Courtts
deterrnlnatlon was whether s.12 of the statute 24
Geo.II, c.40 (1750) (fne Tlppllng Aet) was 1n force
ln New Zealand. That sectlon declared that no
actlon could be brought for the recovery of a debt
for splrltuous llquors unless eontracted for at one
tlme to the amount of twenty sh1II1ngs. The partl-
cular provlslon 1n lssue was to some extent out of
context 1n The Ttppllng Act whlch, as the preamble
declared, was enacted prlnclpally for the purpose
of ralslng revenue dutles on splrlts. In addltlon,
the statute as a whole, os the Count aeknowledged,
was of a loca1 character and may not have been
appllcable to the clrcumstances of New Zealand. l0
9. Ib1d., at p.104.
L0. fbld., at p.L05; In Klqg v.Johnston para.J,
note i at b.96, - the cffi neill-ThEE-tne greit
maJorlty of the Actts provlslons were rrclearly
lnapplleable'i but dld not feel that the enact-
ment ln lssue was lnappllcable to the Colony
on that account.
But the provlslon was 'revldently and
passed fon the purpose of proteetlng
and on that account was part of the
colonlsts r*ould caruy wlth them to a
Johnston J held:
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professedly
publle moralstt
law whlch
new country. t'
rNow provlslons for the malntenance of pub11c
morallty and the preservatlon of the publlc
peace are ln thelr general nature appllcableto all Colonles, and unl-ess they are
necessarlly connected wlth some clrcum-
stance or condltlon whleh renders them
clearly J-napp1lcab1e, 1t would appear that
they ought to be treated as part of the Iaw
of the Colony. Now suppose the statute 1nquesblon had been lntltuled orAn Act to
suppress drunkennesstt, and had reclted 1n
1ts prearnble that 1t was !'deslrable to put
down or d1m1nlsh drunkenness among the
communlty'r, and had gone on to enact, &s
a remedy tendlng to effect thls obJect,that persons who gave credlt for less
than 20s worth of splrlts at one tlme
should rrot be entltled to recover the debt,
could it be doubted that thls was an enact-
ment appllcable to the clrcumstances of theColony? If so, ean 1t make any real dlffer-
ence ln the case that the Act of 24 GeorgeI! c.40, was ehlefly dedlcated to provlslonsfor raislng revenue from outles on splrlts 
'
...tt12
AccordinglV, the learned Judge held that
although the statute taken as a whole may not have
been appllcable to the clrcumstances of the Colony
the partlcular provlslon was.
For reasons alluded to earller the Canadtan
approach to the appllcatlon of partlcular provlslons
11, Ib1d., at p.I05.
12, Idem.
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of statutes ls slrnllar to that adopted by Johnston J
ln the New Zealand Supreme Court. In Fraser v.
Klrkqatrlck13 t,he lssue was ivhether provlslons of the
Engllsh Debtors Act, 1869 were ln force ln the North
I,'lest Provlnces. The relevance of an argument
advanced that some of the provlslons 1n the Act 1n
questlon coulcl not be applled was cursorlly dlsrnlssed
by Harvey J wlth the eonment:
"... 1t lsthe Debtorsbut whether
constltute
appllcable
not a questlon of whetherAct as a whole 1s ln force,
certaln provlslons of lt whlchpart of the 1aw of Eqgland are
-anA so ln force ...''lt
And 1n Sheppard v. Sheppardrs Martln J held that where
a provlslon ln a statute appllcable ln prlnclp1e was
wholly lmposslble of appllcablon to the condltlons
of the new Colony, that d1d not mean that the statute
had to be reJected, but only that the provlslon ln
questlon should be dlspensed w1th. 16
It 1s submltted that the Australlan Courts took
a narrower vlew of the appllcabll1ty of partlcular
provlslons 1n 5ng11sh statutes because the test of
appllcablI1ty 1n that Jurlsdlctlon was expressly
related to the admtnlstratlon of Justlce. And."
that context, the general purport of the statute
1n
as
r3. (r902)
14. rb1d.,
15. (1908)
15. rb1d.lnR
5 W.L.R.287.
at p.289.
13 8.c.R.q85.
at p.511; andHall [1941] 2 see s1m1larlyIil.'q{.R. 2u5,tv. ELI1s C.C.J.
t 3.05l
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a whoLe was a factor wh1ch, necessarlly, attracted
conslderable attentlon. But, as Forbes C,J. sald
as early as 1B3B ln R v. Maloney: I7
rr... It has always been, and must r,.
always b€, a prellmlnary polnt to adJust,
whether the Act of Parllament, lntended
to be applled, 1s appllcabLe to the condltlon
and clrburnstances of- tne Colony, . . . " 10
Thus, ln relatlon to thls flrst step of resolvlng
the su1tab1l1ty of Engllsh law to the Australlan
Co1onles.. the declslons of the Australlan Courts
are as applleable here as our own, because ln thls
regard, lt 1s submltted troth the Engllsh tawsAct
1858 and the New South l'lales Act were merely afflrm-
atlve of the common law.le
Statutes of a Local or Polltlea1 Character
Under the cotnmon law prlnclples referred to ln
prevlous paragraphs 1t was antlclpated that colonlsts
carrled wlth them to the new eountry the great bulk of
Engllsh 1aw then ln exlstence. But there were
exceptlons, as Blackstone aclcnowledged when he sald:
17. (1836), 1 Legge,7U,
18. rb1d. , at p.77.
19. Per Fonbes C.J.
cf. Pnendergastpara.4, note 1.
1n R v. Maloney,
c . J; lnT]rtiiil;lc 1bld. , aE p .77 ,v. W_qqthqtgd
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irThe artlflclal requlrenents and d^lst1nc-tlons lncldent to the property of a great
and commerclal people, the laws of po11ce
and revenue (such especlally as are
enforeed by penaltles ), and a rnultl-tude of othen provlslons are nelther
necessary nor convenlent for them andtherefore are not 1n force."I
These exceptlons were to be found 1n laws of
local po11cy,2 that 1s, laws
"that grew out of loeal clrcumstanees
and ... [were] ana ... [were] meantto have a merely loea1 openatlott. i:3
fn the case of Whleken v. Hurne the House of Lords
held that the statute g Geo.II, e.36 (L735) (gne
Mortmaln Act) was lnappllcabLe to the clrcumstances
of the Colony of New South hlales because 1t was
wholIy polltlcalt ln lts character and ceslgned to
deaL wlth an ev1l that was pecullan to the Mother
Countny, There was no evldence, lt was heId, that
the mlschlef the Aet was lntended to remedy, 1.e.
the lncnease 1n the dlsherlson of helrs by glvlng
property to charltable uses, was at all an ev1l that
was feltr oF llkeIy to be felt 1n the colonles.s
1.
2.
4.
Commentarles, book 1, p.l0Z.
Per Lord Chelmsford C.J. 1npara.J, note 18 at p.150.
3. A statement from the Judgment of StrGnant ln {!!:_Gqn. v.stewart (lB17) 2clted by lFilE'ellnsf6m bthlekerpara.l, note 18 at p.150
Para.l, note^I8, aqd see slmiLarly Jex v.IrteKlnney ( r889 ) ; t4 App. Cas. ZZ.
Para.3, note lB, p.16L,
Whleker v. Hume,
W11I1am
Mer.143 and
v. Hume
5.
t 3. 051
The dlstlnctlon recognlsed ln the cases, ls between
laws of purely 1ocal and those of general app11c-
atlon. The latter crass be1.ng lnvarlabry found
to be sulted to the condltlons of a new colony.
The canadlan courts have had some dlffleulty 1nfllterlng out Engllsh laws that were wholly pol1t1-
ca1 and lntended to remedy purely 1ocal mlschlefs.
The fMortnaln Actr 1s a case ln polnt. fn
Doe d. Anderson v. Todds Roblnson c.J. herd that
1t was 1n fonce 1n Ontarlo, but only because the
LeglsLature 1n enagtlng other laws 1n the provlnce
had assumed, ex abundantl cautela, that the
'Mortmaln Act t was ln fonce there. Thlrty_one
years later 1n whltby corporatlon v. Llscombe? the
ontarlo court of Appeal also upheld that v1ew.
But 1t dld so pnlnclpalry because the declslon 1n
Doe d.Andenson v. Todd had been accepted for too
long and had, for too long a perlod governed tltres
to land 1n the Provlnce to be lnterfered wlth 
-
except by the Leglslature. s These Ontarlo
deelslons, rather than the reasons glven for tlrem,
subsequently lnfluenced the lrtanltoba supneme court
and l.n Law v.Actons Rlchards J followed the ontarlo
6.
7.
8.
(r8451, z rLc.e.B.B2.
(1876), 23 Gr.1.
In Macdonell v. purcell (f893) 23 Can.S,c.R.101ooe@q n @and Whltby Corporatlon
-
v.Llseombe wgre aEE$tea affi or0ntarlo on thls questlon.
(1902) 14 Man.L.R. 246.9.
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cases and held the tliIorbmatn Actr to be 1n force
1n Manltoba also. But 1n that case the Judge
completely over*looked the prlnclples enunclated
1n Attorney-General v. Stewant and Whlcller v. Hume. l0
rn [e Estate of Fentonrr Galt J felt bound to follow
Law v. Actin for the same reason the ontarlo court of
Appeal foLlowed Doe d. Anderson v.Todd, but on appeal
the Manltoba court of Appearl2 over-r.uled Law v. Acton
holdlng that lt was qulte lnconslstent wlth Attorney-
GeneraL v. Steqgqt and Whlcken v. Hume.
t3.051 Laws for the Malntenance of pub11c Morallt
As Johnston J recognlsed ln Highett v. MacDonald, I
laws rrfor the malntenance of pub11c morallty are ln
thelr general nature appllcable to all Colonles, . . .
unless they are necessarlly connected wlth some
clrcumstance or condltlon whlch renders them clearly
lnapp1lcable."2 And laws for the suppresslon of
gambllng have long been recognlsed as Laws 'rfor the
malntenanee of pubIlc morallty" 1n thls context.
In Attqrlrey-Genera1 of New South Wales v. Edgley3
Chlef Justice Dariey he1d, 1n relatlon to the
10. Supra, para. l.
11. (1920) lr D.L.R.594.
12. Re Fenton Estate (1920) 53 D.L.R.82; and see@it rrg4ri 1 w.w.n.4zll-cigar:I D,Jr.r.o)) for4 the present posltlon 1n t,{anltoba.In that case 1t was held tnat the Engllsh Actfor the Preventlcn of the Marrlage oF Lunatlcs(15 Geo.II, c.30 (1742)) was a p[rety loea]. Actpassed to deal wlth a local sltuatlon 1n EngJ_and.
1. Par.a.4, note 8.
2. Supna, para.1.
3. (1888) g N.S.W.t.R.157,
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statute 42 Geo.III c.119 (1802), an Act declarlngprlvate lotterles eommon publlc nulsances:
''..:.. looklng at-the obJect of the Aet,whleh we have already ieen to be thepreservatlon of morallty and the pro..tectlon of the unwary., w€ can see nothlng1n the Aet or the clrcumstances of ifie---'colony whlch would render 1t lnappllJible."o
And 1n ?uan 4_gk v. Hlnds I 0'Connon J sald:
"It eannot, I thlnk, be doubted that theEngllsh laws prohlbitlng lotterles came' lnto force ln l,iew South ,,{ales on thepasslng of 9 Geo.IV c.83. They were,11ke t!. Iaws agalnst gambllng inO wafier_1ng, of general appI1citlon, Ind lntendedto safeguard the rnoral well..belng of thecommunlty, and there would appear to beno reason why they should not have been1n force froqr the very beglnnlng of thesettlement 
. 
t'5
3ut by far the most posltlve statement on the general
appl1cat10n of gamlng laws 1n the co10n1es ls to be
found ln the Judgnrent of Rlchrnond J ln E11lott v.
IlamlltonT when he sald:
fb1d., at p.t6O.
Suprao para.J, note 13.
Il19-., ?!. p.378; but cf . Beck J 1n a declslonof the Alberta Supreme Court 1n R v. Huns Gee(r9rs) 13 D.L.R.44 , i6 ;h;-""r"or inffi=n"tthe Engllsh statutes nelatlng to rottenles and
conmon- gamlng houses eontalned provlslons
whlch lndlcate them to be dlrected toloca1 and temporary abuses whlch aretncapable of belng carrled out 1n the colontes. ?'
( rB74; , z it.?,. Jur. 95 .
4.
q
7.
tr'ozl
';Accordlng to the prlnclple of the commonlqvr, as declared by the Engllsh Laws Act,1E58, ihe laws of ingland, as they exlstedat the date of the foundailon of Lne colony,are 1n force here, so far as they areappllcable to the elrcumstances of tnecolony, and have not been altered by sub_
sequent leg1sLat1on. As regards a gooddeal of the Engllsh 1eg1slat1on of t[e lastcentury and a half dlrected agalnst thepractlce of gambllrrg, 1t mlghC no doubt be
argued that 1t 1s l1ttle sulted to thenecessltles or the temper of a colonlalpopulatlon 1lke our orrn) and that prohlbltions
openly dlsregarded and penaltles never
enforeed would be better removed from theStatute Book. These reasons" however, are
such as should be addressed to the tegis_lator" rather than to ttre Judge: and Ufrey
apply wlth equal., or. nearly equal, force tothe mother.-country and the eolonles.Regardlng the matter from a purely 1egalpolnt of vlew, I can see no reason why the
:S-!g!yt" agalnst lotterles, 10 and 11,Irtrllllam fII, chap.1/, should not extend tol'lew Zealand. It has nothlng of a local
eharacter, but forms part of the generalcrlmlnal law of England. As suc[, 1t 1sJust as nuch ln force here as any 6ther partof Engllsh erlnlnal 1aw.tr8
t3.c7l
The concluslon to be drawn from these eomments of
botlr New zealand and Austnallan Jud,ges 1s that the
Engllsh Laws relatlnE to wagerlng and ganrng were
prlma facle appllcable to the clrcumstances of the
colonles unless there was somethlng ln the clrcum-
a Ib1d. , at p.95.
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stances of a partlcular Colony to render them
1napp11cab1e.
In relatlon to the statute B and 9 V1ct. , c.109(1845) lt dld not expressly apply to the colonles
and nor 1s there anythlng 1n the Act to suggest that
1t was necessarlly 1mpl1ed that 1t should. As lt
was enacted after the 14th day of January Ig40 1t
dld not therefore apply to flew zealand, ancl nelther
dld lts repeal of the provlslons of the statutes of
Charles (1654) and Anne (1710).t
As to the Act of Charles II (lddq), the preamble
to that statute conflrms 1t as an Act for malntalnln.q
publlc morals and there 1s nothlng to suggest that 1t
was lntended to deal wlth a purery loea1 m1sch1ef.
I'lor ls thene anythtng ln the Act whlch wouLd render
enforcement of 1t ln !trer^r Zealand dlffleult or
lmposslbre. rt was applled wlthout argument by the
I'iew south wares supreme court 1n chambers v. perry(f847)z where Dlckson J held that an actlon to
recover 8250 0n a horse race, the anount not belng
pald down at the t1ne, was unenforceable. There
appears, however, to have been no reported cases 1n
whlch thls provlslon has been apprled 1n New Zealand
or Canada.
In r.elatlon to the Act of Anne (1T10), the flnst
sectlon ls clearly appllcable ln New zealand for the
same reasons advanced ln respect to the Act of
1. See the reasonlng of Skerrett
n Qeorge ltgzl I N.z.L.R ,\9a,
(18471, I Lesse 430.
c.J.
502.
2.
ln Johnston
t 3.07l
Charles II (1664). That sectlon was, of course,
modlfted 1n 1835 by the Act of bI1II.IV and both Acts
must bherefore be consldered together. In 0ff1c1a1
Asslgnee of Matene Mlta v. Johnston3 Cooper J unequl-
vocalLy held that:
"The statutes 9 Anne, c.14, and 5 t 6
1,1111.IV, c.41 are 1n-force 1n Nevr Zealand. "r
And ln Johnston v. George,s whlch 11ke 0ff1c1aI Asslgnee
of Matene Mlta v.Johnson, was also on the flrst
sectlon of the Act of Anne as modlfled by the 1835
Act, Skerrett C.J. treated the pnovlslons of those
Acts as 1n foree here. But ln 0fflclal Asslgnee v.
Totallsator Agency Board6 although Counsel for the
appellant eontended that the Act of Anne was 1n force
1n llew Zealand (tn 1960), the Court d1C not flnd 1t
necessary to declde the po1nt.
ft ls suggested that the flrst sectlon of the
Act of Anne (1710) and the modlfylng Act of W111.IV
(1835) are both 1n force ln New Zealand. There 1s
nothlng 1n these provlslons renderlng them lnappllc-
able and the welght of authorlty 1s 1n suppont of
that coneluslon. !r:s!g.!.!. v. MeDonaldT .- both the
3.
4.
Irgra]
IbJ.d. ,
Note 1.
[ 1950 ]
Para. 4 ,
i.i.2.L.R.373.
at p.374.
l{.2.L.8.1064,
note B.
5.
6.
7.
a Court of Appeal dec1s1on.
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reasonlng and the declslon - on an analogous
provlslon, also supports that v1ew, as does the
New South tfales case of Chambers v. Ferrys on the
Act of Charles II, (f654). The Canadlan declslons
also support thls vlew, there belng a long l1ne of
authorltles 1n that Jurlsdlctlon where the flrst
sectlon of the Act of Anne has been applled, op been
assunerl to have applled 
-. 
wlthout argument. e
In DoEherty v. Poole (1875),to a Maglstratets
Court declslonr &D actlon brought by the loser of a
wager of a game under s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710)
succeeded. In that case 1t was strongly argued by
the defendant that that provlslon of the Act was not
ln force ln l,lew Zealand because, 1D rel-atlon to acttons
by lnformers, 1t requlred part of the penalty to be
dlsbursed to the "poor of the parlsh''.
eontentlon 1s , csf eourse, supported by
and Ex parte Lyons; In re I'lllson. 12 But
Thls
R v. Schofleldrr
1t was
8.
o
Note 5Il.
See e.g, Rose v. Col11nson (1910) fz w.L.R.648,
16 c.c.c.WT UITGr nTartln ltgz3l 1tl.to.R.64i carr Bros. nlA-uds tlf,Iffr !{.trl.R.2\91
rn re-ffirat i|F5rts (1896), L2 0.R.r{8;ffirn]Erl t t^l.vtr.R .769,
fr93IJ z il,ilffZ3E Gosslns v. Morrlson [1925]2 w.i{.R.75, lr925l 2 D-ffi2o3TT-e qnc v.
Thonas ( 1932 ), 5 M. P.R. 410 ; KaaluE--ilFa=ilIukG95Bf, 25 w.l,r.R.3zr, t4 o.r-,.n-(m') 408 
-and on the Act of 1835 Bee further Wlndsor
Hotel Co. v. Sllverman [1935] I D.L.Rff6.
10. (1875), 2 N.Z.Jur. (}tr.S.) l-4.
11, Para.3, Note 6.
12. Para.3, note L0.
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reJected by the Resldent Maglstrate who held that the
actlon was based soleIy on the flrst part of the
sectlon whlch gave a remedlal proceedlng to the loser.
He went on to sayi
". . . I see no reason why that part of thestatute, at any rate, 1s not law 1n NewZealand. The second part of the statute
1s of a penal character; but I need notglve an_y oplnlon upon r,trhether" that 1s law
here. lt 13
Although the lvlaglstrate referred to the trseeond part
of the statuter', ln the eontext, hls remarks relate
also to the second part of the sectlon. That pant,
1s clearly severabLe from the flrst pant, 1n that
whereas 1t, the second part, p5lves a eause of actlon
to conmon lnformers, the flrst part glves 1t to the
wlnner. Thus, the cases of q v.9:h€19_]9., Exparte
Lyons, In re Idll-s_sg are 1n grolnt but dlstlngulshable
as regard.s severablllty of the flrst part of the
sectlon. And, there belng no apparent reason to
requlre a flndlng to the contrary, the flrst part of
s.2 ls clearly applleable ln liew Zealand; although
the common lnformers rlght of actlon ls, I suggest,
not.
The wrlterrs concluslon, therefore, ls that the
relevant provlslons of the Acts of Charles II (1664),
Anne (f7fO) anO W1l1lam Iv (1835) relatlng to gamlng
and wagerlng contracts applled, and contlnue to apply
ln I'iew Zealand, except to the extent that they have
13. Note 10, at n"14.
[3.07J
been repealed or modtrfled by the New Z,e'a.1and
Leglslature. Up to the pregent tlme they have
ndt be€n expressly'rrepeal.ed for Neu ZeaLandls
and noF have they, th the wniterts vleru, been
rendered tnapplLcable by the pnocesc' of lmplled
rrepeal, But the ne-aoLutl,on of that queetLon
muot be left for later ehspte'rs when New Eealand
IeglsXatlon wlll be exaslned.
14. The penal pnovlslone have, however. See s.9
of the CnLmee Aet L951 (s.6o The C:rlmlnal 
'0odeAet, 189'3 ) 
"
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[4.01] Introductlon
The prlnclple of lalrr ldentlfled by Blackstone
that carrled Engllsh 1aw lnto Brltlsh colonles was
prlnclpally concerned to meet the lmmedlate needs
of the colonlsts. And thelr needs could only be
net by reeognlslne (as that prlnclple does ), that
menrs nature, thefu: :rablts and lnstlnets, do not
change overnlght or wlth a Journey to the far slde
of the world. The early eolonlsts brought more to
New ZeaLand than themselves and thetr laws. They
brought a way of 11fe - and one that had been
slgnlflcantly domlnated for centunles by the partl-
cular speculatlve tralt referrerl to 1n ehaoters
one and two of thls 'aror!i. trhey brought the games,
practlces and tradltlons of the tlme whlch \{ere a
manlfestatlon of that speeulatlve tra1t.
As later paragraphs cilsclose. and perhaps not
surprlslngly, the Brltlsh were no less extravagant
ln thelr wagerlng and gantng in New zealand than they
had been tn England. At flrst Enr;ltsn ganlng lanrs
1n fonce ln the eolony (supplemented by fragmented,
provlnelal 1eg1slat1on) provlded sorne measure of
control. But Engllsh Laws on wagerlng and gamlng
were hopelessly lnadequate and outmoded even ln
England ln 1840 and, 1t 1,1111 be reealled, durlng
and after f84l they were substantlally reforrned.
[4.02 ]
[ 4.02 ] The Ganlng and Lotterles Act 
" 
lBBL
Between 1841 and lBBl- there were enacted a number
of ProvlnclalrOrdlnanees2 and Actssln l,lew Zealancl
whlch eontalned provlslons relatlng to wagerlng and
ganlng, but 1t vras not unt11 the latter year that
the flrst substantlall and nat1onal, leg1slatlon on
the subJect "r,{as passed. That Act, fhe Gamlng and
Lotterles Act, 1881, was concerned pr1nc1pally to
enact laws relatlng to Famlng houses,s bettlng
There were, ho'.rrever, no Ordlnances or Acts on
l{agenlng and Gamlng of the Leglslatlve Councll
of New Zealand between 1840 and 1880, and nor
were any enacted by the Leg'.1-s1at1ve Councll-s of
the l{ew Ulster and llew lt{unster.
For example s.2(6) and Q) of the Vagrant Ordl-
nanee, sesslon XIII, l,to.52 (1861) of the OtagoProvlnclal Councll and s.4(1) of the PollceOrdlnance, Sesslon X, I{o.1 (1858) of theCanterbury Provlnclal CounclI.
For example s.1 of the Bllllard Tables Act,Sesslon XII , No . I ( 185 4 ) of the i.ie Is on Pnovln-clal Counc11. s.2(12) of ilre Rural pol1ce Act,Sesslon XIX. lio.11 (1855) and r.5(44) of the
Auckland !{unlc1pal Pol1ce Aet, Sesslon XIX,
No.15 (1866) of the Auckland Provlnclal Councll.
There r^rere no gamlng or" r,ragerlng Acbs or On<ll -
nances as such, of the Provlnclal Counc11s,
such enactnents as were passed were contalnecl
1n 1lcens1ng and vagrancy leglslatlon.Interestlngly, durlng the Maorl wars era lt was
found expedlent tn the }ielson Provlnce to
encourage one form of ganlng. The Rlfle PrlzeAct, 1860 (Sesslon VII, lto.3) was passed to
encourage competence wlth the rlfle 1n theProvlnce. There ls somethlng of a flavour ofthe Engllsh statutes on eamlng passed durlnq the
relgns of Rlchard fI and ilenry VIII ln the terms
of the preamble whlch reacLs: "!,'hereas lt ls
expedlent to promote the use of the Rlfle by thelnhabltants of the Provlnce of I'le1son, as a means
of defence ag:alnst lnvaslon ...'i
Sectlom 3-10.
I.
2.
?
4.
5.
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After 1845, therefore, 1t became necessany for the
colonlal leglslature to conslder s1m11ar reforrns
ln l{ew Zealand. In tlre course of thls some dlffer-
ences ln the Laws of England and ltew Eealand
oeeurred. These ln turn pronoted more pnonouneed
dlfferences as the Courts and Leglslature neacted
to the gamesters I attempts to draw subtle dlst1nc..
tlons between thelr schennes and the prohlbttlons
1n the Acts. But even alIowlng for bhese dlffen-.
ences, ganlng and wagerlng pnactlces 1n l,lew ZeaLand
were very rnuch a reflectlon of the colonlsts
lmpresslon of such practlces Fbaek Homer,, Not
unnaturallf, lt was to England that the early 1aw
reformens looked for solutlons to sor:la1 problens
caused by these pnactlces, as they oceurred 1n the
young colony. As a resuLt, Engllsh gamlnq and
wagerlng laws of the penlod are very nuch mlrrored
ln the 19th century eolonlal Acts; lndeed go much
so that the hlstory of the colonlal 1eg1sLat1on 1s
to be found prlnclpally 1n tire Imperlal experlence,
and the t1tle of thls chapter must therefore be
read wlth that qual1flcat1on ln m1nd.
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housess and lotterles,T lts maln provlslons belnq
based upon sectlons ln the Engrlsh Gamlng Act Lul5
( I and 9 V1ct. 
.. 
c. 109 ) and the Bettlng iiouses Act 
_
1853, (t6 and 17 Vlct., c,119). Anci also basec on
tlrese Bngllsh Acts were sectlons 33 ancl 34 of the
1881 Act, the flrst lier,* Zealano enaetments concerned
wlth the 1egal status of wagerlng and gamlng con_
tracts. s
Sectlon 33 of the l-881 Aet 1s a eopye of s.10 of
the statute B g 9 V1ct. , c. tC9 (,f 845 ) l0 the provLslon
declarlng all gamlng or Haserlng contracts vold and
unenforceable. The j'few zearand parllamentary Debates
of the perlod are sl1ent on the speclflc reason for
the 1ncluslon of thls provlslon 1n the colonlal
statute. rl 
-nut they do dlscrose that warrerlnq and
6. Sectlons tI..15.
7 . Sectlons 16.-13.
B. The words ,,gamlng and wagerlng contracts'. are
used here 1n a general sense. As later para--graphs show s.34 and the provlso to s.33 werenot eoncerned wlth rvagerlng and gamlng contractsper se.
9, OnIy the layout, the sectlon number and thelntroductory words 1n ti:e two provlslons aredlfferent. The Engllsh and New Zealanclprovlslons are ldentlcal ln all materlal
respects.
10. Supra, chapt.2.
11. Un11ke the Engllsh Gamlng Act, 1E45, the NewZealand Act oi tBBl was not pieceoed nv aselect commlttee 
" 
and the records of the Jolntstatutes Revlslon commlttee of the perlod havenot survlved.
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gamlng lvas a promlnent and extravasant past-tlme ln
the young colony. rn 1BB1 the Hon. T. Dlck advlseri
the ilouse that there was more giarnbllng 1n the colony
than some ilonourable menbers rea1lsecl:
when }Ier'r zearand became a tsrlttsir corony ltlnirerlted, lt seems, some of that Eng,llsh passlon for
extravagant gambllng of whlch John Ashton wrote. &
It nad been calculated that 1n Dunedlnat least C100,000 a vear clranged hands 1ngambllnE transactl0ns, and thd gentleman whomade that calculatlon stated thlt Chrlst*church was even worse, so that they lah;honourable mernbersl might reekon tlrat betweena quarter and a half a mllLlon of money
changed hands 1n the course of a year lngambllng 
- a most useless and unprofltable
manner of spendlng money .,,- 12
and the Hon. l,r. Roblnson advlsed members that:
ii... he knew that bets amountlng to thousancsand tens of thousands of pounds :.{ere nowpendlng on eomlng events.lt13
L2. ( 1BB1) Sa U .Z .P.D. 49g .
r3. (1881) 39 tr.2.P.D.437.
14. Parl.lamentary debates of the penlod dlsclose tlratpr1nc1pa1 concerns were sweepitakes and consult--atl0ns, (1880) 35 N.2.p.D.258, (r.g81t jg-NlzlFlo.
?9r-zi Arr. unloniand i,otterle;, 'iiSS0t-i: rvli:p:D.?75, (r88r) 3E N.Z.p.D.2B1; poor.*arr.r" tjrese arefrequently referred to rn most unJorirrruntarvlanguage:-g:Er^(188r) 3B 
.rr.z.p.D.49t' Garnbtlnl byIoglh ( tSBr ) 3g t{. z . p. t. 495 ; cambriig tn Clubs-(rB8e) 4r N_.2:p.D.405. rlrtrcur;it' lltuetrativeof thls Engllsh lnherltance are the RacecourseRegerve ordlnance, Sess.Xr, Ito.Z (igi9i;-c;;;;"_buly Provlnclal counclr, and the Ordinancesess,YII, ,N9,3, (1869.1 , s.ess . rv. No. T (tSiii;-C;;:i;No.3 (r863) of th6 ltelllneton provi.,"tat councll
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rt was not surprlsln,r, thepefore, that the coronlal
Leglslature should look to the experlence of lts
rmperlal counterpart for solutlons to thls problem.
And, 1n so do1ng, lt was natural that 1t should also
adopt the rnperlal approach of deallng wlth ganbllng
ln a thoroughly trenchant manner". rndeecl, legls-latlon that d1d anythlng ress than that wouId, as
S1r Wllllam Fox observecl at the t1me, t,be so much
mllk and wate*'';.15 Between rg40 antt 1Bg1 thene ls
only one reported llew Zealand case ln whleh an actlon
was brought to recover money 10st 1n a bettlng trans-
actton.16 TLre 1nc1us1on of a provlslon renderlng
gamlng and wagerlng contracts vold and unenforceable
ls therefore dlfflcult to sustaln on tl:e basls of any
speclflc, and exlstlng, colon1al need at the tlrne.
But to the extent to whleh such a provlslon operated
to dlscourage gamlng and wagerlng 1ts enactment 1n
1BB1 was Justlfled and, 1n any 
€vuo.1t, 1n the llght
of the Engllsh experlence and the exlstence 1n Englancl
of the 1845 provlslon decrarlng gamln,q and 
',ragerln,gcontracts vold and unenforceable, an Act of a colonlal
leglslature whlch laeked such a orovlslon courd
relatlng to racecourse reserves for Manawatu,Hutt Park and ldalnarapa respectlvely. Butgambllng hras 
-not- the prerogbtlve of the Engrlshsettrers." and thls wal reeognlsed ln tne-iEsr-aetss.9 and 10 of whlch spectfleally outrawed thechlnese games of fan*tln and pr-i.a-Joo anc houseskept for the playlng of such baures. "
15' (1BBr) g0 rf .2.p.D.496. The Hon. Mr J. sheehan,on the other hand, eomplarned that the Ganlns i,Lotterles Btll r^rai too strlrrg"nC (rgei)---'-"cr39 N.Z.P.D.3o2.
16. P$grtv v. Pogle (1875) 2 N.z.Jur.(lt.-s.)14.rne case was pleaded on the statute of Anne(1710).
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handly be seen to be deallng nlth the vlce of
ganbllng ln a thorough nanner. For these reasons
the Engllsh provlslon was adopted ln irier^r zealand,
as 1t was also 1n a1I the Austna:l_1an states. rz
Althougir based, ln large measure! unon the Engllsh
Gamlng Act 1B4l the colonlal Act d1d not, llke the
former Act, repeal elther the earllen statutes con.
cerned wlth gamlng, tt o" thos provlslons 1n the Acts
of Charles II (1664) and the Act of Anne (fZfO) whlch
had not been 'altereC hy ilre Act of lg35.le Thus,
followlng the 1845 Act, the potentlal exlsted forqulte substantlal dlfferenees ln the law reLatlng to
gaming and wagerlng eontracts between the mother
country and 1ts colony. Those dlfferences wlll be
examlned ln some deta1l 1n later paragraphs when an
attempt w111 be made to ldentlfy the scope of Nevr
Zealand gamlng and wagerlnq contraet ravis. But further
dlfferences ln the raw of the two countrles were to
occur before New zealand garnlng and wagerlng laws were
settled ln a consolldatlng Act 1n 190g,m and the
clrcumstances glvlng rlse to them are lmportant ln
terms of understandlng and lnterpretlng the cor_onlal
legls 1at1on.
17 . New South. Irlales , Gamlng_ and l3ett1nfi Act , 19L2 ,!:l!; South Ausiralla, Lottery anO"Camf"g l"t,L9\!, s.?7: Vlctorla Follces bffences AcE. fqil!.96; Queenstand, Ganlng Acr, rA-0;-;:S, -u3ri6ii'Australia, pollce Act Amendment A;t, t[i9i-iio. il.
g_: 12; Tasm_an1a, Gamlng Act, I89I, ,. f G . " -Sde'f,.rlV].1.$f1{eyer, Wagers, Gaming ana f,otterles 1n Australla(t9291, cnapt.tt.
18. See supra, chapt.2.
19. rbld.
20. Ikre Gamlng Act 1908.
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[4. o3] Read v. Anderson
A prlnclpal obJectlve of s.18 of the Engllsh
Gamlng Act, 1E45 was to pnotect the Courts fron the
degradatlon of belng e'engaged 1n ludtcrous
1nqu1r1es;,1 lnto gamlng and wagerlng cllsputes . But
desplte the sweeplng terms of the provlslon and the
llberal constructlon glven 1t by the courts, ln rBB2
a crack 1n the leglslatlve armour apoeared.
In 1881 a turf comrnlsslon agent named Read, ot
the request of a better named Anderson, plaeed bets
on eertaln races nun at Ascot. To the knor*ledge of
Anderson, there was a well establlshed usage that
a turf commlsslon agent lnstructed by an emproyer to
back a horse, backed 1t 1n h1s own name and became
alone responslble to the la:/er of the odds or the
person uilti: whom the bet or bets were made. And,
on the settllng day after the event, the agent
recelved on pald the wlnnlngs or losses, and then
rendered hls own account to h1s pr1nc1paI, paylng
to, or recelvlng from hlm, the balance of the money
won or rost. But on thls occas10n.. and for reasons
that are lrrelevant here, a dlspute arose between
the prlnclpal and agent and, 1n respect to some
bets that had been lost, Andenson lnstrueted Read
that he was not to pay the wlnnens. Read, however,
was a professlonal turf commlsslon agent and a
member of rattersall?s subscrlptlon Room for whom
1. Per tord Ellenborou8h 1n Squlres v.(t8rr1, 3 Camp. 140; 1tii. Hhlsken
r]. 03l
a default 1n the payment of wlnners could glve rlse
to serlous consequences, Even loss of 11veLlhood.
Read therefore pald the wlnners and then brought an
aetlon to recover an amount of F.L7;-, belng losses
for whlch Andenson refused to relmburse h1m.2
The actlon came before iiawklns J 1n the Cou't
of Queens Eenclr and the plalntlff base,l h1s case on
the princlpal,/agent relatlonshlp. In repIy, the
defendant pleaded flrstly that recovery of the
losses was barred by s.1B of the Oamlng Act, rg4l"
and secondly that ln any event the authorlty to pay
the wlnners had been revoked befone Read pald then.
The learned Judge reJected these contentlons. The
rB45 Rct did not, he held" render rragers lllegar.
It slmply made i'the 1aw no longer avallable for
thelr enforcerrrent!t. 3
that:
And, he later went on to ho1d.
-'. 
. . although the law w111 not compel theloser of a bet to pay 1t, i:e may liwfull,,r
9o_:o 1f he pleasesl and-what hl nay law-ful1y do hlmself he may 1awfully autf,orise
anybody else to do fon h1m_ and 1f by hls
request or authorlty another person pays hlslost debts, the amount so pald can UL
necovered from h1m as so much money paldto h1s use. " {
fn regard to the
the wlnners had
the lnstant case
argument that flre authorlty to pay
been revoked Haw}<lns J held that 1n
an authorlty to pav the bets, lf
2. Read v. Anderson
3.
4.
rbld.,
rb1d.,
at p.104.
at p.105.
(1882) rO Q.8.D.100.
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Lost, was coupled wlth the employment, and although
before the bet was made the authorlty to pay lt
could be revoked, the moment the employment rvas
fu1f1lled by the maklng of the bet tlre authorlty
to pay 1t, 1f 1ost, became lrnevocable.5 Accord-
Lng1y, he entered Judgqment for the p1a1nt1ff Read,
On appealo the reasonlng and declslon of Hawklns
J was upheld, but Brett !t.R. (dlssentl.g) took a
strong stand agalnst al1ow1ng the law to be used to
protect the buslness of a turf commlsslon agent.
He sald:
". . . 1t has been contended the lawputs 1t lnto the plalntlffrs power to
enforce paynent by the defendant of the
amount of the bet, beeause unless 1t 1spald the pla1nt1ff wtlI suffen a loss 1nhls buslness; but the plalntlffts bustness,
although lt may not be lllegal, 1s dlreetly
obJected to by the law, and the contracts
maqe by hlm ln hls buslness cannot be
enforced: 1t ls a buslness of whlch the
law ought not to take notlce, and therefore
the lnconvenlence and the 1oss, whlch theplalntlff may suffer ln h1s obJectlonablebuslness, fonm no ground for an actlon for
r"evoklng an authorlty whlch ihe pr1nc1pal
ought not to have glven. The cases, lD
whlch an authorlty cannot be revoked, oughtto be conflned to those cases ln whlch the
agent w111 upon revocatlon suffer rrrhat the
law deems to be an lnJ ury . t'7
There was no denylng the log1c of the obJectlon of
the Master of the Ro11s. How could the law conslst-
5.
6.
7.
Ib1d.
Read
, &t p.109.
v. Anderson (1884) 13 Q.8.D.779.
Ib1d. , aE p.781-2.
[4.04]
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ently deny recognltlon to gamlng and wagerlng
eontnacts on the one hand, and then afford pro*
tectlon to the buslness of a turf commlsslon agent
on the other. The problem faclng tire court,
however, was that although the transactlon certalnlv
came wlthln the sptrlt of s.lB of the 1845 Act 1t
d1d not eome w1th1n lts express terms. In a later
cases Lord Co1erldge C.J. sald that at the tlme
Read v. Anderson vras declded he entlrely agreed wlth
the dlssent of the Master of the Ro11s. and he
thought the case:
". . . reaIly cut at the root of the value
and pr1ne1pIe of the statute, because 1t
was a declslon that 1f you employed some.-
body else to do that whlch you could not,
so as to make lt effectual at law, doyourselfr Vou could 1n effect make a good
contract 1n respect of a gamlng debt.'i'
Brl<lger v. Savage
The buslness of Turf Conmlsslon Agent was
elothed 1n legltlmacy by Read v. Anderson and thls
was relnforced ln 1684 when Brld,ger v. Savager came
before the same court. In that case the agent had
placed bets as lnstructed by hls prlnclpal, and,
although pald by the losers, had refused to pay the
prlnelpal the wlnnlngs he held on hls behalf, The
prlnclpal sued, and the agent pleaded that the
B.
9.
1.
Tatam v. Reeve t18931 1 Q.8.44.
Ibld.,
( 1885 )
p.46.
Q.8.D.363.
at
I5
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actlon riras barued and the contract avolded by the
Aet of 1845. Thls case vras closer to the terms of
s.l8 than Reacl v. Anderson had been 1n that the
prlnclpal was 1n fact brlnglng h1s actlon to
recover I a sum of money allegetl to be won uDon
a wagert.2 However-. the case ralsecl a fundamental
prlnclple of the 1al.r of a$ency and the count felt
qulte unable to a1low tire agent to beneflt at h1s
prlnclpalrs expense. Bowen L.J. sald:
iiltow wlth respect to the prlnclple lnvolved
1n thls ease, 1t ls to be observed that the
orlglnal contract of bettlng ls not an
1l1ega1 one, but only one whlch ls vold.ff the person who has betted pays hls bet,
he does nothlng wrong:: he onlv i+alves abeneflt vrhlch the statute has glven to h1m"
and confers a good tltle to the money on tneperson to whonn he pays 1t. Tnerefore when
the bet 1s pald tlre transactlon ls completeC,
and when 1t 1s pald to an agent 1t cannot be
contended that 1t 1s not a good payment forhls prlnclpal. If not, how monstrous lt
would be that the agent who has recelved
money r.rhlch belongs to h1s prlnc1pal' and
whlch he recelved for h1s prlnc1pal and only
on that account, should be allowed to ,say
that the payment 
',vas bacl and vo1d."3
In Brld_ger v. Savage the pr1nc1pal succeeded.
Flve years later, Cohen v. :i1tte1ll a further ease
lnvolvlng a turf conrmlsslon agent vras brought. In
that case the pn1nc1pal had er.ployed the agent to
bet on commlsslon-. but the agent fa1led to make
certaln bets pursuant to h1s prlnclpaLrs lnstructlons.
S.LB of the Gamlng Act, 18q5.
Ibld. , at p. 357-8.
(1889) zz Q.8.D.680.
2.
3.
Ir
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Thre pr1nelpa1 sued the agent for breach of contract
c1a1m1ng as damages the excess of galns over losses
whlch tne defendant should have recelved had the bets
ln questlon been made. In the lower court the Jury
found a verdlct for the prlnelpal. Eut on appeal
I{uddleston E and l.{anlsty J found for the agent on
the grounds that ln splte of what was held 1n Reaci.
v. Anderson and Brlciger v. Savafe, lf 1n fact the
bets had been placed, and won, and the Loser had
refused. to pay, the effect of the statute of 1Bq5
must have been to leave hlm r^rlthout any 1ega1
remedy. Under that Act such a contract was nu1l
and vold and, applylng ordlnary orlnclples of agencil.
the success of the prlnclpalrs actlon depended upon
hlm belng able to shoi.t that he could have reeoverecl-
under the contract h1s agent negllgently fa1led to
nake on hls behalf.s But at the root of Mr Justlce
Manlstyts obJectl-on to the clalm t'ras h1s beIlef thai,
there had already been a conslderable, and undeslr-
able eroslon of the prlnclples and obJectlves of the
1845 1eg1s1at1on. He regretted the declslon ln Read
v. Anderson and personally pneferred the dlssent of
the Master of the Ro11s.6 The deelslon 1n that case,
f
6.
". . . It 1s sufflclent to say that the effect of
statute B a 9 vlct., c.109, s.18, belng to
render bets lrrecoverable at }aw, a prlnclpal
can suffer no real loss throueih the refusal of
h1s agent to nake bets on hls aecount. "
Per Manlsty J at p.584.
It seems clear frorn the terms used by the
learned Judge at p.684 that he would not have
followed Read v. Anderson 1f 1t had not been
blndlng on-E-tn. E-ffii-rrot agree that the rneret'lnconvenlence of excLuslon from Tattersallrs"provlded any Justlflcatlon fon a1lowlnq the
agent to recoup ln that case.
[4.05]
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and that of p$dggl v. Savage had, ln h1s vlew, had
serlous soc1al consequences. lie sald:
fi... thls statute, . .. as the preamble sirorvs
was to add to the strlctness of the }aw r^rltii
respect to gambIlne. Slnce the Aet passed-,
however, and 1n consequence, as I cannot but
th1nk, of some of the declslons upon lt"
the practlce whlch lt rvas lntended to
dlscountenance has greatly lncreased" andthat wlth results of a most dlsastrous
character, as regards both horseraclng and
transaetlons 1n stocks. "'
The Gamlng Act,, 1892 (U.K. )
In splte of Jud1c1al concern and dlssatlsfaetlon
wlth the prlnclple establlshed by Re.ad v. Andersonr
1t r.ras not untll L892 that the fmperlal leglstature
lntervened. In that year 1t was enacted that:
t'Any promlse, express or 1npI1ed, to pay anyperson any sum of money pald by h1m under
or 1n respect of any contract or agreement
rendered null and vold by the Act of the
elghth and nlnth Vlctorla, chapten one
hundred and n1ne, or to pay any sum of noney
by way of commlsslon, fee, reward, or
othenvlse 1n respect of any such contract,
or of any servlces 1n relatlon thereto or
1n connectlon therewlth, shall be null and
vold, and no actlon shall be brought or
malntalned to reeover any such sum of money. ''2
T.
1.
Ib1d., at p.683.
Supra, pana.J.
55 Vlct., e.9, s.1 (1892), The Gamlng Act, 1892.2.
tq.c5l
Thls enactment came under Judlclal scrutlny 1n
the year lt was passed ln Tatam v. Reeve.3 In that
case, 1n response to a letter fron the defendant"
the plalntlff settled h1s, the defendantts, debts
wlth four persons ln tlre amount of 8148. Tlre defend-
antts letter d1d not dlselose that the money ltas
owed ln respect of bets on horseraces, but the eourt
was of the vlew that ln regard to that, "'the p1alnt1ff
was not an lgnonant person ln the transactlon. r'h The
p1a1nt1ff sued to recover the amount pald and argued
that the Aet of 1892 d1d not touch the transactlon
between he and the defendant. That Aet, he argued,
meant to strlke at transactlons ln whlch the person
who pald money was a party, 3s agent, to the contract
of gamlng; and he, the plalntlff d1d not pay the
money ttunder or ln respect oftt any contract rendered
vold by the f8q5 Act. The court, however, reJeeted
thls contentlon. lrl1]1s J was of the vlew that,
under the Act:
IrI do not thlnk 1t nakes any cllfference
whether the plalntlff knew, or dld not knovr,
that the payrnents he made wetre 1n payment ofbets; because, 1f those payments were made
r1n respeet off bettlng contracts, he ls
brought rulthln the very words of the Act . " s
3. tIB93l I Q.8.44, declded ln Novenben 1892,
approved by_the Court of Appea1 1n Saffery v.
Mayer [1901] f X.B.11.
Per Lord Colerldge C.J, at p.47.
Ib1d., at p.48, But see Hyams v. $tuart Itng
t190si 2 K.8 .696 , 7L5i pra66Tidra vl@Tlqrrl1 K.8.594, 505j where 1t was safd there must be
knowledge on the part of the person paylng that
he 1s paylng a bettlng debt, I{1IIs J went toofar 1n thls statement.
q.
5.
tq,05 l
Tvro years later, 1n OtSulllvan v. Thomaso lt was
argued that the 1892 Act effected a change ln the
1aw so that a r1ght, whlch prevlously exlsted to
recover deposlts fronn stakeholders before they had
pald the wlnners "7 had been taken away. In that
case the depositor had demanded the return of h1s
deposlt after the event but before the stakeholder
had pald the wlnner. The stakeholder refused to
comply and pald the wlnner 1n tlre faee of the plalnt'
lffrs demand. The latter sued to recover h1s
deposlt and, as the lar^r stood prlor to the lB92 Act
he was clearly entltled to succeed. The lssue ln
the case was slmply whether the money deposlted bv
the plalntlff could be sald to be a "sun of money
pald'i under the Act, that 1s, a sum of money pald
by the plalntlff . tJtlls J, after observlng that
the case depended on the courtrs lmpresslon as to
the meanlng of the language used 1n the sectlon,
found for the plalntlff. An t'opposlte construetlonil
he held:
"... would make the Aet of Parllament, whlchcertalnly was not passed out of synpathy wlth
the bettlng fnaternlty. thelr charter
the Act was not concelved wlth the vlew of
affordlng 1egaI facllltles to bettlnet men to
enable them to carry out thelr bettlng
operatlons by the aia of the Courts of Law. "8
6.
T.
[1895 ] 1 0.8.598.
Hampden v. Wa]sh (1876)Dffiv. [fss--(r87?)
Ib1d. , at p.700 .
I Q.8.D.189 :2 Ex .D.U22,
B.
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t{111s J held that the r{ord "pa1d" must be "g1ven
1ts prlma facle meanlng of pald out and out", and lt
was not appllcable to money deposlted for the ourpose
of paylng a thlrd party. 0r Sulllvan v. Thonas was
upheld by tire Court of Appeal a felv years later 1n
Burge v. Ashley & Sm1th, Ltd.e, a ease on ldentlcal
materlal facts. r0 There, Co111ns L.J. conflrmed the
rrlmpresslon' of l{111s J of the 1892 Act 1n the earller
case. He sald that althouEh:
"... the 'rrords [of the 1892 Aet] looked atby themselves mlght cover tbe case .. r Ithlnk we have to conslden somethlne more
than mere words. " rr
Tatam v. Reeve lnvolved a sltuatlon where the
p1alntlf f pa1<i the defendant's gamlng debts. In
In re OtShea; Ex parte Lancaster12 lnstead of paylne
OtShears debts, Lancaster guaranteed a bank overdraft
at the former's bank to enable OfShea to pay the
debts hlnself. 13 The Court of Appeal held that a loan
to enable another to pay a bettlng debt was not a
transactlon whlch falrly fell wlthln the terms of the
1892 Act and was accordlngly a good d.ebt to support
a petltlon 1n bankruptcy. Tatam v. Reeve was
9. Ir9oo] r a.8.744.
10. As Colllns L.J. observed the case was "vlrtually
an appeal frorn the declslon ln OrSuLLlvan v.
Thomas",, 1b1d. e at p .749, see afSffif,lffi'rth L.J.rF- 7-46.
11. Ibld., at p.750.
t2. lrgrr] 2 K.B.gB1.
13. There was also an earller loan for f,1r000 and
an overdraft guarantee for f.1r000, but only the
fl500 overdraft guarantee 1s rel-evant here.
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dlstlngulshed. But ln MaeDonald v. qlegqr" the same
court explalned Ig re 0rShea: Ex parte Lancaster as
a case where there was an lntentlon, but not an
express contractual stlpulatlon that the borrowen
should dlseharge h1s bettlng debts. If there was a
eontractual stlpulatlonrs that the money was to be
applled ln payment of bettlng debts - as there was 1n
MacDonald v. Green 
- 
then the lender 1s, ln substance 
'paylng the debtorts losses, and the loan 1s a payment
1n respect of a bettlng debt whlch 1s avolded by the
tB92 Act.
In re 0tShea; ex parte Lancaster was declded b,y
glvlng a I1teraI lnterpretatlon to the terms of
the 1892 Act. fn O'Sulltvan v. Thoqas, Burge v.
Ashley & Sn1th, Ltd. and MacDona1d v. Green,
however, the courts were more concerned wlth the
obJeetlve of the legls1at1on than lts express
terms. In each case, on a IlteraI eonstructlon
belng adopted the deelslon must have gone the
other way. But ln 0'SUlllvgq v. Thonas and
Burge v. Ash1ey & Smith, Ltd. the lesson of Read
v, Anderson was fresh ln the memory of the Judges
who were perhaps more consclous of the meanlng 1n
the comment of Blackstone that:
14. Note 5.
15. Dennlng L.J. at p.505 consl-dered that lt d1d
not matter 'rwhethen the stlpulatlon 1s expresg
or lrnpLled or to be lnferred from the clrcum-
stancestt . But Cohen L. J. and Asqulth L.J.
declded the case on the basls of the stlpulatlon
havlng been 1n express terms, lb1d., pp.6O2, 605.
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[ 4 . 06 ] De $attos v. BenJ anrln
Although the Count of Appeal Ln Tatam v.
!'... partlcular descrlptlons [1n statutes]
w111 ever be larne and deflclent the
lnventlons of sharpers belng swlfter than
the punlshment of the 1anr, t'rhlcir only hunts
them from one devlee to another.tr16
Reeve
and subsequent cases adopted a eonstructlon of the
1892 Act that was very much 1n sympathy wltlr the
leg1slatlve lntent 1ts llmlts were recognlsed 1n
De $attos v. BenJamlnr 1n 1B9l{. In that case the
agent had 1a1d bets on hls prlnclpal's behalf and
had been pald by the loslng backers . I'lowever, he
fa1led to dellver the wlnnlngs to lrls prlnclpal
and the latter brought an actlon to recover them as
money reeelved, and held by the agent on hls behalf.
The agent pleaded that the prlnclpalrs claln was
caught by the Act of 1892 but Lord Co1erldge C.J.
reJected thls contentlon saylng, lnter a}la:
16. Commentarles, book IV, p.I73. In a later caser
MacDonald v. Gneen, Lord Dennlng left no doubt
mE Te-Atcraed-@fnst the pIa1nt1ff lencler,
who was the ltlanaglng Dlrector of a Companv
carrylng on buslness as bookmakers and commlsslon
agents. For to declde the case ln hls favour,
he consldered: tt. . . should present bookmakers
wlth a means of evadlng the Gamlng Acts. ,. . All
that a booknaklng company would have to do [to
avold the ]-892 Actl r,rouLd be to send a messengerto the backer, wlth a cheque drawn by the manag-lng dlrector ln favour of the backer and a draftletter prepared ready for slgnat'ure, and get
both baek, the cheque endorsed and the draftletter slgned. t' Note 13, at p.6C5 .
1. (1894) 63 L.r. (A.8. ) 248.
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"The Ganlng Act I89Z enacts that whlch 1s
reasonable and rlght. It makes t11egal [ 2 ]
all parts of the transactlon lncluded 1n 1ts
scope, lncludlng the act of a person who,
as commlsslon agent, effects an 111egal
contract But 1t does not enable a person
who has recelved money on behalf of anotherto retaln 1t for hls own use. It does notgo on to enact that 1f B recelves money from
A to pay over to C, B would be entltled toput lt lnto hls own pocket.r'3
,The purpose of the l-B?Z Act, stateci 1n lts
sfunplest form was." therefore, to deprlve contracts
of agency and loan for ganlng and wagerlng of such
legal effect as would dlseourage the agents and
lenders themselves, and Erldger v. Savage remalned
undlsturbed. And thls 1eg1slat1on, 11ke the Acts of
IB45 and L853, also provlded the basls for slmtlar
reform 1n llew Zealand 1n the form of s.2 of the
Oarnlng Act , 169 4 ,
[4.07] The Gamln8i Act, 1894 - Agency Bett:lng and Stakeholdlng:
The Explanatory Note bo the Gamlng 8111 fB94
states that the declslon 1n F.ead v. Anderson:
f" 
. . . and that 1n Brldger v. Savage, led tofresh developments 1n berttlng-Sus.fness of
a most obJectlonable form, and the EngllshAct lras passed 1n 1892 for the purpose ofputtlng; a stop to 1t. The I'Iew Zealand Courts
lrave of late years seen many such cases, and1t 1s a scandal that the Courts should be usedfor such punposes. 
"
2. ,1lkr1s is an error. ,The
transactlons 1LJ.ega1,
3. Ib1d. , at p .249 .
Act d1d not make the
merely unenforceable.
[4.07]
In the context of thls explanatlon, s.2 of the Gamlng
8111, after adoptlng the 3-anquage used 1n the Engllsh
statute of 1892, then added the words :
". . . and no actlon shall be brought or
malntalned to recover any sum of money
won, 1ost, op staked 1n any bettlng trans-'
actlon whatever. I'
The reason for the addltlon of these words 11es 1n
part 1n the expressed lntentlon of the leglslature ln
the Explanatory i'(ote to meet the sltuatlon occurrlng
ln Firldger v. Savager as well as that 1n Read v.
Ar4le_rson.z But why should the New Zealand legls-
laturers coneern wlth wagenlng and gamlng predomlnate
to the extent that they were prepared to allow a
dlshonest agent to keep hls prlnclpalts vrlnnlngs?
The obJeet, Do doubtr was to dlscourage the pubtlc
from resortlng to such agencles, but 1n order to
understand the leglslatlve concern lt 1s necessary
to go back to the Act of tB81 anct examlne develop-
ments from that t1me.
Prlor to tire passlng of the 1BB1 Act there was
much debate 1n New ZeaLand as to wi:ether the total*
lsator should be permltted to operate 1n the country.
There was, 1n fact, stnongly volced opposltlon to lt,
prtnclpally because, a.s S1r il1Il1an Fox sa1d, 1D the
debates on the 1881 8111:
Suprag pBpB..4. Thls may be statlng the case toohlgh. But there 1s a strong lnference arlslng
out of the statement ln the Explanatory Notethat the 1894 8111 was lntended to prevent
actlons of the Brldger v. Savage class,
Supna, para.3.
1.
1.
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"... It seemed a great mlstake, when they
riere attemptlng to dlscourage the vlce of
garnbllng and were strlklng at the very root
and foundatlon of those temptatlons whlch
lnduced 1t, tirat they should leave a l1ttle
sappllng Llke thls totallsator standlng,
whlch someday would probably be found to have
grown lnto a large tree under the shadow of
whlch vlce flourlshed You would never
extenmlnate the race of cats by encouraglng
the breedlng of l1tt1e kittens.l'3
liowever, the totallsator possessed three lmport-
ant advantages to a leglslator concerned to put down
gamlng and wagerlng. FlrstlV, the hlstory of gamlng
and wagertng 1n England and other parts of the world
had clearly shown that lt was qulte lmposslble to
stamp out thls forn of actlvlty completely, and the
totallsator d1d provlde a means by whlch 11m1ted and
controlled facllltles could be provlded to enable the
pub11.c to lndulge lts lnrepresslble appetlte for
rvagerlng.{ Secondly, the totallsator permltted, a
form of lndlrect taxatlon on the proflts from wager-
1ng 1n the sense that lt enabled money to be
channelled lnto the raclng clubs so that they eould
lmprove thelr fac1l1t1es and prlzes and thereby
foster funproved breedlng and lmpor"tlng of raclng
stock.s Thlrdly, and most lmportantly, 1t mlght
dlseourage those fmen who ha<l very much the apoear-.
3. (188r) 38 N.Z.p.D.496. See (1880) 35 N.Z.p.D,
275 where an anendnent to outlaw the totallsator
was 10st. Also (r88r) 39 N.Z.P.D.\37; (1882)4r ll ,2.p.D.402: lbld., 405: (r8Ea) 43 N.z.p.D.
117, for Later complalnts.
N. Z. P.D.4. (1880) 35 N.2.P.D.258; also (1885) 52
100 and 102; (1894) 83 N.2.P.D.287.
5. (1885) SZ N.2.p.D.101: (1894) E3 I*i.2.p.D.285.
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ance of vultures' looklng out for preyr; the
bookmakers.s
Throughout the last two decades of the 19th
century the buslness or occupatlon of bookmakers
was under contlnual attack. Thelr presence 1n the
communlty was vlewed ln New Zealand as a grave
soclal evtl7 and 1n lBBf thelr actlvltles were
conslderably curtalled by the Act of that year vrhlclr
ereated an offenee, lnter a1la, of bettlng 1n any
place 1n a way of buslness.s Unfortunately., however,
although the totallsator was lntended as an lnstru'-
ment for the suppresslon of bookmakens, 1t subse-
quently proved to be bhe means of thelr survlval'e
'Ihe tEBt act dld not deelare the buslness or
occupatlon of a bookmaker unlawfull0 and, although
5. The lion.lrlr T.Dlek (r88r) 38 N.2.P.D.495, and also(rB8o) 35 l,i.z.p.D.zT5i (rBBr) fe i{.2.P.D.196-7.
7. The general attltude to them at the tlme 1s very
much refleeted 1n the comment of the Hon'E'
Wakefleld that bookmakers were t'...a lot of men
who to all appearance had no rlght to be outslde
the waII.-oi'I taol". (1881) 3q-N.2.P.D.498.
And see lion.R.J:Seddon (1894) B3 ll.z.P.D.29I'
8. The 18Bl Act contalned extenslve provlslons
aBalnst bettlng houses and gamlng houses u but theprlnclpal sections affectfn! Uooimakers 
"qf" s.18lna s.ir. See, e.g. Porter v. o'Connor (1887)
5 N.z.L.R.257i rn"reEIE & BfFd-13S91) 9 N.z.
L.n. 315, narn6t@Frson-Tr-[192 ) 11 N.z.L.R'
3 1 ? ; 
- 
IU de -il, -6i-c oqno!-fl89tfl 1, N _. z . L . R . 7 2 3 :laartrii-v. can6Wq2il,.l3- I .!.y.1.12:^*ttd
o
E!-son 
". 
@1 (1894) 13 N.2.L.R.529-
A not altogether unforeseen occurrence. In 1881
the Hon. RlHursthouse sald 1t was ".. . a clever
mechanlcal lnventlon to enable lazy bookmakersto make a llvlng out of the unwary publlcr'.(rB8r) rg N.z.P.D. tt97.
lfhe buslness or occupatlon of a bookmaker was
not declared unlawful untll- 1920, Gamlng
Arnendment Act 1920, e. 2.
10.
[4.07]
by s.46 of that Act raclng elubs were permltted to
operate totallsators at race meetlngs under llcence t
bettlng on the totallsator could be done "by or
through some person present on the spot lmmedlately
before the race 1s run". l1 At a tlme when only
11m1ted travel facllltles were avallable thls 11n1t"'
atlon on the totallsator gave rlse to a oubllc demand
for off.-course bettlng faclllties '- whlch the more
enterprlslng bookmakers eagerlv provlded. Thus, &s
a consequence of the l1cens1ng of totallsators on
race courses, prlvate off-course bettlng ageneles
and totallsator odds bettlng fac1l1tles were soon
ava11able throughout the country. 12 And from all
accounts the buslness was culte extensive. In 1894
the Hon. Capt. l,i.R.Russe11 asked the House :
'i... do they [Honourable i{embers] reallse thatfor every man golng before them lat thetotallsator wlndows I there are at least ten,
and there may be a hundred, who have lnvested
money 1n the prlvate rftote", of whlcir they
see nothlng? Do they know that t'tote' shops
are numerous I w1}l not say 1n almost every
tobacconlstrs shop that would be unJustbut 1n every town ln New Zealand, and thatfor every pound put on the totallsator there
are tens that do not go through the total*
11, Descnlbed by Rlchnond J.
note 8, at p.53I. 1n 
Paterson v. CampbeIl
L2. The totallsator agency buslness was not lllegalprlor to the f894 Act, In re Sellg & ts1r1,
?aterson v. carnobell no@tal-ffiffidds wffioftliegai per se, P€r W1illamsJ. ln Barnett v. Henderson note B, at p.318, but1t was-TTttTe symlty ln a way of buslnessPorter v. 0fConnor.
STTE:& 81ffi?:E-8. Paterson 
v. qampbgl-L, In re
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t'lsator Do they know that fon every
pound that goes through the nachlne tertpounds so to the oockets of the book'
makers . F 13
And the Hon, S1r Robert Stout advlsed the House
that he had recelved lnformatlon that there were
(1n 1894):
". . . nnen 1n thls colony who are maklnqfrom 813000 to t2r000 a year by '?tote'rbettlng. I thlnk that 1s very bad. I
have a llst whlch was glven to me, showlng
that there must be at least somethlng llke
9501000 to t60r000 a year rnade by ;'tote"betters ln thls eolony outslde of thetotallsator altosether. '' rl
Contrary to the leglslatunes lntentlon 
' 
the
totallsator had, 1n fact, proven to be the book'-
makers salvatlon. And, for those who dlsllked the
agency buslness, a totallsator agency could pnovlCe
a very effeetlve cover for a bookmaklng operatlon
rvhlch eontnavened the provlslons of the 1881 Act. tt
The emergence of bookmakers ln thelr nevr style
as ittotallsator agencleso' was a pnlnc1pa1 (and
perhaps exaggerated) concern when the 1B9q Act was
passed. It was thls concern, and also the need to
prevent boolrmakers actlvltles from eatlng lnto the
t-3. (189q) 83 N.2.P.D.288.
14. (189lt) 83 hr.2.P.D.300.
15. In both In re SeI1E & BlrdCampbe1lffi
of thls.
and Paterson v.
more-Tfrffi-hlnt
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proflts of the raclnq clubs, 15 that weakened the
colon1al leglslatunes respect for prlnelples 1n tire
law of agency when lt enactecl s.2 of the 1894 Act.
That Act also took dlrect actlon agalnst such act1v1.'
tles, creatlng lmprlsonable offences tn relatlon to
bettlng totallsator od.ds and belng employed as a total -
lsator agent. l7 But s,2 cl1d not conflne ltself to
rernovlng cornpletely the element of legal obllgatlon
lnherent 1n the ageney buslness ltself. It also
exclsed those obllgatlons from the relatLonshlp of
stakeholder and deposltor, for by the acldltlonal lvords
actlons to recover nonles staked, as well as that won
or lostr were prohlblted.
The extenslon of s.2 of the 1894 Act to prevent
recovery 1n tbe Brldger v. Savage and De Mattos v.
BenJamln sltuatlons ralsed not a volce 1n protest.
But lts extenslon to avold reeoverv of deposlts from
stakeholders dld. ftre Hon. E.C.J. Stevens complalned
1n the Leglslatlve Councll:
?'It was proposed by thls Bl1t to do away
wlth all trusteeshlp that any stalceholCer hadgot ln regard to all stakes whlch were offer-.
€d, and 1n cases whlch the law ltself declaredto be lawfu1 games or races. It took away the
rlghts of the lndlvldual who won the stakes.It absolutely took atday the nesponslblllty on
the part of the 1nd1v1dual wi:o vras entrusted
wlth the stakes., and who was practlcally t:retrustee. It took away the responslbtllty of
the stakeholder to make good the money vrhlch
he held ln h1s hands. He dld not know whether1t was to be consldered a proper way of deal-
L6. (1894) 83
17. Sectlons l-l
N. Z. P.D. 286-. 1bld. , 288-9.
and 5 respectlvely.
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"1ng wlth moneys recelved and those who heldthem as trustees, but 1t seemed to h1m to be
one of the most revolutlonary proposals 1t
was posslble to concelve He thought
. . . Dersons wlnnJ-ng stakes ln a faln and open
fashlon wel?e perfectly entltled to demand
payment. 
" 
ls
The change effected by the 1891{ Aet ln relatlon to
stakeholdtng uras substantlal. And once agaln,, 1D
order to understand the nature of the change and the
reagon for 1t the orevlous Iaw must be consldered.
Prlor to the Gamlng Act, 1845 there was tsome
uncertalnty as to whether a deposltor could demand
the return of h1s stake from the stakeholder. In
Emeny v. Rlchard.sre the Court of Exchequer held that
a deposlt on a wagen of less than €10 on the event of
a foot race could not be demanded back from the stake-
holder by the deposltor, but nust ablde the event.
In Elthqln v. Klngsmanzo on the other hand the Court of
K1n6s Bench was of the contrary v1ew, and the $ame
Court conflrmed thls vlerv of the matter ten years
Iater 1n Hastelow v, JacksonSr But s.18 of the Aet of
lBIl to some extent resolved the eonfllct by avoldlng
all garnlng and r.ragerlng contracts, and that provlslon
speclfleally provlded that no actlon eould be bnought:
rB. (r894)
19. (rBq: )
20. (1818)
2t, (1828)
B3 W.Z.P,D.L77.
14 M.& W.728.
1B & A1d.683.
8 B.& c,zzl-.
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tr. 
. . for recoverlng any sum of money or
valuable thlng whlch shall have been
deposlted 1n the hands of any person to
ablde the event on whlch any vilager shal1
have been made."
On a 11teral lnterpretatlon the provlslon clearly
prevented actlons to recover deposlts from stake*
holders. But Ln Varnev v. Hlckqanz 1t vras held that
that part of s.18 relatlng to depostts applled only
to the non-recovery by the wlnner of the stakes
deposlted by the other party, and 1t d1d not affect
the rlg- t of a deposltor to recover back h1s deposlt
lf demanded from the stakeholder before he pald lt
over to the wlnner of the event. Varney v. Hlckman
was followed 1n Hampdeu v. Wa1sh.23 In that case
Cockburn C.J. explalned the nature of the relatlonshlp
exlstlng between a stakeholder, the wlnner of the event
and the deposltor 1n the fol1ow1ng terms:
Itl.Ie cannot eoncur 1n what ls sald ln Chltty
on contracts, 8th €d., p.574, that ra stake-
holder 1s the agent of both partles, or ratherthelr trusteer . It may be true that he 1s the
trustee of both partles ln a certaln sense, sothat, 1f the event comes off and the authorlty
to pay over the money by the deposltor be not
revoked, he may be bound to pay 1t over' Butpr1mar1ly he 1s the agent of the deposltor'
and can deal wlth the money depoqlted so long
only as h1s authorlty subslsts. "z{
D1gg1e v. Illggs?s a declslon of the Court of Appeal
22. (r8171 5
?3.(1876) I
2U. irlote 23,
25. 0877) 2
c .8 . 27t.
Q.B.D.rB9.
at p.194-5.
Ex.D .422.
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ln 1877, and Tnlmble v. H111!6 a declslon of the
Judlclal cornrnlttee on appeal from the supreme court,
Sydney, lD l-B79 settled any cl,oubts that rnlght have
exlsted after varney v. Hlckmag and }iampden v. walsh.
A stakeholder was not a trustee of the partles to a
wager, h€ was, and remalned at all t1mes, an agent of
h1s deposltor. H1s rlght to pay the wlnner was,
thenefore, dependent upon the subslstence of his
prlnclpalrs authorlty to pay. And 1f revoked before
payment, a payment ln deflanee of the revocatlon of
that authonity would render hlm rlable to the prlncl ,.
pal for the arnount of the deposlt. 27 Eut once the
money was pald a subsequent revocatlon of the authorlty
to pay was lneffectual. And 1n any case, s.1B of the
rB45 Aet prevented an actlon by a wlnner to acqulre
the stakes as wlnnlngo even 1f he was a deposltor.2s
If a deposltor, he eould only pursue to recoven hls
own stake as a deposltor, but not tn the capaclty of
wlnner. a
The declslons a1low1ng repudlatlon and recovery
back before the stakeholder had executed h1s authorlty
can be Justlfled on the basls that after repudlatlon
the money ceases to ablde the event and becomes money
of the deposltor 1n the hands of the stakeholder
26. (L879), 5 App.Cas.342.
27. ilampden v. Walsh lras an actlon to reeover a S500deposrr patd-Er ln deflance of such a revoeatlon,1n Trlmble v. H1ll the actlon was brought to
recoTeE?oo oi-TFe same gnounds.
28. See o.g. Mantln v, Hewson
Savage v.@lq ( 1867rT6
29. Per Cockburn C.J. ln {Arnpden v.at pp.196-7.
(1855) to nx.737 
" 
cf.L.J. (Ex) 178.
tdalsh note 23'
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wlthout any good reason for the latter retalnlng 1tP
But as Lord Esher ljl.R. observed 1n StrachaL v.
g those declslons are
'ran encroachment on the plaln worclsrf 3l of s.18 of the
1845 Act and are acceptable only beeause they are
I'agreeable to [tne] rnlnd.. "? They were, ln other
words, pollcy declslons and stand, l1ke Read v.
Anderson13 Brldger v. Savage*and otSulllvan v.
Thomags as monuments to a Judlcla1 reluctanee to
accept that the leglsLature could have lntended to
place 1ts eoncern about the vlce of garnbllng above
the lntegrlty of the Law of agency. fn England the
prlnclples of agency have survlved the Gamlng Acts. $
fn ltrew Zealand the posltlon ls confused. On the one
hand, as later paragraphs wlll show, the leglslature
has subordlnated the lar,r of agency to 1ts concern
about the actlvltles of bookrnakers. On the other
hand, as 1n England, the Courts have shown some
reluctance to aecept that 1t could have lntended to
do so, The lssue stllL awalts an authorltatlve
resolutton. But ttrere are two further matters whleh
support the vlew that the leglslature d1d not lntend
to aIlow the establlshed prlnclples of agency to
30. Per Kay L.J. 1n Strachan v. Unlversal Stock
Exchanse Ltd., (F-oZfEB95l@-3.
3r. Ib1d. r at p" 599
32. Iden.
33. Supra, para.l.
34. Supra, para.4.
35. Ir895] r Q.8.698.
36. See, 4 Halsburyts Laws of England (llt,h ed. )paras.2l-23, 26, 30-31 on Bettlng.
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operate between prlnclpal ancl bettlng agent 1n New
Zealand. A draftlng error ln the 1BB1 Aet, and an
erroneous vlew of totallsator proprletors as mere
stakeholders of the totallsator lnvestorf s wagers
also eontrlbuted substantlally to thls change. The
elrcumstances of these two factors were as foIlows.
As prevlously mentloned the prlnclpaL provlslons
of the Cotonlal Act of 1881 were extractecl from the
Imperlal Acts of 1845 and 1853 (fne Bettlng Houses
Act).37 Sectlon 33 of the 1BB1 Act, whlch avolded a1l
garnlng and wagerlng contracts, was copled from s.1E of
the 1845 Act. Rut unfortunately, and, it ls suggested
wlthout reallslng the fu1l lmpllcatlons of dolng so,
the draftsman of the llew Zealand Act then copled s.34(of the 1BB1 Act) from s.5 of the Engllsh Bettlng
Houses Act, 1853. That provlslon read:
;'Nothlng 1n thls Act contalned shall extendto any person recelvlng or holdlng any money
or valuable thlng by way of stakes or deposltto be pald to the wlnner of any race or Lawful
sport, gamer op exerclse, or to the owner of
any horse engaged ln any race. i'
The Bettlng Houses Aet, 1853 created offenees of, lnter
aI1a, keeplng premlses etc. for bettlng, that 1s for
recelvlng money as a deposlt on a bet, $ or for the
conslderatlon for an undertaklng to pay any money on
any event or eontlngency relatlng to honse races r
flghts, games, sports and exenclses. 3 The sectlons
37, Supra, para.2.
38. s. 4.
39. s.1.
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creatlng these, and related offenees were, wlth
lnconsequentlal modlflcatlons, coplecl lnto the
ColonlaL Act of 188t.m But s.6 of the Bettlng
Houses Aeto 1853, 1n the context of that Act, was
lntended to do nothlng more than recognlse the dts".
tlnctlon between belng a party to a bettlng trans.
aetlon and belng a mere stakeholder ." the former
belng the concern of the Aet, the latter not. Thus,
s.6 clarlfled the stakeholdens posltlon by declarln;5
that he d1d not, &s such, eome w1thln the pnovlslons
of the 1853 Act.
fn alI probab1llty, the draftsman of the tBSf Aet
lntended that s.34 of that Aet should have the same
llmlted effect as s.5 of the Bettlng liouses Act. But
unfortunately 1t d1d not because the lntroduetory
words to the provlslon 
- 
t'l{othlng 1n thls Act .. . "
also eneompassed the avoldlng provlslon, s.33. It
r^r111 be recalled that ln England the equlvalent of
s. 33 of the New Zealand Act of 1881 was s. l_8 of the
Gamlng Act 1845. The Bettlng Houses Act, 1853 AfA
not contaln such a provlslon. Thus, by lnsertlng
s.6 of the Bettlng Houses Act, 1853 lnto the 1881
Actu the New ZeaLand draftsman effectlvely deprlved
40. s.l of the Bettlng Houses Act, IB53 became s.11 ofthe 1881 Act, and s.4 of the iormer Acb becarne
s.14 of the latter. The provlslons are only stat-
ed ln the text ln general terms. Thene wene o-u1te
comprehenslve provlslons 1n the relevant Acts
whleh also created nelated offenees.
41. s.6 of the Bettlng Houses Act, 1853 was also
adopted by the Austnallan States. But lnterest -lngly enough New South l"Iales (s.48(3), Garnlng andBettlng Act, L9l2); Victorla (s.101 Po11ceOffences Act, 1915); and Tasmanla (s.11 Suppress-
1on of Publlc Bettlng and Gamlng Act, 1895)
conflned 1ts operatlon to the provlslons concerned
t 4. 071
the Varney v. Hlckman*2 l1ne of authorlty of the
essentlal basls for lts appllcatlon ln New Zealancl;
that 1s, s.33, the avoldlng provlslon. As a
eonsequence, on a lltera1 construetlon of these
provlslcns, the confllct betureen Erorry_ v. Rlchardsa3
whlch favoured the trusteeshlp elenent ln stakeholder,/
deposltor relatlons, and Eltham v. Klngsqanrrwhlch
favoured the a€lency approaeh. survlved ln the colony.
The only reported case 1n whlch the New Zealand
Courts were called rrpon to declde the effect of s. l4
on s.33 of tlre Act of IB81 was Darl: v, Island Bgy
Park Raclng Corlpany.bs fn that case, whleh wtl1 be
canvassed ln more detall 1n laten paragraphs, the
lssue was whether a deposltor was entltled to recover
h1s wlnnlngs from the stakeholder.s Counsel for the
deposltor argued that the transactlon dld not come
wlthln s.33 of the Act and under s.34 the wlnner was
wlth the suppresslon of bettlng houses. SoutlrAustralla, (s.68 Lottery and Gamlng Act, 1917)
and tles';ern Australla, (s.9 Pollce Act AnendmentAct, 1893 (No.l)) made the same mlstake as New
Zea1and.
42, Note 22,
43. uote 19.
4lt. Note
note
as supported by llastelow v. Jackson
45. (r886) 4 II.z.L.R.3or.
45. It w111 be the wrlterrs contentlon 1n later
paragr"aphs that the flndlng that the defendant
was a stakeholder of money deposlted pursuantto a wagerlng contnact was erroneous.
20,2t,
entltled to recover. f7 The
squarely wlth the questlon
between ss.33 and 34. But
the 1ssue, saying:
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Court was, therefore, faeed
as to the relatlonshlp
Rlchmond J slde--stepped
I'The present actlon ls eertalnlv nothlngless than an actlon to enforce an agneement
made between the deposltors 1t ls to carry
the agreement lnto effect by an actlon agalnstthe stakeholder. Therefore the case, 1n my
op1n1on, falls apart from the condltlons at
the end of the Act, and falls w1th1n the
enactment of s.33, whlch says that all wager ,
1ng agreements arre nul1 and vold they
cannot be enforced ln a Court of Justlce.'b8
It 1s lmportant. however, to recop;nlse that thls was
an actlon to recover w1nn1f,gs, and not slmply an
actlon to recover Darkfs own deposlt from the stake.-
holder. If the actlon had been of the latter klnd the
declslon may well have gone the other way. "e tsut
regardless of whether lt was an actlon to recover
47, He also argued that the defendant was an agent,
and not a stakeholder. But the argument 1s,perhaps, only brlefly reported. lhe defendant
was not rcalled upon to rep1y. Note U5 at p.301-2.
48. rbld., at p.3oz.
t19. It was a po11cy declslon whleh Rlehmond J
Justlfled wlth the words ". . . I'io doubt the
obJect of the Lepqlslature 1n provldlng that
these mattens should not be the subJect of an
actlon was to save the tlme and dlgnlty of theCourt, for dlgnlty could scarceLy be presenvedln the lnvestlgatlon of the absurd dlsputes
arlslng out of bettlng transactlons.r' Ib1d.,
at p.302. But lt was deelded after Read v.
Aqderson and Brldger v. Savage whlch-fril-ust have
swung EE-e ba1aiG-lF favffi-oT ttre deposltor.
[4.08 ]
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w1nn1ngs, or a successful actlon to reeover a deposlt,
1n elther case such a concluslon flew 1n the face of the
Ieg1s1at1on, Rlchnond J resolved the d1ff1eu1.ty of
applylng s.34 by glvlng 1t no appllcatlon at all; 1t
was 1n effect, a Judlclal- revocatlon of a leglslatlve
enactmentl and one whlch the leglslature ltself ratlfled
when lt repealed s,34 ln the 1894 Act?r But recognltlon,
perhaps, of the draftlng error 1n lnsertlng s.34 ln the
t88t net 1n the flrst p1ace, was not the only reason for"
the sectlonfs repeal. It was also prompted by a coneern
to remove what may well have been regarded as an anor,raly
1n the l"aw 1n respect to totallsator bettlng.
The Gamlng Act, 1894 .. Totallsator Bettlng
When the Hon. Wllllam Montgomery moved the seeond
readlng of the 1894 8111 he sald, lnter alla, of s,2
and the repeal of s.34:
"There was a case a short tlrne ogo, whlch was
assumed bo be of conslderable lmportance, whlch
came before the Court 1n one of the provlnclaldlstrlcts, and whlch afterwards was refemed to
the Court of Appeal. There was then seen to be
a good deal of doubt as to what the law was, andthls Bt1l now proposed to make 1t clear.'t'
There ls no record of such a case belng declded on the
polnt near or at that ttme. But 1n the debates on a
proposed amendment 1n relatlon to sweepstakes and
advertlslng 1n 1887 there 1s a s1rn1lar comment. fhe
Hon. G. Mclean sald then, ln the Leglslatlve Councll:
50. It may weLl b€, althoughthe po1nt, that Rlchmond
draftsman f s eruon.
51, By s.7, The Gamlng Act,
1. (r.894) 83 N.Z.P.D.r7T.
the report 1s sllentJ was not unaware of
1894.
on
the
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". . . The Judges of the Supreme Court and theResl-dent i4aglstrate have declded that 1f aperson lnvestlng hls money 1n the totallsator
demands the return of h1s money he can get 1tback; and I presurne that the Councll wlll not
obJect to pass a measure remedyl5re thls flaw1n the exlstlng leglslatlon ... r'
The only case on record about that tlrne was DarE v.
fsland Bay Park Faclng Company3 whlch was declded by
Rlchrnond J 1n the htrelllngton supreme court 1n March
18E5. And 1t 1s submltted that although 1t was not
tlrat case, that the Hon. l'I. Montgomery referred to 1n
the above quotatlon, the case does lllustrate the
po1nt. In Darkrs case the pla1ntlff Dark had backect
a certaln horse at the defendant club?s totallsator
durlng a January meetlng. unfortunatery the horse ln
questlon ran a dead.-heat wlth another horse anc the
cl-ub refused to pay any dlvldends on that race and
ordered that 1t be re.-run. The re-.run was won by
another horse and Dank brought an actlon to recover
the 82.2s dlvldend he alleged he was entltLed to on
the result of tire flrst race. rn the Lower court the
Maglstrate non-sulted the plalntlff holdlng, that by
vlrtue of s.33 of the Gamlng and Lotterles Act, lBEl
the contract was not enforceable. The case ralsed the
lssue of the status of the raclng club as llcensee of
the totallsator. Slchnrond J sald:
I'It apoears to me to be beyond all controversythat the present actlon 1s brought to enforce
t. (1847) 5T bl.z.P.D.zi'. Hedeclded 1n Dunedln at that
only reference to lt now ln
(1386) 4 u.z.L.R.3or.
was referrlng to a casetlme, But thls 1s the
exlstence.
5.
[4'oB1
I'a wagenlng contraet. The totallsator ls
descrlbed ln sectlon B of the Act as an
lnstrument of gamlng and wagenlng, and as
such the use of 1t ls generally prohlblted
and subJected to penalty and fonfeltureft 1s qulte pla1n that the lnstrument 1s
treated by the Act as an lnstrument forgamlng and wagenlng, and I do not see anydlffleulty 1n saylng who vrere the layers of
the wagens affected by the lnstruments. It
1s perfectly pla1n, I th1nk, that the depos-ltor 1n the totallsator backs the horse he
selects, agalnst the f1e1d. That ls the
wager, and 1t ls Ia1d wlth the backers of
the other horses - whether the layers of the
wager are known to one another or not signlfies
nothlng 
- and those vrho are worklng the
machlne are the stakeholders. 'i t
Now havlng regard to the flndlng ln the case that
s.33 of the Aet applled to a c1a1m for wlnnlngs aga.lnst
a stakeholder" the vlew that the operators of the
totallsator were stakeholders of the betters I deposlts
could glve rlse to qulte lnconvenlent consequences,
especlally 1f the actlon agalnst the stakeholder was
brought to recover a betterrs deposlt.
Speakl-ng of the nature of tlre totallsator 1n
Tollet v. Thomass Cockburn C.J. sald:
'rThus, wlth lngenulty worthy to be employed 1n
a better cause, 1t was eontnlved that eachperson, who was lnduced to bet, mlght see at
a glance what was the amount of the odds offer-
ed 1f he bet on any partlcular horse; but(anO thls ls materlal to be observed), the
state of the odds was llab1e to change before
the race was run
The person therefone who, by means of thls
machlne, 1s lnduced to part wlth hls ha1f.-
4. Ib1d. ,
( 1871)
at p.302.
5 L.R.e.B. 5145.
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t'crown, does so on a speculatlon, hls chance
of remuneratlon dependlng on two events: one,
narnely, whether h1s horse w1ns, determlnlng
whether he shall get back anythlng: the
other, namely, how nany other gamblers shall
have deposlted thelr half-crowns, and on
what ...[horses], determlnlng how much he ashall recelve ln the event of h1s wlnnlng.'t'
Thus, the odds are not flxed and an lnvestor on the
totallsator knows that the dlvldend pald ls determlned
by the total amount lnvested on the race, the horses
upon whlch 1t 1s lnvested, the wlnner/s of the race
and the amount the club may deduet as a peneentage of
the total lnvestment for operatlng the nachlne. But
1f, as Rlchnond J suggests 1n Dar! v. Island Bay. ParE
Raclng Conpany lnvestors on a totallsator are wagerlng
wlth each other and the proprletor of the totallsator
ls menely the stakeholder then, otr the authorlty of
the l{anpd.en v. lla1sh, Dlggle v. Iilggs, and Trlmble v.
H111 l1ne of authorlty a deposltor could demand, and
lndeed sue for, a return of hls deposlt. Thus, the
oCds on a bota]lsator dlvldend are subJect to the
furthen contlngeneyr the lntegrlty of an lnveetorts
feLlow lnvestors.
It 1s the wrlterrs contentlon, however, that
Rlchmond J ln Dark v. Island Bay Park Raclng Company
mlsunderstood the 1ega1 nature of both totallsator
lnvestments and wagerlng contracts.
In a carefulLy consldered statement
deflned a wagerLng contract ln Car11i1
Hawklns J
v. Carbollc
6. rb1d. 
" 
at
1n Attorne
p.5r9. See also Hanworth M.R.
v. Racecounse Bettlng Control
,57---General
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Smoke BalI ConJpgny- 7 1n the fol1ow1ng terms:
t'... a wagertng eontract 1s one by whlch twopersons, professlng to hold opposlte vlews
touchlng the lssue of a future uncertaln
event, mutually agree that, dependent upon
the determlnatlon of that event, one shall
w1n from the other, and that other shall pay
or hand over to hlm, a sum of noney or other
stake; nelther of the contractlng partles
havlng any other lnterest 1n that contract
than the sum or stake he w111 so wln or lose,
there belng no other real conslderatlon for
the maklng of such contract by elther of thepartles. ft 1s essentlal to a wagerlng con-tract that eaeh party nay unrler 1t elther wln
or l-ose r r.uhether he w111 wln or lose belngdependent on the lssue of the event, and
therefor"e, remalnlng uncertaln untll that
lssue 1s known. If elther of the partles may
wln but cannot lose, or may lose but cannot
w1n, lt ls not a waferlng contract." I
Thls deflnltlon was adopted wlth approval by the Court
of Appeal ln Ellesmere v. lJallace rs and Lord Dennlng
M.R. 1n Tote Investors Ltd. v. Smokerro sa1d. he would
not 11ke to treat lt as a rtgld deflnltlon:
".. . but lt does brlng out thts feature: lt1s essentlal that each party may elther wltr
or ]ose. If one party can nelther w1n nor lose
then 1t 1s not tgatntngt ot3 twagerlngt... "ll
7. [1892] 2 Q.8.484. Thls deflnltlon, although glven
subsequent to Darkr s case was, however, based on a
eonslderatlon of eases decldei before i886.
See supra, ehapter 2.
8. Ibld., at pp.49o-1. And see Cotton L.J.
v. Hardy (1878) 4 Q.8.D.585, 695.
9. ltgzg) z ch.1 , 24, 33, ll8-9.
t0. [1958] r Q,8.509.
11. Ibld., at p .5L6.
1n Thacker
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In that case Tote Investors Ltd. brought an actlon
agalnst Smoker to reeover 823.13.8d. owed by her to
them followlng credlt bettlng transactlons 1n whlch
she placed bets to that arnount on the totallsator.
The defendant arEqued that the contnacts by whlch the
debt was lncurred were wagerlng contracts avoldecl by
s.18 of the Oam1ng Act, 1845. llowever, the Court
reJected thls contentlon. Lord Wllberforce sald:
"Now 1t 1s true that thls contract or trans
actlon may be descrlbed as a transactlon ofbettlng. It 1s so descrlbed 1n fact 1n theBettlng, Gamlng and Lotterles Act of 1963
whlch consoLldated sone eanller leglslatlon
and whlch 1n terms refers to transactlons
wlth the totallsator as 1nvo1v1ng bets. It
1s equally true, as the defendant polnted
out, that 1n a number of eontexts, lneludlng
1egal d1ct1onar1es, bettlng 1s equated r^rlth
wagerlng. However, the questlon we have to
answer here 1s whether bettlng wlth thetotallsator can be eonsldered and ought tobe conslderedl wagerlng wlth1n-TEFffi'IiEffi 1n the Aet of 1845. Now,
wlthout acceptlng every wond and every
element ln the deflnltlon by Hawkln J 1n theCanllll ease, that element 1n the defln1t1on,
whlch says that 1t 1s essentlal to a wager-
1ng contract that each party nay under 1t
elther w1n or lose, does seen to me one
whlch has been supported by authorlty from
whlch lt 1s lrnposslble that we shoulddepart [0n those authorltles ] I thlnk
we have to regard tlre posltlon as belng thatthe totallsator, as the result of trans--
actlons wlth 1t, ls lncapable of elther
wlnnlng or loslng and thereflore not engaglng
1n a wigerlng trineactlon.tt12
ltly emphasls
L2. Ibld., at p.518.
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The authorltles to whlch Lord l*tllberforce refenred were
Ellesmere v. Wallace and the declslon of the House of
Lords ln Attonney-Genenal v. Luncheon and Sports Club,
Ltd,13 In that case itgambling transaetlons" were
carrled on through the lnstrumentallty of the total-
lsator. The lssue 1n the case was whether lnvestments
on the eLub's totallsators attracted bettlng duty 1n
respect of wagers on horse races, under s.I5 of the
Flnance Act 
" 
1926. The ilouse of Lorcls held that they
d1d not besause the lnvestrnents d1d not constltute
wagers or bets between the lnvestors and the club. Lond
Buckmaster sald, lnten alla:
ttA bet J-s somethlng staked to be lost
on the result of a doubtful lssue, butdoubtful lssue affects the respondents
they nelther w1n nor lose on any such
And Lord Blanesburgh sa1d, lnten a1la:
or won
no
chance. "r\
;tI am doubtful lndeed whether they [tfre rulesaffectlng bettlng on the clubts totallsatorl
connote the maklng of any bets at all elther
between pool members lndlvldually or between
Ios1ng pooL members on the oge hand and wlnnlngpool members on the other. t' ls
The concluslon of the Engllsb cases 1s that bettlng
on the totallsator, although I'bettlng of a sortttr6 does
13. ltgzgl A.c.400.
14. rbld., at p.405.
i5. rbLd., at p.4oT.
15. Per Humphreys J ln2 K.B. 522, 533. Everett v. Shand I1931]
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not constltute bettlng wlth the rnachlne.rT And,
although there 1s no concluslve authorlty that such
lnvestments do not constltute bettlng between the
lnvestons lnter se, there 1s Jud1c1al oplnlon to that
effectls But lmportantlV" for the Engllsh Courts
lnvestments on the totallsator, although bets are not
wagerlng contracts 1n terms of the avoldlng provlslonle
Rlchmond J declded Dark v. fsl-and Bay Park Raclnel
Company wlthout resort to authorlty and wlthout argument
from the nespondent.zo And no attempt was made by the
learned Judge to analyse the lngredlents of a wagerlng
contract and relate them to totallsator bettlng.. fhe
declslon 1n the case was slmply a product of the Judgets
revulslon agalnst totallsator bettlng. But ln splte of
these weaknesses ln the Judgmenb and 1n splte of the
17. The Scottlsh vlew 1s to the contrary, see
v. Alblon Greyhounds I1933] S.C.(J) 9I.
18. Lord Blanesburgh 1n Attorney-General v. Luncheon
sports club" note 13m heaffiTEE:Fothe report lnaccurately states that ribets were madelnter se!r. But thls apparently rvas based on a
statement of Lord Buckmaster at p.405 that the
contracts were entered lnto between the lnvestors
through the c1ub.
Lords Dennlng I,I.R. and l.l1lberforce 1n Tote InvestorsLtd. v. Smoker were both careful to coffi
6l6Fcluslon-s 6- wagerlng contracts ln the context
of the avoldlng provlslon.
The respondent was not called upon to reply, andthe appelJ.ant did not argue lt was not posslble to
eonstruet a wagerlng contract fnon totallsatortransactlons. He nerely asserted that the persons
wonklng the totallsator were agents, although not
stakeholders. Thls tends to suggest a coneesslon
on the appellantts part that the lnvestons werebettlng lnter se.
Strathern
lLl
?0.
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qua11f1ed leglslatlve approval of totallsator bettlng
ln the 1881 Act]r Dark!s case has conslstently enJoyed
Jud1c1a1 approval even to the present day? For later
courts, however, the task of fol1ow1ng Dank v. Island
B'ay ParJ< Raclng Conpany was made easler. For, what
Rlchmond J left unsald 1n that case was revealed for
then ten years later 1n the I artlculated maJor premlss t
of Dennlston J 1n Polloek v. Saunders.23 I{e sald:
ItThe Gamlng and Lotterles Act 1s lntltu1eC
t An Act for the Suppresslon of Gamlng andBettlng--houses, and fon the nrore effectual,AboLltlon of Lotterles ? . In lt 1t 1s 1nc1d,rnt
ally provlded that those uslng the total -lsator under the very llmlted and restrlcted
condltlons lmposed shaLl not be llable to thepenaltles and forfeltures enacted ln respect
of all other pub11c wagerlng and gambllng.
The totallsator, thou.gh not actually banned"1s certalnly not blessed. It remalns what 1t
was before the Act an lnstrunent for bettlng
and gambllng .- praetlces tolerated by the lawbut not recognlsed by lts Courts. It seems
extravagant to lnvoke 1n favour of thts half*
contemptuous concesslon a restrlctlon onprlvate rlghts establlshed for the proteetlon
of the laudable and neeessary pursults oftrade and conmerce.tr 24
In that case the court was respondlng to an argu-
2J". Quallfled, b€eause only llcensed totallsators
were lawful.
22. $ee €:B: Pollce v. Pools (NZ) Ltd. [1962] N.Z.L.R.854, 858;-EEce vffil N.z.L.R.q92.
494; Racineffir.-prrEFlEa. v. Forlee tl97bl
N. Z . L;R=;I. z. t v. Iila?E Bay parkRactng Company 1s express fla_oproGtflS:lT
23, (1897) 15 N.Z.L.R.581,
2u. rb1d., ar p.589-90.
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ment by the pLalntlff, a pnofesglonal bookmaker, that
the use of a llcensed totallsator on a naclng club?s
ground durlng a race meetlng gave the publlc a rlght
to enter, such that the cl,ubrs pnlvate property
ceased to be Jurls prlvat1.2s fhls eontentlon was,
of course, reJected.
The readlnesse wlth whlch thls statement of
Dennlsbon J has been accepted 1n later cases dlscloses
a reluctance by the New Zealand courts to accept
totallsator bettlng as eonduct worthy of 1egal
recognltlon. In 0ff1c1a1 Assl€nee v. T.A.8.27 the
Court of Appeal upheld the declslon ln Dark v.
Bay Park Raslng Company but, the iwo Judges who
alluded to the nature of the contraet lnvolved eame
to thelr concluslons on dlfferent grounds, Gresson P
sald:
t'I thlnk the cunrent of authorlty requires oneto regard bettlng on the totallsator as a
multlpartlte agreement between numerouspartles dlvlded lnto groups who bet to w1n
or lose aecordlng as ^lhe uncertaln event doesor does not happdn. "8
C1eary J, however, looked to provlslons ln the Gamlng
?5. The argument was based on the pnlnclple lald
down by Hale 1n hls treatlse De Portlbus Marls,
Hargr.ave I s Law Tracts, 77 .
26. For example MacGregor J ln Goggln v. Young [1928]N.2.L.R.753,757; Haslam J 1n In re $clqqdqon;gfflclal-Asi1gne6 v. T.A.B. tt9ffiBut cf. Hutchlson J ln 0ff1c1al Assignee v. T.A.B.[1960] N.z.L.R.to54, ro8?;-
27. Note 26.
28. Ib1d., at p.Io75.
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Act whleh ldentlfled the totallsator as an 'flnstrumentfor ganlng or wagerlngt'rD and as t'the lnstnument for
wagerlng or bettlng known by that nametr.30 fhe Aet,
he observed, spoke of orpurchaslng any tlcket or maklng
any bet 1n connectlon r^rlth the worklng of a total.-
lsatort:31 and consequently, he held:
". . . whether the bettlng be wlth the tota.l-lsator proprletor or by the lnvestors lnter
ii'"'f3rfifil\;;;"1:rl:"fil,ou" monev lost
!,I1th 0ff1c1a1 Asslgnee v.
to reconsl-der Darkts case was
J 1n Economou v. MacDonaLd and
conclude:
T.A.B. the opportunlty
lost, and ln 1973 Cooke
Others33 was abl.e to
'r... that the concept of mutual bettlng must
now be regardecl q,s authorltatlvely settled1n New Zealand. I's
But the complleatlon that arose wlth Darkrs case
29 . the Garnlng Act 1908, s. B (2 ) .
30. Ib1d., s.50(B).
31. Ibld., s.53.
32. fb1d., at p.1082. In thls respeet the Engllsh
?osltlon 1s no dlfferent. See e.g. Lord WltUer=-fonce tn Tote fnvestors Ltd. v. Srnoker. note 10.at p.5r8 ffiatlofrE-Tltl'not move'
h1m toward the vlew that there was thenefore
a wagerlng contract,
33. f1 unreported^Judgment, Supreme Court, Ham1lton,Utl^4uegq! 1-973, The cla1m r.elated to a Jackp6tof $89r.554.?0.
34. rb1d., &t p.26-7.
remalned. V1g, d1d a totallsator lnvestor have the
capaclty to repudlate the totallsator pnopnletorrs
authorlty to pay hls deposlt to the wlnner and demand.
1ts return? In Offtclal Asslgnee v. T.A.B. C).eary J
the only Judge to refer to the questlon sald:
[4.06]
the
at all
an
pay
"It seems to me to be p1a1n that 1ftotallsator can be called a stakeholcler1t 1s a stakeholder of an unusual lclnd,
because lt cannot be 1n the posltlon of
ondlnany stakeholder whose authorlty to
over the stakes may be countermanded.,rss
But ln H?grlson L Others v. Greyrnouth_Trottlng CIub(Inc. ) & othe{g36 Casey J was of the contnary v1ew.
Ironlcally, however, thls dllemma nemalned only
because the courts falIed to recognlse that 1t had 1ts
orlglns 1n Darkts case and was resolved by the legls.-
lature 1n the 1894 Act. There was open to the 1egls-
lature then two possible courses of actlon. Elther 1t
could Leglslate ln favour of the vlew that an lnvest-.
ment on the totallsator d1d not amount to a wagerlng
contract,3T or lt could slmpIy repudlate any rlght that
then exlsted to recover deposlts from a stakehorder.
And, conslstently wlth the expnesslon of real concern
durlng the Panllamentary debates at the tlme38 about
35. Note 26, at p.1083.
36. {q unleporlgq Judgnent, Supreme Court, Greymouth,28rh May ]975,
37, That 1s, follow the Engllsh approach.
38. Seetlon 6 of the 1894 Act 1s a reflectlon of thls
concern. ft provldes, lnter alla, that totallsatorllcenses were to be reduced by Z/3rds of the numberlssued ln the 12 rnonth perlod lst August l89Z to3lst July 1893.
[4.09]
the extent of totallsator bettlng, the l.atter course
was adopted; s.2 of the 1894 Act speclflcally provLdlng,
lnter al1a, that no actlon eould be brought to recoven
any sum of money 'rwon, lost r gp* staked ln any bettlng
transactlon whateverrt . s
[4.09] The Gamlng Act. 1894 - Prlzes for Games, Sports andffi
When s.18 of the Imperlal Act of LB45 was enacted
whereby gamlng and wagerlng contracts were avolded an<l
rendered unenforceable, that provlslon was followed by
the words:
rrProvlded always, that thls enactment shal1
not be deemed to apply to any gubscrlptlon or
eontrlbutlon, or agreement to subserlbe or
contrlbute, for or toward any pJ.ate, prlzer oF
sum of money to be awarded to the wlnner or
wlnners of any lawful game, sport, pastlme,
or exerctse. 'r
Thls provlso, wlth sone lnconsequentlal alteratlon, was
carrled lnto s.33 of the Colonlal Act of 1881, and lts
purpose was lntended to protect from the avoldlng
sectlon arran6enents whereby the wlnnen of a lawful
game, etc., was to beneflt from contrlbuttons or sub-
scrlptlons deposlted or pronlsed for that purpoee. r
It My emphasls
39. See lnfra, chapt.5, para.3.
l. Dlggle v._H1ess (1877) 2Wallace, [1929] 2 Ch.1;ITsliSf5 c . a. 81,8. -
Ex. D ,42?',
cf. Batty Ellesmer"e v.ffiI6tt
[4.09]
In relatlon to horse-raclng thls poI1cy was lmportant,
because lmprovement of breeds and lndeed partlclpatlon
1n the sport requlred a guarantee of reasonable stakes.
And, to that end, contrlbutlons or plates were fre-
quently offered by the Cnown ancl raclng e1ubs.2 But
although the pollcy, and lndeed the express terms of
the provlso are clear the Courts soon found great
dlfflculty 1n applylng 1t.
The flrst case ln whleh the provtco came under
Judlclal scrutlny was that of Batty v. Marrlott.3 In
that ease two rnen each deposlted 
€10 wlth a stakeholder
to ablde the event of a footrace between them. In sub-
stance the arrangement between the two amounted to a
wager as to who could run the faster and the element of
I eontrlbutlon or subserlptlont 1n terms of the provlso
was, to say the least, tenuous. However, wh1lst 1t was
reeopn:1sed that '(1f two persons only run thelr horses
one agalnst the other for a sum of money that ls clearly
a wager't rb the Court conslderecl that the arrgngement 1n
2. The early hlstony 1s outllned by James R1ce,Hlstory of the Brltlsh Turf, VoI.1 (1879).In a Repgrt, Select Commlttee on Gamlng,
20 May 18q4, p.VIII the lmportance of thepractlce 1s recognlsed as worthy of protectlon.
See supra, ehapt.2, para.5.
Note I.
Ibld., at p.829 per W1lde C.J.
3.
It.
the case was not w1th1n the
saved by the provlso. In a
v. Hlggss the ease of Babty
the Court of Appeal holdlng,
C.J. that the:
1n the words of Cockburn
enactlng sectlon
subsequent case
v. Marrlott was
tq.0el
and was
of D1gg1e
over-'ruJ-ed,
ft. 
. . provlso was lntended tobona flde contrlbutlons to ato the wlnner ln sone lawfulto noney deposlted by way of
meet the case ofprlze to be glven
competltlon, but not
wagers . r'o
Havlng regard to the olrJect of the avoldlng
provlslon Dlggre v. Hlggs- made sense. The promotlon of
horse-naclng and 1awfu1 sports and ganes 1s one th1ng,
glvlng legar necognltlon to wagers on those games qulte
another. But, &s prevlously mentloned, when the 1BB1
Act was passed s.6 of the Bettlng ilouses Act, 1953 was
enacted as s.34 of the former Act. The llteral_ effect
of thls, 1t has been contended, was to prevent the
appllcatlon of the avoldlng provlslons to stakeholdlng.
The conJunctlon of s"J4 wlth the provlso to s.33 was,
ln essence, to lncrease the scope of the prlnclple
expressed 1n the provlso. The former provlsl0n I1ter-
a1ly leglsrated 1n favour of the prlnelple 1n Ba.tJg v.
Marrlott thus throwlng doubt on the appllcabll1ty of
9lggle v. Hlggs ln the colony. sectlon J4 was repealed,
1t 1s submltted, partly ln recognltlon of that error.
But the New zealand leglslature went further. The
provlso to s.33 had, in England, caused no end of
(t877 ) a nx .D .4a2 .
IbId: r ^ot p.428. Dlscussed al-so supra,chapt.2, pana.7.
-
n
t4.oel
dlfflcultyT and penh&psr for that reason, 1t also
was repealed 1n New Zealand by s.Z of the Gamlng Act,
1894. And, to remove any doubts as to what was
lntended lt was further provlded that:
tt. 
. . no actlon sha1l be brought or malntalned1n any Court of 1aw for reeoverlng any sumof money or valuable thlng alleged to be wonby way of stakes or prlze on any event or
contlngency relatlng to any horse-nace. on
other race, game, sportr of exerctse.il I
Thls provlslon was not 1n the Gamlng 8111 1894 when 1t
was flrst lntrodrreed lnto tbe House. Ihe necords
dlsclose that lt was only lnserted 1n the B11r after
1t had energed from the Jolnt statutes Revlslon comm^
lttee, and before lt went to the Leglslatlve counclr.
The records of the commlttee have not survlved, and the
Parllamentary Debates are sllent on the reason for 1ts
1nclus1on ln the Act. lltrere were no New Zealand
declslons on the provlso to s.33 and, although as
prevlousry observed, s1m1lar eruors ln relatlon to the
enactment of s.34 oeeurred ln the Australlan states, the
earllest neported declslons 1n whlch the problem was
recognlsed there, was deelded 1n March 1895.s
7.
B.
Howard A. Stneet, Law of Garnlng (1937) at pp.542-544 observes-that Batty v.-Marrlott wasrrelther aecepted or d1Sffi:gu1sn6?fJFFwenty-
nlne yearsrr before lt was over-ruIed by Dlgifev. Hlggs ln 1872.
By s.7 Ganlng Act, L894.
9. Dalley v. Hardlns (1895) 16 A.L.T.175.
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[4.10] concluslon
Thls survey of the hlstory of the leglslatlon would
not be cornprete wtthout mentlon of a flnal provlslon
relatlng to wagerlng contracts. By s.15 of the t8gt Rct
lt was provlded that money deposlted wlth persons contrary
to the provlslons of the Act:
". . . shall be deened to have been recelved to orfor the use of the person from whom the Bame was
recelvedn and such money ... shall be recovered.
aceordlngly wlth full costs of sult ln any courtof competent Jurlsdlctlon. rt
Tfie 1mp11catlons of thls provlslon w1LI be examlned
ln later paragraphs, sufflee 1t to say at thls polnt
that 1t, l1ke many of the provlslons of the Act was
based on earLler Engrlsh leglsratlonr and that 1t must
not be overrooked when conslderlng generaLLy the Lavrr
relatlng to gamlng and wagerlng contnacts.
The provlslons of the I88l
subsequently brought together
the Garnlng Act 1908. fhat Act
transposltlon of the sectlons
and 1894 Acts were
ln a eonsolldatlng Act,
1s ln force today. The
ls as follows:
0amlng and Lotterles Aet l8B1
s. 15
s. 33
Gamlng Act f894
s.2
s.7
Gamlng Act 1908
s. 38
s. 59
s. 70
s. 71
s.15 of the Gamlng and
copled frorn s,5 of The Lotterles Act, 1881 wasBettlng Houses Act, 1853.
1.
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0HAPTER 5
THE SCOPE OF THE LAW OF
GAMING AND WAGERING CONTRACTS
NEW ZEALAND
Introductlon
The performance of the New zealand leglslature 1n
relatlon to the law of gamlng and wagerlng contracts has
been far from satlsfactory, rn the lg8l Act we flnd
leg1s1at1on characterlsed by uncertalnty and error wh1lst
the 1894 Act created more dlfflcultles than 1t solved 
-dlfflcultles whlch remaln wlth us today by vlrtue of the
consolldatlng statute, the Garnlng Aet 1909.
The law of gamlng and wagerlng contraets 1n England
has been extenstvely eovered by other wrlters rand as the
New zealand legls1at1on 1s largely copled frorn the
rmperlal statutes mueh of what has been sald by those
wrlters 1s appllcable 1n New zearand and w1lr not be re-
canvassed hene. rn thls work the scope of the law of
gamlng and wagerlng contracts 1n lilew zealand w1Ll be
ldentlfled 1n the context of ascertalnlng the slggr1f1-
cant polnts of departure from Engllsh law and the effect
of that depanture on New Zealand law. rn so dolng lt
It\
[5. or]
L. The Law of Garnlng (L937) by lloward A. Street ls thepost comprehenslve on garnlng and wagerlng contnacts,Uyl tlq toplc aLso attracts varylng-Oelrees ofattentlon 1n bhe leadlng Contrabt CextJ. Theposltlon ln New Zearand ls dlscussed tn cheshlre
and Flfoots Law of Contract, (qth N.z. ea,j-ii?4.
[5,02]
[5. oe 1
wlII be eonvenlent flrstLy to er1t1cally examlne the
constructlon applled to the exlstlng pnovlslons 1n the
Gamlng Act 1908 and then to deternlne the appllcatlon
of the Acts of Charles (1664), Anne (fZfO) ana
Wl1l1arn (1835) tn thls Jurlsdlctlon today.
Sectlons 69 and 71. Gamlng Act 1908
Tfiere are two essentlal dlfferenees between the
New Zealand avoldlng provlslons, s.69 and lts counter-
pant, s.1B of the Ganlng Act, 1845. The flnst 1s that
whereas the Imperlal provlslon stl11 retalns the
provlso exemptlng actlons for the recovery of prlzes,
on subscrlptlons to prlzes to be awarded to the wlnners
of lawful garnes, etc., thls has been repeal.ed 1n New
Zealand by the Garnlng Act, lB94. r And the second ls
that as prevlously outl"lned, the Engllsh courts have
adopted a narrower deflnltlon of a rvagerlng eontract
than have the New Zealand Courts.2 The second such
dlfference has already been dlscussed, the ftrst
requlres further examlnatlon.
The repeal of the provlso to s.69 (tnen s.33 of
the Gamlng and Lotterles Act, I88l) was accompanled
by the enactment of s,7L (then s.7 of The Gamlng Act,
1894). It has been suggested that one reason fon the
provlsofs repeal was to avold the dlfflculty created
by Batty v. Manrlott3 whlch was compounded ln New
1.
2.
Sectlon 7, Gamlng Act, 1894.
Supra, Chapt . 4 
., para, 8.
(1848), 5 c.8.818. Dlscussed supra, Chapt.4,para. 9.3.
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Zealand by the erroneous lncluslon of s.34 of the 1E81
Act. But somethlng more vras obvlously lnvolved because
Batty v. Marylott was over-ruIed by Dlggle v. i{lggs r
ln 1877 so that the dlfflculty eeated by the former
case was largely resolved before the fB94 Rct was
passed. All that was nequlred, therefore, on the part
of the colonlal leglslature was to repeal s.34 of il:e
tBBt lct and Leave the provlso lntact 1f 1ts only
concern was Batty v. Marnlott. i{hy dld 1t go the
further step of repeallng bhe provlso and enactlng s.71?
The answer, 1t 1s suggested-. ls revealed 1n part, 1n
the followlng statement of Hosklng J ln Patterson v.
ldollandrs when he sa1d, speaklng of s.71:
fiThe enactment 1n questlon ls lntroduced notfor the beneflt of naclng elubs or persons
who offer money or other pecunlary prlzes onthe prohlblted events, I t ] but on pubI1cgrounds, and so that the a1d of the Stateby the medlunn of an actlon 1n 1ts Courts
shall not be lent for the recovery of the
money or prlzes won.t'7
It was, therefore, the pollcy to lnclude actlons for
the necovery of nroney or" prlzes by the wlnner of the
reLevant event wlth1n the scope of the unenforceablllty
prlnclple. It 1s lmportant to note, however, that
4.
5.
6.
(tE771" 2 Ex.D.422,
(1915) 34 !{.2.L.R.7\6,
The phrase r?prohlblted events'" ls 'rrlth respect,lnapproprlate. 
''ReLevant events" would have been
more sultable. But thls mls-descrlptlon 1slndlcatlve of the eolonlal reluctance to see anyform of gamlng or bettlng for money as worthy of
Iega1 recognltlon.
Ibld., at p.747.7.
t5.021
Hosklng J was careful to conflne the provlslonts
operatlon to actlons brought by the wlnner to recover
h1s prlze because the seetlon does not encompass actlons
by betters on the slde of bhe event to recover thelr
wlnn1ngs..0 And, 1n order to determlne whether the
aetlon is to recover bettlng wlnn1flgs r as opposed to
noney won by way of a prlze (or stakes) by the wlnner
of the event, the pr1nc1pIe ln Dlggle v. Higgs applles
the consequence of 1ts appllcatlon belng neversed.
That 1s, 1s 1t an actlon to recoven:
I'a prlze to be glven to the wlnner ln some .[:]
competltlonr^ but not money deposlted by way
of wagers . it ro
If the latten, tt falls w1th1n the categony of a
wagerlng contract 1n s.69 and 1f the former, then
although 1t may also be a ganlng contract under s.69
1t 1s nevertheless unenforceable under s.Tl.
B. luu, Coo{e, J ln Economouts case, unreported,Supneme Court, ttamTlfrI'Jlth August 1973, aip,27. M1-!_qLq11 v. Seck_ (f 913) 32 i'l ,Z,L.R.l2Z9,
w1lson 7@tn tF27l N.2.1.n.33a, 335, and'EhEha-v. nffif6-aTr-tr9?il r tv. z.r;R.6r6i- 6zz
support thls v1ew.
9. The word "Iawful'' has been omltted because,
although 1t appeared ln the provlso under con-
slderatlon 1n Dlggle v. Ilggg lt does not appear1n s .71. It 1s ffiIevaiFffilsslon because- iflt was contalned 1n s.7t 1t could glve rlse to a
sltuatlon where actlons to recover a prlze 1n an
unlawful game or race fell w1th1n the tenms ofthe Il1ega1 Contracts Act LgT1 (see s.7 of thatAct) whereas ln the ease of lalvful actlvlty s.TIls concluslve. See, 
€.9. Wllson v. llggarth note
10. Note 4. at p.428.
8.
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fhe applteatlon of s.TL was further llrnlted by
W1ll1ams J 1n Mltchell v. Beckrr when he sald the
provlslon applles only to money won where 1t has not
been pald to the wlnner. 12 In that ease the owner of
a honse had agreed to pay 1ts tralner and lessee half
the stakes won by the anlmal ln raceg. lt The owner
havlng been pald an amount won by way of stakes Wllllams
J held that s.71 dld not preclude the tnalner fnom
sulng to recover h1s half-share. And 1n Bhqna v.
Barrlballrb W1lson J held that lf the wlnnlngs have
been pald to the agent of a partnershlP, (on a fortlorl
the wlnnerrs agent), s.71 does not bar an actlon by the
prlnelpal to recover the wlnnlngs frour the agent. fn
that case the pr1nc1p1e establlshed by Brldger v.
Savagers and De ,Mattos v. BenJamlnr6 welghed heavlly
wlth the Judge 17 and although the sectlon would llter'-
11- Note B.
12. Ibld., at p,1280.
note B, at p.334-5,
at page 27,
Upheld 1n dllgon v. HogarthLnd E conoinloiirF-c as e-il6t6-8,
13. Cf. Idllson v. Hogarth note B, where Mlt,chell v.
Beelc was applled-Tnlelatlon to the stakes won
Eif[-pa1d to tne owner, but the actlon to recover
wlnnlngs of beis made on the races falled even
thour,h that money had been pald to the oYrner.In relatlon to the latter monles the bets wet'e
made by the owner as agent of the tnalner " and
was unlar.tful un<ier s.52 and 53 of the Gamlng Act
rg0 g.
14. Note B.
15. Supna, Chapt.4, para. 4.
15. Supra, Chapt.4, pana. 5.
!7, Ibld., at p.621. Hls comment on these cases was not
conflned to dlseusslon on s.71 and onLy Brldgen v.
Savage was elted 1n relatlon to the latter sectlon.
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aIly exclude such an actlon, the Court was reluctant
to entertaln the ldea that the law would prevent
a prlnclpal from recoverlng from a dlshonest agent.
Brldger v. Savage was based on an lnterpretatlon of
s.69. And havlng regard, to the faet that s.71 ls
assoclated (by lts terms and the tlme of 1ts
enaetment), vrlth the repeal of the provlso to s.59,
tt 1s submltted that 1ts qual1fleat1on by the Brldgel
v. Savage rule 1s Justlfled. tg
However, the presence of s.71 1n the Gamlng Act
1908 and the repeal of the provlso to s.59 has
extended to scope of the unenforceablllty concept
1n New Zealand beyond the boundarles of ganlng and
wagenlng contraets. It ls true that the ownen of a
horse, or a competltor, who enters 1n an event for
stakes or prlzes ls gamlng 1n a sense, but he may
not be gamlng 1n the way that has tradlt1onally been
the eoncern of the legls1atlon, that 1s by:
;rplaylng at any game [whether of chance or
skllll for stakes that ls to say, for
money or moneyf s worth, to !_e obtalned bythe wlnner from the loser. t rs
Thus, ln cases where a horse owner or a conpetltor
has not hlmself hazanded stakes on the event, to
I8. De Mattos v. BenJarnln dld not, of courser-refel tot3ffi-ratrrdF-ffiat 1s now contalned ln s. 70
of the Garnlng Act 1908. However, although ondlfferent sectlons the ratlonale behlnd thepnlnclple 1n the two cases ls the same.
19. Per SaLmond J ln Weathered v. Fltzglbbqn [1925]
N.2.L.R.331, 333;-T56Ffr5d[ v. d66FEFTI903] 2 K.B.
428 and see the caffia 4 HaTffi'l[ryf s Laws of
England (4th ed. ) p.4, para.2, fn.1.
t5.031
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preclude a lega1 rernedy to recover hls wlnnlngs on
prlze 1s, wlth respect, to move outslde the area of
concern and go beyond the phllosophy of the gamlng
Acts. Yet thls 1s exactly what s.7I does, and was
lntended to do. fn thls age of the professlonal
sportsman operatlng ln an lnternatlonal arena lt ls
surely too much to expect that he should wrLte off
h1s lnablllty to recover h1s wlth-held wlnnlngs (by
whlch to recoup hls not lneonslderable expenses) to
the cost of the loss of h1s amateur status. And
dleappolntnent rnay well turn to anger wlth the real-
lsatlon that he 1s frustrated by a product of the
Vlctorlan era whlch emerged, even at that tlmet
wlthout explanatlon or Just1flcatlon.20 In the
wrlter's vlew the leglslature should now return to the
good sense of s.1B of the Gamlng Act, 1845 Uy repeal-
1ng s.71 and re-enactlng the provlso to the former
provlslon, 1n s.69 of the Gamlng Act, 1908.
Eectlon 70, Gamlng Act 19CB
As prevlously outllned thls provlslon $tas copled
from the Engllsh Aet of 1892 whlch was deslgned to
overcome the effect of Read v. Andersol. But, 1t
has been asserted, the New zealand LegJ'slature was
not content to stop ther"e and added to the provlslon
for the purpose of repudlatlng for the colony the
effect of Brldger v. Savage- also. The meanlng of
20. Thls may be too strong 1n vlew of the fact that the
records of the Jolnt Statutes Revtslon Commlttee
have not survlved. But the addltlon of thlsprovlslon dld not prompt any dlscusslon ln the
House on the Councll.
[5.03]
the colonlaL appendage, namely the words:
'ror any sum of money won, lostr oR
staked 1n any betttng transactlon what-
evgr"l
ha.s not yet been concluslvely determlned by the
New Zealand Courts. I But 1t has caused eonsider-
able dlfflculty.
In Sharp v. Mg.fftg.onzthe plalntlff deposlted
€50 wlth a stakeholder to ablde the result of a
forthcomlng electlon ln the Stratford Electorate.
H1s candldate lost, but bel1ev1ng there were lrreg--
ulanltles 1n the electlon the plalntlff repudlated
the stakeholderrs authorlty to pay the wlnners and
dernanded a return of hls deposlt. The defendant
argued the concludlng words of s.70 debarred the
pJ-alntlff from recoverlng, but the presldlng l,lag;ls-
trate held the words:
'r tmoney staked ln any bettlng transactlon
whatevert ln s.70 have exaetly the s€ule
meanlng as the words of s.61, tmoney
deposlted 1n the hands of any person to
ablde the event on whleh any wager has
been mad,e t .'f 3
1. The only Australlan Statute 1n whleh the words ln
lssue appear ls s.33, The Suppresslon of GambllngAct 1895 (Queens'land). The onLy case mentloned 1n
thq reports on the provlslon 1s CampbeLl v. $fry.(1899), 9 G.L.J.(N.c.)I2q whlch fs, unfartunatel;r,
only a brlef note on the case and qulte unhelpful.
[rger] N.2.L.R,254.
Ibld., at p.256,
2.
3.
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Edwards J, on appeal, upheld the Maglstnaters vlew and
eoneluded as a consequence that the case cane dlrectly
wlthln the authorlty of OtSulllvan v. Thonasr and Burge
v. Ashley & Srnlth, Ltd.5 And he went on to say:
'rlf the concludlng words of s.70 have any
effect at all 1t 1s to nemove the doubtr lf
there ls a doubt, whether the earller part
of the same sectlon 1s sufflclent to prevent
the loser of a l{ager, whose stake has beenpald over to thq wlnner, fnom recoverlng lt
back fron h1m. " 6
The learned Judge concluded that the lnc1uslon of the
word frlost't 1n the provlslon removed that doubt by
preventlng the loser from recoverlng. Thus, 1n the
vlew of Edwards J, the concludlng words ln the pro"
v1s1on really added nothlng but clarlty to the meanlng
of the basle Engllsh provlslon. fn Harrlson & Others
v. Greymouth Trottlng CIub (Inc. ) & Othens 7 Casey J
followed thls reasonlng, saylng:
'I prefer to fol1ow Edwards J and-preserve thelonlstandlng lnterpretatlon of s.59 whereby abettor who repents ln tlne can recover from
the stakeholder by revoklng hls authorlty. To
hold otherwlse would enable a dlshonest stake'-
holder to retaln the funds agalnst all clalm-
ants, and mlght actually encourage gamlng by
maklng lt more certaln for a wlnner to collect
from the stakeholder, slnce the loser would beprecluded ln any-clrcumstances from gettlnghls money back."E
4. t18951 I Q.8.698, dlscussed supra, chapt.4, para.5.
lrgoc] I A.B,?44, dlscussed supra, chapt.4, para.5.
Ib1d. , 8t p.257 .
Unreported, Suprenre Court, Greymouth, 28 May 1975.
fb1d. , dt p.7 of the Judgnent.
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fn Johnston v. Georgere however, Skerrett C.J. was of
the contrary v1ew. He eonsldered that the last words of
s.70 had no relatlon to the subJeet*matter dealt wlth 1n
the flrst part and he went on to saY:
'iI an lncllned to the oplnlon that these words
only apply to cases where the sum of money won'lostr o! staked 1n the bettlng transactlon has
not been pald over to the wlnner.'t l0
In Offlcla1 Asslgnee v. Totallsator Agency Bgardrl Cleary
J erltlclsed thls statement because he could not lmaglne
a sltuatlon ln whlch there 1s a clafun to reeover money
"l,osttr as opposed to belng lrstaked;r 1n a bettlng trans"
actlon. But, wlth respeet, there 1s nothlng lmproper 1n
Cal!11gmoney,ttwgnir01' ttloSt" after the eventrbUb before the
wlnner ls pald and wh1]st the money remalns 1n the hands
of the stakeholder. And, before the evente money 1n the
hands of the stakeholder 1s s1mp1y ''staked'r. Perhaps 1n
recognltlon of thls poss1b111ty Cleary J concluded:
I'The tentatlve vlew expressed by S1r CharlesSkeruett C. J. ls at varlance wlth what was
sald by Edwards J ln ShqS. v. llorrlsonbut, wh1le I thlnk Edwards J there gave the
word t lostr 1ts natural meanlng, the questlon
whether the declslon that the stake was recover-
able may some day call fon further conslder-
atlon.ttE
9. 11927) N.Z.L.R.49o.
I0. Ib1d.,et F.505.
1.1. [1960] N.2.L.R.1064, 1082.
L2. Ibld.
t5.031
fn Bhana v. Barnlballrs the actlon was bnought to effect
recovery of a sum pald to the agent of a partnershlp of
whlch the plalntlff contended he was a member. After
referrlng to the crltlclsm of C}eary J levelled at the
dlcta of Skerrett C.J. 1n Johnston v. George trtr11son J
also found dlfflculty rvlth the eoncluslon of Edwards J
1n Sharp v. Morrlson th.9.!*the'''r:oi'tclrirJlng words of s.70
had the same meanlng as the cor'!'ir-l-1c'irJ'l'nq words :i'tt r ' (9 '
Because: ''
rr... If so, 1t 1s odd that the addltlon s'hottlC
have been rirade 1n s. 70 rather than s.69. The
reason mav be that 1t was lntended to apply
to both sLctlons. " lq
But then, llke Edwards J t he went on to hold that the
concludlng words were to make 1t p1aln that the bar to
recovery exlsts lrrespectlve of the result of the bettlng
transactlon 1nvolved. And Just as Edwands J felt qulte
unable to accept that the leglslature could have lntended
by the concludlng words to s.70 to lnterfere wlth the
deposltorts rlght of repudlatlon and r"ecovery back from
hle stakeholder, Wllson J felt sln1Iar1y about the
wlnnerr s rlght to recover hls wlnnlngs 1n the hands of
h1s agent. He held:
itAn actlon for money won [tfrat has been pald to
the wlnnerrs agent] ls, 1n my oplnlon, ln the
same positlon wlth regard to the concludlng words
of s.?0 as wlth regard to s.69 and the declslon
1n BrldFer v._ Savage applles egually to both
nrovlslons. tt"
13. t1973l
L4. rb1d.,
15. Tclem.
L N. z.L.R.6L5.
at p.5zz.
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l,Ilth respect, thls fl1es ln the face of the clear
words of the sectlon and l-s, unfortunatel.y, lnconslst-'
ent wlth the expressed lntentlon ln the Explanatory
Note to the Gamlng B1I1 1894 to leglslate agalnst
Brldger v. Savage. As to thls latter po1nt, the
leanned Judge could not have known that. But unllke
s.59, s.f0 was enacted for the express purpose of
deallng wlth agency bettlng. If the leglslature had
lntended no more than was suggested 1n Morrlson v.
Sharp, Harrlson & Others v. Greymouth Trottlng Club
(Inc. ) and Bhana v. Barr1ball surely 1t would have used
the words 'inoney won, lost, and staked ln any bettlng
tr"ansactlon whateverrf . But 1t dld not, and the word
staked stands alone and operates regardless of the
resul-t of the event, so that ln thls Jurlsdlctlon
0f Su1l1van v. Thomas and tsgggg v. Ashley & Srnlth' Ltd.
ln relatlon to stakeholdlng! and Brldgen v. Savage and
De Mattos v. BenJamln 1n relatlon to agency bettlng'
do not apply.
In Offlclal Asslgnee v. Totallsator Agency Board
Counsel for the appellant argued that the eoneludlng
words of s.70 should be conflned to the irtrlpartlte''
sltuatlons to whlch the flrst part of the sectlon
related. Cleary J however dlsagreed, for to do so
would l1m1t the generallty whlch the wonds bear ln
thelr ordlnary neanlng '?wlthout ., o any Justlflcatlon
for dolng so". l5 Wtth respeet, there 1s every reason
for dolng so. In Sharp v. MorrLsodTEdwands J, after
conflnlng bhe meanlng of the added words to s.70 to
that already glven to those concennlng deposlts wlth
stakeholders 1n s.69, then went on to say:
16 . llote 11, at p. 1082 .
L7. Note 2.
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'rThe other classes of actlon forbldden by the
concludlng words of s.70 - namely, actlons by
the vrlnner: of a bet agalnst the loser, and
actlons for the recovery of stakes, as stakes,
from the stakeholder - are forbldden also by
s.69. So far as actlons by these clagses are
eoncerned." the coneludlng words of s.70 are
mere surplussage, rr 18
Thus, havlng regard to the lnterpretatlon glven by the
learned Judge to the word "staked':, the concluslon 1n
the Judgment must surely be that all the added words
"are mere surpluss&ge", * a rather unsatlsfactory
nesult. And, wh11st acknowledglng that 1t 1s lmposs-
lble to avold some over-1ap between s.70 and s.69 1t ls
the wrlterrs contentlon that the words 1n questlon only
have meanlng when conflned to the context 1n whlch they
appear, that 1s, trlpartlte sltuatlons. And 1n that
context, they are capable of, and should be accorded
a 11tenal constructlon. Thus actlons by deposltors
to recover thelr losses, wlnnlngs or deposlts frorn the
stakeholder are barred, as they are also by a prlnc1pa1
agalnst h1s agent.
The eoncludlrtg words of s.70 have, however, fa1Ied
to eIlclt from the Courts tbe response sought by the
leglslature. But thts ls not surprlslng. The ldea
that an agent should be permltted to steal h1s prlncl-
palrs wlnnlngs, oF that a stakeholder should have
llcence to lgnore hls deposltorts lnstnuctlons 1s
dlfflcult to reconclle wlth reason and Justlce. It ls
smaLl wonder, therefore, that the New Zealand Courts
have relegated the poss1b1l1ty that the leglslature
could have lntended to allow lt, to the level of the
13. Ibld., at p.257,
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lnconcelvable. And, it ls suggested, even,the
knowledge that the Explanatory Note to the Ganlng 8111
1894 speclflcally lncludes the Brldger v. Savage
doctrlne w1th1n the scope of the actlons the 8111
sought to render unenforceable, w111 not prevent our
Courts from reslstlng that concluslon.
0n the other hand the terms of the Engllsh Gamlng
Act 1892 have enabled the Courts 1n that Jurlsdlctlon
to malntaln an even balance between what 1s Just and
unJust, havlng regard to the phllosophy and punpose
of the legtsIatlon. To achleve that balance 1n New
Zealand, and also, trr order to overcome the confuslon
that the concludlng words of s.70 even yet hold for
the future, thelr :repeal ls reconmended.tg
:-9. Prlor to 1971 s.70 wouldr ln any event, have had a
l1m1ted appllcatlon because by s.5 of the OamlngAet 1894 il.lz of the Gamlng Act 1908) lt was an
offence to act as an agent, or to enpLoy any person
to act as such agent, for the purpose of maklngbets etc. on a totaLlsator. But that provlslon
was repealed by the Raelng Act I97I, and was not
ne-enacted 1n the repeallng statute. By s.2 of the
Gamlng Amendment Act 1920, however, the buslness or
occupation of a bookmaker was declared unlawful andby s.3 of that Act lt was made an offence to make abet wlth a bookmaker. In s.2 of the Gamlng Act
L908 where "bookmaker'r 1s deflned 1t lncludes aperson who carrles on buslness as a turf conmlsslonLgent. In such cases r-ffire, the contractbetween the prlnclpal and agent 1s unlawful and
cannot be enforced unless the prlnclpal or agent
can obtaln rellef under s.7 of the l3.1ega1 Contracts
Act 1970. See. €.E. Sumner v. Solonon [f9og] S.A'? e g lqqo-q 1908
L, R. 21, wllson v. Foeffi-[lg271-T;25. R. 332. rn
cases wh6E-EFe aeEGt-fg 1awfu1, but the contract
entered lnto for the prlnclpal 1s not, see tenant v.Elllott (179?), 1 Bos & P.3; Bousfleld v. WITgq4
1T845'-f15 M. a r,,r. rB5 ; Farmen'u;-..@ ( rTgXf;T. 19"& P.296; but ef . so6tF=il-il94esif,f795) , 5 s.R. q05;
Nlcholson v, Gooeh-TfBi6 ) ,T-F]E-9.999. As to the5p-pTfcTffirn oI'-EhF Illega1 Contracts Aet 1970 see1nfra, chapt.6.
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[5.041 Sgctlon 38. Garnlng Act 1908
As prevlously lndlcated thls provlslon was copled
verbatlm lnto the eolon1al Act of 188Lr from s.5 of the
Bettlng Houses Act, 1853. And, ln the context of those
Aets 1t complemented some rather eompllcated leglslatlon
deslgned, and lntended, to prevent the:
'i.. . Iurlng [of ] the lgnorant and lrnprudentto the rulnous courses to whlch the vlce of
gambllng too frequently leads. It was lntendedto present every obstacle to the professed
gamester uslng a place for exerclslng hls
iocatlon. " 2
Because of the unhappy eholce of words 1n the lntro-
ductlon to thls provlslon the scope of 1ts appllcatlon
ls not readlly apparent. In s.38 of the Ganlng Act
1908 the provlslon commences:
"Any money or valuable thlng recelved by anyperson as I t ] aforesald as a deposlt on anybet, or [n] as for the conslderatlon for any
sueh assuranee, undertaklnt, promlser or
agreement as aforesald .. . "
In the Bettlng Houses Aet, 1853 these words ralsed the
lssue as to whether the words ttany person as aforesald';
1.
2.
3,
s.L5 Gamlng and Lotterles Act, 1881.
Per Earle C.J. ln Doeset v.
L7 c.B. (N.S. ) 66g3fc C4!te_4nq (1864),
The word ztasir was added by the llew ?.eal,and drafts--
man ln the Oamlng and Lotterles Act, 1.881.
In the Bettlng Houses Act, f853 and the Garnlng andLotterles Act, 1881 the provlslon nead, "... on aBfor the conslder"atlon'r. It ls submltted the ehange
1s not mater1al,
4.
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referred back only to deposlts recelved by the persons
referred to ln the precedlng sectlon, 1.e. 8.4, of
whether they were wlde enough to refer to transactlons
arlslng from eonduct made lllega1 by ss.l, 2 and 3
also. s In Do€ggtt v. CalternEo the maJorlty 1n the
Court of Exchequer Chamber favoured the vlew that the
scope of s.l was conflned to transactlons leglslated
agalnst ln s.4. But 1n Polrell v, Kempton Park Race-
course CompanyT the House of Lords cast doubt on th1s.
In that case rthe Lord Chancellor the Earl of Halsbury
L.C., ln whose Judgment the maJorlty concurredo sa1d,
The lssue was of some slgnlflcance because s.4 of
the Bettlng Houses Act, tB53 was drafted 1n narrow-
er terms than the precedlng seetlons 1n that lt d1d
not refer to persons uslng any premlses or place for
the purpose of recelvlng, lnter aI1a" deposlts onbets. The concept of lmposlng 11ablllty on the users
of prenlses ln the context of the Bettlng Houses Act,
1853 ln ltse1f ralsed the questton as to whether the
obJect of the Act was to attack the buslness of bet-
tlng generally, or whether 1t was slmp1y lntended to
lmpose sanctlons agalnst persons 1n control or occu-patlon of premlses used for such a buslness. In
Fowell v. Kempton Park Racecolrrsg Cg. [1899] A.c.143,
the-House ffiie latten approaeh, the
Lord Chancellor saylng, lnter al1al 'rThere must be a
buslness conducted, and there must be an ownert
occupler, manager, keeper, oF some person who, lf
these deslgnatlons do not apply to h1m, must never-
theless be some other person who 1s analogous to and
1s of the same genus as the owner, keeper or occu-pler...tt (1bld., at p.161). Thls case speclf1cally
over-ruIed Hawke v. Dunn t18971 1 Q,8.579 where
Hawklns J hEd-Sne t6'Eme trouble to establlsh the
wlder constructlon as the eorrect one. A dlscusslon
of the ranlflcatlons of the House of Lords test 1s
beyond the scope of, and unneeessary to, a dlscusslon
of s.38 of the New Zealand Aet.
Note 2.
v. Mortlmen (f906)
Lords '.iiatson, liaoilaght'en. llcrrls, Shand and James ofHereford agreed, wh1lst Lords Hobhouse and Davey
dlssented.
6.
7.
B.
Note 5, and see also Vogt
22 T.L. R .763.
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ln relatlon to ss.1 to 4 of the Bettlng Houses Act,
r853:
'?The offence, whatever lt 19, ls creabed by
ss.1 and 2, The other seetlons 1n the Act
apply as corollanles fnom the commlsston of
the offence . . ,tt e
In h1s vlew s.4 was merely anclll1ary to the penal
provlslons ss.l and 2 so that the scope of s.5 was wlde
enough to encompass transaetlons falllng wlth1n each
of the precedlng sectlons. The dllemna posed by these
two confllctlng vlews followed s.5 of the tsettlng
Houses Act, 1853, but when the New Zealand leg1s1at1on
was consolldated 1n the Gamlng Act, 1908 the draftsman
was careful to ensure contextual conslstency between
s.38 and the two precedlng sectlons so that the confllet
between Dogget! v. Catterng and lowe11 v. Kgnpton Park
Racecourse Company r.ras thereby avolded for Nelv Zealandlo
9. Note 5, at p.165.
10. The confllct was to some extent allevlated by s.26
of the Gamlng and Lotterles Act Amendment Act, L907
whlch complemented s.15 of the 18BI by provldlng,
s1m1Iar1y, ln relatlon monles recelved as deposlts
on bets, etc., ln any street. The term 'rstreetirlncluded enclosed and unenclosed land (s.25(4)).
And, perhaps 1n recognltlon of the questlon that
the statement of the Earl of Halsbuny ralsed when
he spolte of other persons tranaS.ogous to and of
the same genus as the owner, keeperr or occuplertt.
s.14 of the 1907 amendlng Act provlded, lnter a11a,that a person .. . 'nho acts ers r or as 1f he were the
occupler or person havlng the care or managenent of
any house, offlce, room, or place shall be deemed
.. o to be the oecupler thereof, whether he 1s the
real occupler therbof or nott', Seetlon 26 of the
1.907 arnendlng Act (whlch beeame s,25 of the GamlngAct 1908) was repeal-ed by s.2 of the Gamlng Amend'-
ment Act, 1910. The 1907 and 1910 amendments have
a rather complex hlstory, but sufflce here to saythat the former Act lntroduced the notlon of on-
[5. oI I
As to the nature of the aetlon avallabIe under
s.38, 1D lgEgcl v. Stoddart; Davls v. Stoddartu the
defendant argued that the plalntlffts case (unden s.5
of the Bettlng Houses Aet, 1853) was 1n respect of a
contract by way of gamlng and wagertng whlch was vold
under the Acts of 1845 and L892 (U.K.). The Court,
however, reJected thls contentlon holdlng:
'iThe p1a1nt1ff who sues under s.5 1s not ...1n any senee sulng on bhe ganlng contract or
on any term of lt, elther express or 1mpI"1ed'but ln respect of a stqtutory rlght con-
fenred Uy tne sectlon. " D
eourse llcensed bookmakers (s.35) and the prlncl--pal provlslons of the Act were deslgned to that
end, 1.e. to dlscourage off-course bettlng 1n the
case of s.26. But by 1910 leglslatlve patlence
wlth the bookmakers (many of whom were eheats and
crlrnlnals) ran out and the nepeaL of s.26 followed
1nc1dental1y, wlth the repeal of the prlnclpal pro-
vlslons tn the 1907 amendlng Act whleh had lntro-
duced the llcensed bookmaker. Sectlon L4 of the
1907 amendlng Act survlves however as s.13 of ihe
consolldatlng Act. In the 1908 Act the eoncept of
"a person uslng any premlses or place'f whlch had
occurred 1n the Engllsh Bettlng Houses Act and
s.13 of the Colon1a1 Aet of 1881 was dropped.
Llabl11ty was thereby conflned to persons havlng
the relevant status referred to by the Lord Chan-
celLor ln PoweLl v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co.fhls was co6ffient1 -
cedlng sectlons to whlch s.38 could apply, 1.€.
s. 35 and 37 t and because s. 37 mlrnors s. 36 lnthe relevani partlculars the scope of s.38 Ls not
lncreased by argument that lt refers back to s.36.
Ll. Irgoz] 2 K.B.2r.
L2. Ibld. , at p.J6 per Roner L.J.
t5. 05 l
[5.05] The Appllcatlon of the Acts of Charles II (1654)'
Anne (f?fO) ana Wllllarn IV (f.835) 1n New Zealand Today
As pnevtously suggested, the relevant provlslons of
the Acts of Charles II (1654), Anne (f7fo) and Wl1llam
IV (1835) whlch applled ln i{ew Zealand on and after tlre
14th day of January 1840, eontlnued to apply except to
the extent that they have subsequently been expressly or
lrnplledly nepealed (or modlfled) by the New Zealand
leglslature.l Up to the present tlme they have not been
expressly repealed.2 And, lt has earller been assertedrg
they have never been rendered lnappllcable by the
doctrlne of lmpJ.ted repeal. It nemalns to Justlfy that
assertlon.
The consldenatlons rvhlch welgh ln determlnlng
whether there ls a repeal by 1mp11cat'1on ralse a pre'-
sumptlon agalnst 1t occurrlng ln any partlcular case.
They are ldentlfled 1n the foLlowlng often quoted
statement of A.L. Smtth J (as he then wae) 1n Kutner v.
Ph1l11ps. b He sald:
"... a nepeal by 1mpl1cat1on 1s only effected
when the provlslons of a later enaetment are
so lnconslstent wtth or repugnant to theprovlslons of an earller one, that the two
cannot stand together, 1D whlch case the
max1m, Leges posterlores coqtrarlas abrogant
... aip
1.
2.
3.
4.
Supra,
Except
( 1664 )by the
Supra,
[189]l
Chapt,J, para.7.
to the extent that the Acts of Charles II
and Anne (f7:.0) vrere nepealed and nodtfledAct of Wl1l1an IV (1835;.
Chapt.3, para.7.
2 Q.8.267.
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'irepugnant.to each other, tl:at effect cannotbe glven to both at the Eane tlne, a repeal
w111 not be lmplldd, 'and speclal Acts'are not
repealed by general Acts unless there ls some
express reference to the prevlous leglslatlon,
or unLess there ls a necessary lnco4slstency
1n the two Acts standlng together.tt "
Consequentlyr 8s OtLeary C.J. observed ln the
Court of Appea1 1n Orlleala v, biestfleld Freezlng Co.
Ltd.r6 a nepeal by 1mpllcat1on 1s never favoured:
"... and must not be lmputed to the Legls-lature wlthout necesslty or strong reasonto be shown by the par.ty lrnputlng lt.tt'
The prlnclpa] concerns of the Acts of 1664, 1710
and 1835 l.Iere f1rst1y, to pr"ovlde rel1ef from the
ob1-1gat1on arlslng out of speclfled securltles g1ven,
granted, drawn or entered lnto ln respect of certaln
gamlng or betttng transactlons;8 secondly, (1n the
case of the Act of 1835) to enable the drawen, glver
or executor of those securltles to recover any money
actually pald by hlm 1n satlsfactl-on thereof to any
5. Ibld., at pp.27L-2. Adopted 1n New Zealand by theFull Court 1n Weston v. Frazer [1917] N.2.L.R.549,
and the Count 6ffip-peal In'-OTqqra v. [estfleldFreezlng co. Ltd. [1942 ] u. zlf,T253: atilT6Fffi v. Markholm Constructlon Co.Ltd.&
others [rgZol-N'lz.r,. sfI9TqI t t{.2.L.R,763. 
-
Ibld., at p.268.
A statement from Broomr s
adopted by OtLeary C.J.
at p.268.
8. s.3 of the Act of Chanles II (1664). s.l of Anne(1710) and W11l1am IV (1835;.
6.
7. Legal. Maxlms, LOthln 0rlvlearats case,
Ed. 3481bld.,
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lndorsee, holder or asslgnees of such a security the
amount so pa1d, from the person to whom that securlty
was orlglnally glven;e th1rdly, (ln the case of the
Act of 1710) to provlde the loser of S10 or more "at
any tlme or slttlng'' wlth a cause of actlon whereby
to necover h1s pald losses from the wlnner: r0 and
finally, to establlsh qu1 tam actlons by eonmon
tnf,ormers, u and to subJect the wlnners of any such
amount to penaL sanctlons. 12 In relatlon to the
provlslon of the 1710 Act establlshlng qu1 tan
actlons by common lnforrners 1t has already been
demonstrated that lt rvas not applleable to the clrcum-
stances of New Zealand ln 1840 and t{as, therefore,
never 1n force ln i\lew Zealand. As to the remalnlng
concerns of the early Acts the relevant provlslons
of each rnust now be examlned 1n turn and consldered
1n the l1ght of the subsequent enactments of the New
Zealand leglslature to determlne whether there 1s
€IrrV: or a sufflclent degree of lnconslstency or repug-
nancy, to lnvoke the doctrlne of lmpl1ed repeal.
@:
The provLslons of the Acts
avolded securltlesrs slven or
of 1664 and 1710 whlch
entered lnto ln satls"'
o s.2.
10. s.2.
11. s.2.
12. s .5.
13. As to the nature of the securltles wlthln theqcgpe.of the Act of 1835, see Fltch v. Jones
( 1855 ) , z\ L. J . e. B. 293:, BarrcwoFE6-T. QrF(r909 )25 T. L: R.722, 26 T. L. R. l65ffiffiowardTl-street,
Law of Garnlng ( 1937) , at pp . 381{'39q,
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factlon of ganrbllng debts or bets on games (or for the
relmbursenent of "any money knowllngly Lent or advanced
for such gamlng or bettlngt') caused conslderable hard-
shlp to lnnocent hoLders when thelr voldness, even ln
the hands of those lnnocent thlrd persons, was conflrm-
ed ln F_gEyer v. Sanptonls As a consequence of that
rule s.l of the statute 5 & 5 w111.IV, e.4t (1835) was
enacted to pnovlde re11ef to such per$ons. That
sectlon provlded:
"That so much ... lof the Acts of 1664 and
17L01 ... as enacts that any note, b111 or
mortgage whleh lf thls Act had not been
passed would, by vlrtue of the sald ...
Acts or any of them, have been absolutely
vo1d, shall be deemed and taken to have been
made, drawn, accepted, g1ven, or executedfor an 1l1egaI conslderatlon, and the sald
Acts shal1 have the same force and effeet
whlch they would respectlvely have had lf
lnstead of enactlng that any such note, b1II,
or mortgage should be absolutely vold, such
Acts had respectlvely provlded that every
sueh note, b1llr or mortgage should be deemed
and talcen to have been nade, drawn, accepted,glven, or executed for an 1L1ega1 conslder'-
atlon: . . .!i
The general purpose and effect of thls provlslon was
ldentlfled by Fletcher Moulton L.J. 1n Hyams v. ltuart
I(1ngls vrhen he sa1d, speaklng of a securlty ln the form
of a cheque 16 1n that case that, the Act of 1,835 declared
14. Dlscussed supra, Chapt.I, para.t. Put see Pollock v.Paterson & Co. (r9oo) 19 N.2.L.R.94 where Stout c.J.ffiort a return to the pre-1835 Actposltlon.
15. IlgoBJ 2 K.8.695.
16. See e.A. H,vams v. Stuart K1ne. supral lvloul1s v.Owen
trgozl- 1 rT-.E-17a5 : Silrffierrs-ss IrgzeJ,E.c.T'-
conflnmlng earller authorltles that the provlslon
extended to cheques.
i5.051
that such seeurltles:
'r.. . lnstead of belng vold, should be deemedto have been glven for an lllegaL conslder-
atlon. Thls amendnent of the 1aw [by theAct of 1835 I protected lnnocent holders for
value, wh1le 1t left the partles to the
transactlon and any holder taklng such a
cheque wlth notlce of the nature of the
orlglnal conslderatlon 1n the same posltlon
as ifrey had been under the statute bf Anne. 'r7
The cornblned effect of these provlslons of the
Acts of 1664, 1710 and 1835 was, therefore, to attack
the securltles glven for certaln gamlng and bettlng
debts rather than gamlng or bettlng eontract ltself: ra
althoug;h they consequentlally avolded the contracts
of loan arlslng therefrom and rendered the gamlng or
bettlng 1tself 1l1egaI.re Also, those Acts (of 1554
and 1710), dld not avold securltles glven for bettlna
contracts per se. Thelr coneern was wlth gamlng, not
bettlng, and lndeed not even gamlng per se, but
excesslve gamlng. And excesslve gamlng 1s revealed
1n the Aet as occurrlng where securltles nather than
ready cash are passed 1n such transactlons, or 1n
repayment of loans obtalned for them or wherer oo
another plane, ready cash amountlng to t10 or more 1s
lost by a player or better on the game at any one tlrne
17. Ibld., at p.714; an alnost ldent1ca1 statement by
the same tord Justlce appears ln Moulls v. O-wen,lbld., at p.762; and by Bankes L'J: an the later
case of De_g v. Mayo [fgZO] Z f.8.346 
' 
3551 and seeSutters n. !r:!gg, 1b1d.
L8. wh11st s.J of the Act of L654 d1d, however, avold
the contract of gamlng or bettlng the Act of 1710
d1d not.
19. Supra, Chapt.l, para.4.
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or slttlng. There ls, therefore, a clear dlstlnctlon
betrueen the leglslatlve purDose of the Acts of 1564,
17f0 and t835, and the general avoldlng provlslon of
the later Engllsh Gamlng Act, 1845. (s.69 of the Gamlng
Act 1908 (N.2.)). By the express terms of that latter
provlslon lt Is the eontract of gamlng or wagenlng 1f-
self that 1s avolded, and the provlslon extends to all
such contracts, not Just to games or bets on games.
The courts have recognlsed some overlap 1n these pro-
vlslons. For example, io Browne v. ga11ey!0 Darllng J
concLuded, 1n relatlon to an actlon on a cheque for
bettlng losses:
;'whether the cheque here was affected by the
earller statutes or not, lt certalnly was
wlthln B & 9 Vlct., c.109, so far as the bets
were concerned; for 1t slmply summed up the
result of the bets, and was cLearly a con!-ract
1n wrltlng by way 6f gamlng or wag6r1ng."2l
But thls overlap does not render the securlty provtslons
of the earller Aets "so plalnly repugnant' to the
general avoldlng pr.ovlslon 1n the later Act that effeet
cannot be glven to both at the same tlme. Rather than
belng repugnant to, or lnconslstent w1th, eaeh other,
the earller and later Acts are complementary. And
they were certalnly so regarded 1n the Engllsh Act of
fB4S whlch, wh1lst enaetlng for the f,1rst tlme the
avoldlng provlslon contalned ln s.69 of the Gamlng Act
1908 (N.2, ), Left 1n force so much of the Acts of L564
20. ( lgo8)', 24 T.L. R.544.
2I. Ibld., at p.6U5. And see Appleganth v. Colley (1842)I0 M. & '$.723, 732 uhere RoIfffiLudeilEF6=F the
consequence of the Act of 5 & 6 lillll.rv., c.41, wasthat 'rall contracts fon the payment of money won atplay" were avolded.
and 1710 ras was
latter Act ltself
As to the second:
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not altered' by the Act of 1835; the
contlnulng to apply.2
The rlght of actlon agalnst the wlnner of a game
or a better on the slde to recover money actually pald
by h1m Ln satlsfactlon of any speclfled securlty glven
to the wlnner 1n satlsfactlon of that debt was con-
ferred (for the flrst tlme) by s.2 of the statute of
1835. That sectlon provldeg:
"That 1n case any person shalL, after thepasslng of thls Aet, make, draw, g1ve, oF
execute any note, b111, oF montgage for
any eonslderatlon on account of whlch the
s.ame ls by the ... llcts of 1664 and 1710.,. ]declared to be vo1d, and such person sha1l
actually pay to any lndorgee, holder, op
asslgnee of sueh note, b111, oF rnortgage the
amount of the money thereby secured, or anypart thereof, such money so pald shall be
deened and taken to have been pald for ard on
account of the person to whom such note, b111,
or nortgage was orlg1nal1y glven upon suchlIlegaI conslderatlon as aforesald, and shallbe deemed and taken to be a debt and owlng
from such last named person to the person who
shall so have pald such money, and shall
aecordlngly be recoverable by actlon at
1aw 
' 
. .tt
At the tlme thls provlslon was enacted s.2 of the
Act of Anne (1710) was st1ll ln force. That provlslon
provlded the loser of t10 or more at any tlme or
22, In Cox and Walsh v. Burton and Another t19331N.Zffiol1@o., note 14,
aLthough the ect-iTIB35 waffine eourt
treated 1t as belng ln force 1n New Zea1and. InOfflclal Asslgnee of Matene Mlta v. Johnston Ifgfe]
nhe rS3STAr was lnforce ln New Zealand. See also Joh4ston v. George
lL927l N.Z.L.R.4gO.
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slttlng wlth a rlght of actlon agalnst the wlnner
to recover any money pald 1n satlsfactlon of that
debt. By s.3 of the Act of 1664 and s.1 of the Act
of Anne (1710) securltles glven 1n satlsfactlon of
gamtng debts, or bets on games, were vo1d. By thls
comblnatlon of provlslons a loslng gamester was
extrlcated from the web of 1egal obllgatlons arlslng
out of exeesslve garnbllng transactlons even where he
had purported to honour them by payments of monell or
the glvlng of securltles. In thls context, and 1n
the l1ght of the rellef afforded to lnnocent holders
for value of securltles afforded by s.l of the Act of
1835, s.2 of that Act nalntalned conslstency wlth the
pollcy of the Acts of 1554 and 1710 by ensurlng that
a loser who pald hls wlnner by, for example, cheque,
was not 1n a worse posltlon than 1f he had pald by
cash. Prlor to the 1835 Act the cheque lnvolved the
drawer 1n no 1ega1 obllgatlons elther to the payee or
subsequent holders even holders for va1ue. After
that Act, however, wh1lst the drawer was 11able on
h1s cheque under s.I to lnnocent holdens for val-rie,
he could seek re-lmbursement of any amount pald 1n
dlseharge of that llab1l1ty bl' brlnglng an actlon
agalnst the payee under s.2. Prlor to the 1835 Act,
beeause they were vold, rellef from ob3-lgatlons
arislng out of securltles glven for gamlng was afford-
ed the loser at the expense of, 1n some cases,
lnnocent thlrd partles. By s.2 of that Act that
rellef was preserved 
- but at the expense of the
wlnner.
Bead and understood 1n 1ts hlstor'lcal context
the terms of s.2 of the Act of 1835 were clear. But
after the enactment of s.l8 of the Gamlng Act, fB45
the loglcal conslstency 1n the pollcy of the legls-
lature that had prevalled before beeame dlstorted by
t_
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the fallure of the draftsman of the 1845 Act to repeal
s.2 of the 1835 Act. Thls arose because, whllst the
1845 Act repealed s.2 of the Act of 1710 thus pre-
ventlng 1n the future recovery of money pald to the
wlnner by the loser, 
- 
1t left s,2 of the 1835 nct
lntaet. As a eonsequence money pald to the wlnner
ln dlschange of tbe debt could not be recovered but
money pald 1n satlsfactlon of a securlty glven for
the same debt could. Thls dlstortlon 1n the legls-
Latlve polley eaused some confuslon 1n the appllcatlon
and lnterpnetatlon of s.2 whlch was aggravated by the
fallure of the courts to recognlse the hlstorleal
context 1n whlch the provlslon was enacted. And thls
was further aggnavated 1n cases where the dlstontlon
between the Acts of iB45 and 1335 was the greatest,
that 1g when the holder of a securlty gJ.ven for a
gambllng debt was the wlnner hlmself - or h1s banker.
The dlffleulty 1n wtrlch the courts found themselves
1s demonstrated by the facts and Judgment of Channell
J 1n Nlcholls v. Evanszs declded 1n L913.
In N1cholls v. Evans the p1a1nt1ff sued under s.2
to recover money pald to the defendantrs bankers 1n
satlsfaetlon of flve cheques glven to the defendant
for raclng debts. The cheques were crossed by the
dra',ver and made payable to the defendant or to hls
order. The plalntlff contended that the defendant
waa a trhoLder'r under the sectlon or, alternatlvely the
bank was an trlndorseett or a trhoLder for value'?.
Channell J reJected the latter contentlon saylng that
the bankers acted ln the 'rcharacten of agents for
23. [1914] r r.8.118.
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collectlon merely'?a and not 1n the 'rcharacter of holders
1n thelr olvn rlgh6ti .25 But the contentlon that the
defendant was a 'rholdertt was more d1ff1cult because
clearly he was, unless the leglslature 1n uslng that
term 1n s.2 lntended 1t onLy to apply to a holder other
than the orlglnal payee. That 1s, a person other than
the wlnner. There ls nothlng ln the provlslon to
lndleate that that was the J-eglslaturees lntentlon.
But Channell J resolved that lt was, saylng:
?fI do not thlnk there ls any neal doubt aboutthls case. I start wlth th1s, that, &s a rule,bets are vo1d, and a securlty glven 1n respect
of a bet 1s glven wlthout conslderatlon; but
the Gamlng Act, 1835, has lntroduced a new
matter and made such securltles not merely
vold but 111ega1. If a person makes a bet and,
havlng lost, poVS 1t ln cash he cannot recover1t ba.ck. That, I thlnk, ls agreed. If that
1s the case, 1t seerls somewhat rldlculous that
the fact that the bet 1s pald, not ln eash,but by the machlnery of a cheque, should make
any dlfference. It seems to me that where the
eheque 1s the mere machlnery of payment theposltlon between the partles ls exaetly the
same as lf the noney Lad been pald ln tash. " 26
The learned Judge held that a "holder" under the sectlon
was a person wlth a Itdlstlnct'r tltle frorn the orlglnal
payee because, applylng the log1c of the reasonlng
behlnd h1s earller remarks 1n the above quotatlon:
tr... 1f .., the payee has been pald, there 1s no
concelvable reason why the drawer should recover
back the amount .;t27
24. rb1d. ,
25. Idem.
26. rb1d.,
27. rb1d.,
at o.121.
at p.120.
p.121.at
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In the later case of Dey v. l4ayo28 Bankes and Scnutton
L.JJ 1n the Court of Appeal were slnllarly of the
vlew that s.2 of the Act of 1835 was not lntended:
"... to nake any alteratlon 1n the rule of law
whlch provldes that a person vrho pays money
to another wlth fu1l knowledse of the facts
cannot recover 1t back."n
But whllst the Court of Appeal was not prepared to
accept that a payee of a cheque was a rsholder'r under
the sectlon 1t dld concede that even 1f the defendantfs
banker merely recelved the cheque for colleetlon lt
vras a holden, although not a holder ln due course.
Bankes L,J., however, concluded that lf the bank lvas
known to the drawer to be actlng nerely as the co1lec-
tlon agent of the payee any payment nade to lt 1n that
capaclty eould not be regarded, for the purposes of
s.2, ln any other I1ght than a payment to the payee.il
Scrutton L.J., whll-st not expresslng any oplnlon on the
effect of knowledge by the drawer that the holden 1s a
bare agent3l concluded:
'' 
. .. I do not Bee ny way to put any 11m1t-
atlons on the general nrords tany lndorsee?
olr lbolderi except the words |not belng thepayeef, and ln partlcular I hold them tolnclude an agent of the payee who has had
28. [rgeo ] 2 K.B. 346.
29. Ibld., Bankes L.J. at p.355; and Scrutton L.J. atp.360 saLd "... 1t was not lntended to lmprove theposltlon of the gambllng payee, bV glvlng h1m an
easy way of recoverlng a ganlng debt' .
also Atkln L.J. at p.354.
30. Ibld., at p.356.
3I. Ibld,, at p.362.
And see
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"conferued on h1m by lndorsement ln blank anddellvery a tltle to sue on the cheque as holder,
though he has glven no value for the cheque and
1s not a holder ln due course."r
tr,lhllst supportlng the vlew of the maJorlty that
lrholder" under the provlslon trprobablyrt dld not lnclude
the wlnner hlmselfrst Atkln L.J. recognlsed that s.2 of
the Act of 1710 gave the loser a rlght to necover t10
or more pald to the wlnner at the tlme the Act of 1835
was passed and concluded;
'r... ln vlew of the prevlous leglslatlon [tneAct of 17101, there seems to me no lnherent
lmprobab1l1ty 1n a rlght of sult belng glvento the loser where he has pald the wlnnerhlmself upon a note or b1II, and I shouldprefer to reserve the polnt:'|y'
The Judgments 1n Dey v. Mayo, apart from that of
Atkln L,J., contalned tortuous reasonlng deslgned to
support the lmposslble coneluslon that the Aets of 1835
and 1845 reflected a conslstent leglslatlve pollcy on
the rlghts of a l-oser vls-a-vls the wlnner. After the
repeal of the second. sectlon of the Act of Anne (f7fO),
that conslstency dld not ex1st. And ChannelL Jrs
coneluslon that pa)tment of a gamlng debt 1n cash
rendered the sum pald lrrecoverable, wh1lst correct
after the Act of 181]5, was clearly wrong at the tlrne
the Act of 1835 was enacted because at that tlme 8.2
32. Iden.
33. Ibld., at p.365, Ailrln L.J.potnt but declded that ln any
of the case the bankers were
cheques under the sectlon.
34. Iciem"
dld not declde thls
event, oh the faets
rrholdensrr of the
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of the Act of Anne (f7fO) was stlll 1n force.
The fallaey of the reasonlng behlnd the declslons
ln Nlcho1ls v. Evans and Dey v. Mayo was exposed by the
House of Lords ln 1921 1n the case of Suttels v.
Brlggs. s In that case, ln what must have been regarded
as a rrdooms day" declslon by the Engllsh bettlng frat-
ernlty the law Lords placed a eonstructlon on s.2
whlch recognlsed 1ts hlstorlcal context and held that
the 'rholderrr of a note or b111 unden that provlslon
lncluded the orlglnal payee as well as a banker who
merely recelved 1t for collectlon. Thls was so
because, as Vlscount Blrkenhead L.C. succlnctly
explalned:
t'... the lntentlon of Parllament, expressed 1n
s.2 of the Act of 1835, was to make 1t clear
that the amendment of the ]aw effected by s.l[of that Act] was wlthout preJudlee to the rulethat the loser of a bet could recover from the
wlnnen the arnount pald by h1m 1n relatlon
thereto [under s.2 of tfrL get of Anne ( 17101 1:t r
Followlng the declston 1n Sutters v. Brlggs s.2 of
the Gamlng Act, 1835 was qulckLy repealed 1n England.37
But 1t was repealed because lt was repugnant to the
sltuatlon pnevalllng ln England whlch allo','red the exlst-
ence of bookmakers and llcensed bettlng shops.s And,
35. Note L6.
36. Ibld., at p.11. But evendoubts about the cornect
ed on. See Stneet, note
37. Ganlng Act, 1922, s.1.
after Sutters v. BrlEes
conscruEEEffir s.Z.Frcer-
13, at p.4L1.
38. And, of cotrrse, to allow recover'/ from a bookmalter
or bettlnt shop at that tlme r^rould have been qulte
lnconslstent wlth the realltv of that sltuatlon.
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although 1t was seen as lnconslstent wlth the pollcy
behlnd s.18 of the 1Bq5 Act, 1t was not lnconslstent
or repugnant to 1ts terms. Throughout the years of
uncertalnty about the proper constructlon of s,2 the
courts never doubted that 1t coul,d stand and be applled
alongslde s.18 of the later Act.
In Johnston v. Georges Skerrett C.J. reJected a
eontentlon that the Act of 1835 had been 1rnp1ledly
repealed 1n New Zealand by the provlslons of the
Ganlng Act 1908. It was argued, lnter a11a, that
s,2 of the former Act eould not stand wlth s.70 of
the latter 
- 
whlch prevented recovery of rrany sum of
money won, lost or staked ln any bettlng transactlon
whatever." The Chlef Justlce sald:
'rThe lmportant dlstlnctlon between the twoprovlslons ls that the Imperlal statute [s.2
of the Act of 18351 has no appllcatlon untll
the person who gave the securlty has pald the
money thereby secured to some holder, endor-
see, or asslgnee of the securlty. The New
Zealand statute relates to money won, lost, oP
staked 1n a bettlng transactlon, and does not
coneern ltself wlth any securlty glven 1n
respeet of the transactlon or wlth paynent
of the money thereby seeured. The two sec-
tlons deal wlth entlrely dlstlnet phases of a
gamlng or bettlng transactlon. " *
fhls 1s, wlth respect a coruect statenent of the
posLtlon. But a questlon must now arlse as to the
relevance of thls type of paternallstlc leglsIatlon
to clrcumst€rnces pr"evalI1ng ln New Zealand today, and
because any dlscusslon of that questlon necessarlly
39. llote 22.
40. Ibld., at p.505.
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lnvolves a conslderatlon of the terms of s.2 of the
Act of Anne (fZfO) ft wlll be convenlent to conslder
the lssue of the 1mp]1ed repeal of that provtslon flrstlla
As to the thlrd:
The only provlslon 1n the Gamlng Act 1908 whlch
could posslbly support a contentlon that s.2 of the
Aet of Anne (f7fo) was lmplledly repealed by the New
Zealand Leglslature ls s.70; - and speclfleally the
concludlng words of that provlslon whlch prevent
actlons for the recovery of 'rany sum of noney wont
1osi, op staked 1n any bettlng transactton whatever."
0n a }lteral constructlon of those words, the statenent
of Skemett C.J. 1n J_ohnston v. George quoted above
would, 1f applled to the terms of s.2 of the Act of
Anne (f7fO) and s.?0 of the Gamlng Act 1908, render
the pnovlslons lneonslstent wtth and repugnant to each
other. But thls lnconslstency or repugnancy would
only arlse ln some cases because s.2 of the Act of Anne
(f7fO) ts a speclal Aet whllst the provlslon 1n the
Gamlng Act 1908 1s 1n generaL terms. the latter Act ls
concerned 1n s.70 wlth all bettlng whlIst the former ls
coneerned only wlth speclfled ganes and bets on those
games 1n certaln clrcumstances. It 1s therefore
necessary to flndttnecessary lnconslstency 1n the two
Acts standlng together"fr u to brlng the doctrlne of
1mpIled repeal lnto p1ay. l{hether that 'rnecegsary
lnconslstencyi? exlsts ls a mattes upon whlch dlfferent
by A.L. Snlth J 1n Kutner4I. The test propounded
v. Phlll1os, note q.
41a.The questlon of the
ln iitrew Zealand today
1nfra, chapt.7.
nelevance of thls
wl1l- be dlscussed
leglslation
1n detall,
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mlnds may cone to dlfferent concluslons. € In the
absence of prevlous authorlty the concluslon that that
lnconslstency does not exlst ls tenable, and ln the
wrlterts v1ew, the more probable. Hor'rever, 1t 1s not
necessary to eome to a concluslon on thls polnt because
the constnuctlon of s.f0 necessary to create any dlff1-
culty about the status of s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710)
cannot be sustalned.
It has already been shown that the New Zealand
courts have not yet settled the proper constructlon to
be applled to the concludlng words of s.70."3 It has
also been demonstrated that unless a 11teral constructlon
of those words 1s avolded, and unless thelr appllcatlon
ls conflned to o'tr1part1te" bettlng, absurdlty results.s
And, ln that context the wond 'rlost" ln s.70 means
"lost" and st1lI I.n the possesslon of a stakeholder or
the }osers agent before the wlnner has been pald. 0n
that constructlon lnconslstency between the Act of Anne
(f7fO) and s.70 of the Gamlng Aet 1908 does not exlst.
Because wh1lst an actlon under the former Act ls to
recover money paid to the wlnner by the loser, s.70
merely bars recovery by the loser of a bet 1n respect
4?. Althouglr there 1s no Log1ca1 certalnty ln the
appllcatlon of the doctrlne the New Zealand FuII
Court and Court of Appeal declslons 1n hlestqp v.Frazer; o'Meara v. wbltfleld Freezlng C6;FEil; andffina 
"; &@co ,Fv-eal a dagreementby
the Judges 1n lts applleat1on, but cf. Metzget v.
Ivlathleson (1909) rz G.t.R.25 and Westog-v. Fiazer,
supra,
43. Supra, para, J.
44. rb1d.
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of money deposlted wlth a stakeholder or pald to h1s
agent, and whllst 1t ls st1II 1n the stakeholder's
or agentts possesslon. s
45. A vlew shared by Skenrett C.J. ln Johnston
v. George, see supra, para.J.
CHAPTER 5
GAII,IING AND WAGERING CONTRACTS AND
THE ITLEGAL CONTRACTS ACT I97O
[5.0r] rntroduetlon
0n Oetober 24th l-gSg the Contracts and Commerelal
Law Reform commlttee neported to the Mtnlster ofJustlee a need to lntnoduce 1eg1s1at10n to reducetbe harsh consequences f10w1ng f'om 1'legar.1ty 1n
eontract. r The comrnlttee brought to the Mlntsterrs
attentlon a number of cases ln whlch the r_aw at thattlme had forced the eourts lnto unfalr and harehdete'mlnatlons agalnst pantles who had been gu1lty of
nobhlng mone helnous than technlcal breachee of thelaw.2 And the courts had not been lnsensltlve to thefeellngs of the pantles r,rho had been frustnated 1ntherr efforts to neallse on thelr lntended bargalns.The conmlttee was able to suppont lts clafun for a
need for change to the law wlth a numben of hlntsto the Leglslature fo:: such actlon fron the
1. Report of the Contnacts and Commerclal Lar*Refonm conmlttee on tne iaw-Governin[-riregarconrraers, ?,.rh ocrober,-iggg:'-rfi;"fi"iiotwas prompted !v-. neque6t made to-irre-6Jro,rtt"" lnl?95 oy the urirsr;r=;i-;,rrtr." to exanlnethls area of the Iaw.
Wa.v. ru?t=q tt9q3l
i'i: ;:i:r: rqe ; ffi"u#riiagijN.2.L.R.276.
2.
Jud1e1ary.3 Typleal of these was
J onLy a year earller 1n Qarey v,
[6.01]
of I'Ic0arthy
when he sald:
that
Hastle
rlThere are few areas 1n the law of contract
whlch cause more trouble than that of 1l1eg_al1ty, and 1t may be, as some wrlters urgelthat the tlme has come when the Legls1at[r6
mlght look carefully at thls subJect and
conslder dolng somethlng bo renove the over-
severe eonsequences whlch sonetlmes fLowfrom a breach of one of the less lmportantof the very rarge number of regulations whleh
a managed welfare State seems io nequlre.But unt11 that 1s done, we have to dpply thelaw as 1t 1s.,'b
rn that case a earpenter who had carrled out certaln
arteratlons to a bu1ld1ng wlthout a permlt requlred
by the Auckland clty By-laws was unabl,e to recover
h1s eontract pn1ee. Hls fallune to obtaln the permlt
before commenclng the work had talnted the contract
wlth 1llegaI1ty sueh that he was unable to enfonce
lt. Llke McCarthy J 1n the Court of Appeal, Spelght
J 1n the supreme court negretted the concluslon that
the law of l1legal1ty ln contract forced h1m to adopt
ln the case.S rt was a matter of eoncern to hfun that
the party who had enJoyed the beneflts of the work
done under the contract was then able to avold h1s
responslbllltv to pay for lt by a ptea of 1l1egaI1ty.
But 1n thls respect the case was qulte unexceptlonar.
3. Todd v. EAfkeI_[1953] N.?.L.R.39, l?-g;GFfffl tnffiT'r r1 s, I ie - 6 j - N : i,: {-. fr. s a o ]' e5 a ;cotEn'''. g.*@-o1rti'rit Flnance coiporatronffil[rge r
note 2, at p.?BZ.
Note 2 at p.282,
fbld. , at p.278.
4.
5.
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It was slmply one of hundreds 1n whlch the doctrlne
of 1llegallty had achleved 1n.'f ustlce and a grotesque
result.
The Contracts and Comnerclal Law Reform Corrunlttee
presented lts proposals for reform to the Mlnlster
of Justlce 1n the forn of a draft b111. And the
terms of thls, wlth only mlnor alteratlon, were
adopted by the Leglslature and enacted as the
II1ega1 Contracts Act 19?0.6
But although the tltle to the fllegal Contracts
Act 1970 tends to suggest a codlflcatlon of the
doctrlne of lllegaL contracts, 1t 1s lmportant to
recognlse the I1m1ts of the reforn sought by the
framers of the draft b111. It certalnly was not
lntended to provlde a complete code, and the scope
of the reform antlclpated by 1t was more 1n the natu:.,
of a procedural than a substantlve change. That 1 -
the Act ls concerned to modlfy the barrler to enforc
ment exlstlng in an 11lega1 contract, and does not,
wlth rnlnor exceptlons, atternpt to resolve the
perhaps mone dlffleult questlons of definltlon and
dlstlnctlon presented by the concepts of lllegallty
and voldness themselves. T The Contracts and Commer*
clal Law Reform Conrmlttee was asked to examlne the
results flowlng from 1lIega1 contracts wlth a vlew
to tta restatement of the law whlch would produce the
For a dlseusslon of theM.P. Furmston, (I97?) j
See para.2, lnfra. The
on thls account by M,P.
maln vartatlons see
N,Z.U.L,R.r51.
Aet has been crltlcls...
Funmston, lbld.
6.
T,
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greatest measure of falnness. il I The Commlttee lnter-
preted the expresslon i?restatement" as embraclng
'f amelloratlve changerre and the product of 1ts
dellberatlons, that ls, the Illegal Contracts Act
1970, rnust therefore be understood wlth thls quall-
flcatlon 1n m1nd. '
A detalled exposltlon of the operatlon of the
I11egal Contnacts Act 1970 1s beyon.l the scope of
thls work, but as that Act 1s new, and has a partl-
cuLar reLevance to the law of Eamlng and wagerlng
eontraets, some effort w111 be made to ldentlfy the
obJects, as well as the achlevements of thls legls*
latlon. A more extensive dlseusslon than mlght
otlrerwlse be requlred 1s also Justlfled on the ground
that the l11ega1 Contracts Act 1970 compels attentlon
as a posslble lnstrument of reform ln thls areai
and, the close assoclatlon enJoyed by gamlng and
wagerlng eontracts and 1lIegal contracts over the
past two centurles - at least 1n the mlnds of Judges,
Lawyens and leglsl-ators .- provldes an added Justlfl-
catlon for thls approach.
8. l{ote l, at p. 1.
Ibld.9.
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An lllegal Contract under the Act
That the Act ls an lnstrument of llmlted reforn
ls partlcularly emphaslsed by the deflnltlon of an
lllegal eontract ln s. 3. It provldes:
'rrI11ega1 Contractt deflned - SubJect to
smct, for the puiposes ofthls Act the term f111egal contractt means
any contract that 1s lI1ega1 at law on 1n
equltyf wfreth
the creatlon or performance of the contract;
and lncludes a contract whlch contalns anll1egal provlslonn whether that provlslonls severable or not . rr
Thls deflnltlon relles, of course, on exlstlng Law
for the determlnatlon of 1l1egat1ty 1n respect to any
partlcuLar contractr but 1n the area of lllega1 per-
formance and severance some tldylng up 1s achleved.
The doctrlne of severance 1s abollshed ln favour of
the remedles avallable to a party to an llIegal
contraet conferred by s.7 of the Act2 and an attempt
has been made to leglslate a formula for deallng wlth
eontracts whlch, wh1lst ex facle 1egal, have been
1llega1ly performed. In relatlon to the latter', s.3
must be read wlth s.5 of the Act, whlch provldes:
u5. Breach of enactment 
- 
A contract law-fullffil not become 1L1egal
or unenfonceable by any party by reason of
the fact that lts performance 1s 1n breach
1.
My enphasls
Dlscussed Chapt.3, Cheshlre andContract (Atfr N.Z. ed.) by Prof .for a full dlscusslon of th1s.
Dlscussed 1nfra.
Flfootrs Law of
J.F.Northey,
2.
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'f of any enactment, unless the enactment
expnessly so provldes or 1ts obJect clearly
so requlres .tt
In the draft b111 prepared by the Contracts and
Commerclal Law Refonrn Commlttee s.5 contalned a second
clause whlch does not appear 1n the ll1egal Contracts
Act 1970. That elause read:
'rA contract the obJect of whlch or anyprovlslon of whlch ls the dolng of an actthat 1s prohlblted by any enactment shall be
111e9a1, unless the enactment otherwlseprovldes or lts obJect otherwlse requlres.'r3
Thls deleted clause, together wlth what now appears as
s.5 of the Act was lntended by the Contracts and
Commerclal Law Reform Commlttee to leglslate the
approach to an 1l1ega1 performance of a contraet ex
faele legal adopted by Devlln J 1n St.John Shlpplng
Corporallo.n v. Joseph Rank, Ltd.r In that case the
p1a1nH.ff conveyed a cargo of wheat from Amerlca to
England 1n lts shlp whlch, when bunkened wlth the fuel
necessary for the Journey, submerged the trload llnerr
contrary to the provlslons of The Merchant Shlpplng
(Safety and Load tlne Conventlons) Act, L932. For
that offenee the master of the vessel was flned
€11200. The frelght earned by the excess wheat was
82 1295 and the defendants, who were lndorsees of b1Ils
of lad1ng ln nespect of some of the cargo wlthheld
t2r000 of the total frelght contraeted to be pald by
3.
4.
C1ause 5(2) of the draft b111.
lL957l 1 Q.B.25T ! also the s1mllar
adopted_1n New South Wales 1n Hayes(rg6r) 6z s.R. (l{.s.l^I. ) 1.
approach
v. CabLe
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them '- even though the cargo '{as dellvered safely.
The contract for the carrlage of the wheat was ex faele
lawful but the clefendants contended that the plalntlff rs
breach of the l4erchant Shlpplng (Safety and Load Llne
Conventlons) Act, 1932 made 1t 11lega1 and unenforce-
ab1e. Before examlnlng the way ln whlch Devl-1n J
dealt wlth thls contentlon the general prlnclples
relatlng to the effects of 11lega11ty ln contract
neeC flrst to be ldent1f1ed.
At conmon 1aw an agreement to commlt a crlme or
a tort ls 1llega1 and unenforceable.s Slm1lar1y,
eertaln contracts whlch are eategorlsed as contrary
to pub11c po11ey, are unenforceable.6 A eontract,
Lawful ln 1tseLf, ls also 1l1ega1 1f entered lnto wlth
the obJect that the 1aw w111 be vlolated ln lts per-
formance. In such cases the key to unenforceablLlt:.r
1s to be found 1n the proved lntentlon of the partles.
But lf the performance of the contract necessarlly
lnvolves the commlsslon of an unlawful act 1t 1s
lllegal and unenforceable, even where the partles are
lgnorant of the law that makes 1t unlawful.? But what
5. Blgos v. Bousted [r9lr] r lrr.E.R.92; scott v.L-tJ1J 
- 
..Lr. .tr.JrtBfrffi, Doe-ifiillucNab & co. [r8ge] 2 A.TTfr-.Brown. Jenklnson & Co.Ltd. v. Percy Dalton5erl-T-F=EhFf,ort of
hone
6.
FI-anufact[iT?rs
Dlscussed Cheshlre and Flfoot, note I, and pp.
266-289, Vol.9 Halsburyrs Laws of England(4rh ed.).
ffiucffiryaach ofLtd. v. Kunz and C contract see Brltlsh Hstallate G
See the oblter statement of Blackburn J 1n Waugh
v. Morrls (rBZ3) L.R.B a.B.?02, 208; andDenifr!-If.n. ln J.M. Allan (Merehandlslqg) Ltd.nnIn[-T[ R. 
-ln nv. Qlske [1963]
7.
--.
[6.02]
of a contract that 1s ex faele lawful and ls perforrned
lllegaIly as ln St.John Shlpplng CorporP.tlon v.
Joseph Rank, Ltd.?8 There ls no dlfflculty when the
partles lntend to perform the eontract un1awfu11y,
1n such a case they cannot enforce lt. e And 1f one
only of the partL"tlntends to perform the contract
unlawfully he ls barred from enforelng 1t; but a
party who ls not lmpllcated or d1d not partlclpate
1n the 1llega11ty 1s not debarred. l0 In St.John
Shlpplng Corporatlon v. Joseph Rank' Ltd, a breach
of the Merchant Shlpplng (Safety and Load l1ne
Conventlons) Act, 1932 was not antlelpated or lntenCed
by elther party at the blnre the contract was entered
1nto, and 1t was not alleged that the lnfnlngement
of the Act by the pLalntlff was dellberate. rt The
defendant could not, therefore, establlsh agalnst the
p1a1nt1ff an lntentlon such as would preclude 1t from
recoverlng but contented 1tse1f lnstead wlth alleglng
that the unlawful aet ltself, 1n the perfonmance of
the contract, was sufflclent to debar recovery.
Devl1n J reJected thls contentlon saylng:
ttThere are two general prlnclples [relatlngto llIegal contractsl. The flrst ls that a
contract whlch ls entered lnto wlth the obJect
of eommlttlng an 111egaL aet ls unenforceable
B. Note 4.
9. Supra.
10, Ashmore Benson. Pease & Co.Ltd. v. A.V.Dawson Ltd.F6o-nLtd.ffiIrgz[] r r.8.r39, 14i;
v. Loiane [1952]-I A]i.EMe@drilne)_I,!4. v. 9lplre_ hote | , af p.Zbf( eFeh-a-ndrstne) Lta
l-L. Note 4 , at p. 283.
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ttThe appllcatlon of thls prlnclple depends
upon proof of the lntent, at the tlme the
eontract was made, to break the 1aw; 1f
the lntent ls mutual the contract ls not
enforceable at all, and, 1f unllatera1, 1t
1s unenforceable at the sult of the party
who 1s pnoved to have 1t The second
pr1nc1ple 1s that the count w111 not enforce
a contract whlch ls expressly or lmplledIyprohlblted by statute. If the contract 1s
of thls class 1t does not matter what thelntent of the partles ls; lf the statuteprohlblts the contract, 1t ls unenforceable
whether the partles meant to break the law
or not. A slgnlflcant dlstlnctlon between
the two classes 1s th1s. In the former
class you have onLy to look and see what acts
the statute prohlblts; 1t does not matter
whether or not 1t prohiblts a contract; 1f
a contract 1s dellberately made to do aprohlblted aet, that eontract w111 be unen-forceable. In the latter class r Vou have to
conslder not what aets the statute prohlblts,but what contracts 1t prohlblts; but you are
not concerned at all wlth the lntent of thepartles; 1f the partles enter lnto a pro-hlblted contract, that contract ls unen-
forceable. rr l2
Ttre learned Judge then went on to explaln that 1n
determlnlng whether a contract was expressly or
funpl1ed1y pnohlblted by gtatute 1t was necessary to
Look at 1ts performancer &s well as 1ts terms.
sald:
He
".. . whether 1t ls the terms of the contractor the performance of 1t that ls called 1nquestlon, the test 1s Just the sane: 1sthe contract, as made or as performedr a
contraet that ls prohlblted by the statute.rr
L2. Ibld.
13. Note 4, at p.284.
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And, the test to be applled 1n determlnlng whether
a contract ls 1mp11edly prohlblted requlres one to
conslder the true effect and meanlng of the statute
to ascertaln whether lt means to prohlblt the class
of contracts to whlch the contract under conslderatlon
belongs. But:
t'A eourt should not hold that any contract or
class of contracts 1s prohblted by statute
unless there ls a clear lmpltcatlon, orInecessary lnferencer ..., that the statute
so lntended. If a contraet has as 1ts whole
ob"lect the dolng of the very act whlch the
statute prohlblts, lt can be argued that you
can hardly make sense of a statute whlehforbids an act and yet permlts to be made a
eontract to do 1t; that 1s a clear lmpl1c-
at1on. " rq
Devlln J urged cautlon 1n flndlng an 1mpl1ed prohlb'-
ltlon where some regulatory law Ln the commerclal
sphere was unwlttlngly broken. Unless there was a
clear lmpllcatlon to that effect the courts shoulcl
not readlly lnterfere wlth the rlghts and remedles
of the ordlnary law of contract, and ln determlnlng
whether there ls such an lmpIlcatlon 1t was proper
to have regard to the consequences and lnconvenlences
that nlght flow from 1t. The flndlng 1n St.John
Shlpplng Corporatlon v. Joseplr Ranlt Lt{. 'i{as, therefore,
that al-though there had been 11legallty ln the
performanee of the eontract the I'lerchant Shlpplng
(Safety and Load Llne Conventlons) Act, L932 d1d not
lmpI1edly prohlblt the earrlage of goods.
The approaeh 1n S_!.Jq v.
14. l.Tote 4 , at p.288.
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Jo.lanh Rank Ltcl. ,r&s co:rtra"sbecl l,rlti:, antl preferred by,the contracts and commerclar- Law Reform commltte", ,othat adopted by the New zealand courts to a breaehof s'25 0f the Land settlement promotl0n and LandAcqu1s1t10n Act rg52 pr10r to a declsl0n of the courtof Appeal ln Joe v. young. ls That seetlon provldedthat transactlons entered lnto 1n contraventlon of theAct etshall be deemed to be unrawful and sha1l have noeffect'it16 pr10r to Joe v, young the courts, for allpnactlcal purpos€s, l7 lntenpreted that phrase asmeanlng frshall have no effect otherwlse than as anunlawful transact1on.,,18 Thus., the rule 1n Scarfe v.Morganrs and Ar-exander v. Raysone apprled. under thlsrule the lllegallty ln a contract of lease does notprevent a lega1 0r equltable t1tle passlng fnom the1andl0rd to the tenant but the necesslty to plead orexplaln the 111egal1ty prevents the landl0rd fromseeklng the a1d of the counts to reeover possessl0n
15. [1964] N.2.L.R.24.
16' s'25(4) Land-settlement pronotlon and LandAcqulsltt::,19t Lit;;" 1!, precursor was s.46of the Servlcernen;i-dettlement and Land SalesAct 1943.
L7. There was some reluctance to accept an lnter_prerarlon based on 
" 
ir"ar"; ;;;;";rr! woros
"and sharl rrave- no Jrii"_til t?e""*rui"'"u"pIus-
_s_99e, see €rS. Falr andMii;J iigssl N.z.L.R.gugltt J{ 1n watson v.
18. Per Gresson Jp.972.
19. (18361, 4 u.& w.2To.
20. [1936] r r.B.169.
1n Watsoq v. Mlles, note IT at
I
I
I
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of h1s land. a The Court of Appeal 1n Joe v. Young,
however, dlsapproved of thls approach and held that
the words'rsha1I have no effect'r ln s.25 of the Land
Settlement Promotlon and Land Acqulsltlon Act 1952
must be glven effect to 1n accordance wlth thelr
ordlnary meanlng, and consequently, a leaslng 1n
contraventlon of the provlslons of the Act d1d not
preclude the owner from bnlnglng an actlon to recover
possesslon of 1ts land - because the contract of
lease was not only unlawful, but was of no effeet to
pass any tltle to the tenant. The ownert s c1alm
for possesslon therefore rested solel.y on h1s lega1
ownershlp and dld not requlre an explanatlon of the
ll}egaIlty 1n the contract of lease.2
It ls, however, d1ff1cu1t to see upon what basls
the approach ln tire pre-Joe v. Young eases can be
contrasted wlth that adopted 1n St.John Shlpplng
Corporatlon v. Joseph Rank Ltd. Both before and
aftera Joe v. Young the New Zealand eourts have never'
doubted that eontracts 1n breach of s.25 of the Land
Settlement Promotlon and Land Acqulsltlon Act 1952
are, by tta clear 1nrpl1cat1on, op necessary lnferencett2b
21. But cf. Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd.
q---[1945] Kffie owfrEF-d
was treated wlth mone favour by balIeCl chattel-sthe court.
22. Thls rule formed the basls of the declslon 1n
Bqwmakers case, 1b1d. g and see Hayes v. Suthenlandflftr-fffiZ. L. R : n7 7 ; - Manslon Hffi-(Kawfr)-ilEFy. Stapleton [1948] N.trgSrfTr.T[.R. 338.
23. The later cases are dlscussed 1nfra, para.4.
2\. The words uged by Devlln J 1n the St.JohnShlpplng Corlporatlon case supra, n6:F-L-[
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prohlblted by the sectlon. Indeed, thelr prohlbltlon
1s the very obJect of the leglslatlon. As an example
of a dlfferent approach, therefore, the Commltteers
selectlon of the pre-Joe v. Young cases was unfortunate.
It would perhaps have been better to explaln clause 5
of the b111 as slmply acknowledglng a preference for a
more ratlonal attltude to 1l1egal performance ae
demonstrated by St.John Shlpplng Corporatlon v. Joseph
Rank, Ltd. The confuslon evldent 1n the contrast
between the two types of approach selected by the
Commlttee 1n 1ts explanatlon of elause 5 of the draft
b111 also manlfests 1tself ln paragraph 2 of that
clause.&4 One commentator placed the emphasls on the
eoncludlng words to paragraph (2) and sald:
'tlt w1lL be seen that although the antltheslsbetween subsectlons (1) and Q) 1s elegant,the effect of subsectlon (2) would" 1n fact,
be to expand-greatly the scope of statutory1IlegaIlty. " ^
The basls for thls concluslon was that there would be
very few enactments ln exlstence whlch would tother-
wlse provlder or whose robJect otherwlse requlrest
that the contract be Iegal. It 1s not surprlslng
that the Commltteefs lntentlon was mlsunderstood ln
thls w&Vr for by draftlng paragraphs (1) and (2) ln
the same cl-ause the dlstlnctlon between Devl1n Jfs
two elasses of contract 1n St.John Shlpplng Corporatlon
v. Joseph Rank Ltd.4 beeomes blurred. In panagraph(f) the second class 1n whleh tllegal performance ls
a gnatultous consequence of the partlesf trangactlon
24a.Quoted supra.
25. [,1.P. Furmston (l.972) S U.Z.U.L.R.l51, 158.
26. Supra.
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1s dealt wlth; whereas paragnaph (2) purports to
have nothlng to do wlth performance but falls to be
consldered 1n the 1lght of the partles I lntentlon at
tlre tlrne the contract was entered into.2?
In vlew of the definltlon of an ttlIlegal contract"
1n s.3 of the Aet 1t 1s dlfflcult to understand the
need the Commlttee appears to have felt for lnsertlng
paragraph (2) ln elause 5 of the draft b111. It
would have made more sense 1n clause 3, but 1n any
event 1t made no change to the Iaw, and perhaps 1n
recognltlon of thls lt was never lnserted ln the Act.
It 1s suggested that s.5 of the lllegal Contracts
Act 1970, whilst maklng no substantlve change to the
law, does achleve some useful clarlflcatlon of 1t.
I{owever, for lts obJect to be clearly understood the
splrlt of Devl1n Jss Judgment 1n St.John Shlpplng
Corporatlon v. Joseph Rank, Ltd. must also be had
regard to and recognlsed. The sectlon as 1t stands
achleves what 1ts framers hoped for; although lncld-
entally 1t rnay have been deslrable to lnsert the word
"onlytf after rrperformancetr nrhen paragraph (2) of
clause 5 was reJected by the 1eg1s1ator. The provlslon
does not, of course, provlde a preclse formula for
deallng wlth cases of lIlegal performance:. but 1t does
provlde a useful eushlon2sagalnst the ever lnereaslng
burdens lrnposed 1n every sphere of human endeavour b"
the leg1s1atlve control and regulatlon syndnome that
has characterlsed the 20th century. It w1Ll be
neeessary to return agaln to thls provlslon 1n order to
examlne lts appl-1eatlon to the wagerlng and gamlng 1aws.
27. In whlch context lgnoranee of the law 1s, of
course, lrrelevant.
28, R.J. Sutton ltgTzl necent Larv, 28, 32 would dlsagree
wlth the concluslon. It remalns to be seen whether
the New Zealand Courts w111 apply a more llberal
approaeh than e.g. 1n Caney v. Hastle t19681N.2.L.R.276. ,--
t6.031 The Remedy for ll1ega11ty 1n Contract Proposed
by the Act
[6.03]
In regard to the aboLltlon of the doctrlne of
severance, as prevlousLy lndlcated thls was necessary
1n order to achleve the reform provLded for 1n s.7
of the Act. Thls wlll be dlscussed further 1n the
fol1ow1ng paragr€rph, but at thls polnt the need to
abollsh the doctrlne can be succlnctly, and clearly,
explalned by quotlng paragraph 12 of the Contracts and
Commerclal Law Reform Commltteets report. It reads:
'rAt presente the courts have the power Ln
certaln eases to asslst the partles to an
11lega1 contraet by severlng and dlscardlng
the lllegal portlons of 1t, so that the legalparts remalnlng can be enforced. Thls power
can sometlnes work lnJustlce 1n that the
enforcement of only a part rather than the
whole can have the effect of dlstontlng thepartlesr bargaln. It seems to usr however,that the need for the remedy w1ll dlsappear1f the larger reforms we recom.mend [fn ss.6
e 7 of the Actl are adopbed. Under these the
courts w1ll have a much r,rllder dlscretlon to
enforce or not enforce the contraet (lnc1ud1ng
the l11egal portlons of 1t) whether 1n whole
on 1n part. Irle therefore recommend ln
clause 3 of our draft statute that contracts
should be treated as lIlegal whether the
11legal provlslons 1n thern are severable or
not. tl
As prevlously lndlcated" the lllegal Contracts Act
1970 was a neactlon agaLnst the often too severe
consequences that fLowed from the appllcatlon of the
doetrlne of 1Ilegal1ty ln contraetr - especlally
l. Supra, para.1.
-G.
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where 1ts appllcatlon was attracted by a purely
gratultous breaeh of one of the multltude of r"egula-
tory provlslons 'iwhlch a managed welfare State seems
to requlre".2 But whllst statutory 1llega1lty was the
prlnclpal concern, the reform effected by the Act
extends also to conmon lait 1l1ega11ty.3
The emphasls 1n the Aet, however, ls on substlt-
utlng the non-enforeeablllty concept of the common lavr
wlth a more flex1ble approach to deallng wlth eontracts
talnted wlth lI1egaI1ty. Thls ls achleved 1n ss. 6 &
7 of the Aet, the purposes of whlch were explalned by
the Contracts and Commerclal Law Reform Comnlttee ln
the fol1ow1ng terms:
"Any general reform should, ln our v1ew,have the effect of maklng such contracts
as are l}1ega1, of no effect, so that no
rlghts w111 pass under them and the posltlon
of the partles w111 be the same as 1f the1Ilegal contract had never been entered lnto(clause 6 of the draft statute [s.6 of theActl). We would quallfy thls ruIe, however,by glvlng to the cour:ts a dlscretlon to orderthat, notwlthstandlng the 1llegal1ty, the
contract be enforced ln whole or 1n part.
2, Per McCarthy J 1n Carey v. Hastle [1968] N.Z.L.R.
276 , 286; thls passage was 6d6ffid by McMullln Jln Dreadon v. Fletcher Development Co. [1974]
2 t'llZlffiTtl, 1cy behlnd
the Act: ':It was the needtto remove the over-
severe consequences whlch sometlmes flow from a
breach of one of the less lmportant of the verylarge number of regulatlons whleh a managed welfare
state seemg to requlre I . . . and not so much to dea]
wlth the consequences of common law 1I1egallty that
the ll1ega1 Contracts Act was enacted.tt i
See e.g. the deflnltlon of an 1IIegal contnact ln
s.3 whlch encompasses a contract that 1s 1l1egaItrat law or 1n equlty;!.
3.
116.031
"We would make thls exceptlon because we
recognlse that there may be clrcunstances
where lt may be lmposslble or unJust that
the partles should be restoreo to thelr
orlglnal pos1t1on. l,rle therefore make the
recornmendatlons set out 1n clause 7 of the
attached draft statute [s.7 of the Act]'rr+
Sectlons 6 and 7 of the Illeeal Contracts Act 1970
orovlde as follons:
"6.(1) ilotwlTfiFEfndtng any rule of law orequlty to the contrary, but subJeet to theprovlslons of thls Act and of any other
enactment, every lIIegal contract shall be
of no effect and no person sha1l become
entltled to any property under a dlsposltlon
made by or pursuani to any such ccntract:
Provlded that nothlng ln thls sectlon shar..!
lnvalldate
(a) Any dlsposltlon of property by a partv
to an lIIegaI eontract for valuable
conslderatlon: or(b) Any dlsposltlon of property made by or
through a person wiro became entltled to
the property under a dlsposttlon to whl nhparagraph (a) of thls provlso applles
lf the person to whom the dlsposltlon was
made was not a party to the 1Ilegal contract
and had not at the tlme of the dlsposltlon
notlce that the property was the subJect of,
or the whole or part of the conslderatlon i'or 
"
an lllegal contract and otherwlse acts 1n
good fa1th.(2) In thls sectlon the term t dlsposltlont
has the meanlng asslgned to that term by
sectlon 2 of the Insolvency Act L967 ,"
Par.a.11, Report of the Contracts and Commerelal
Law Reform Conmlttee on l1lega1 Contracts. Ti:e
Commlttee also made speclflc proposals 1n rela.tio''
to contracts 1n restralnt of trade. A dlscuss'.o;.
of those proposals 1s beyond the scope of thls
work, but see s.8 of tbe I1lega1 Contracts rlct
1970.
4.
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u7.(t) Notwlthstandlng the provlslons of
sectlon 6 of thls Act, but subJect to the
express provlslons of any other enactment,
the Court may 1n the course of any pro-
ceedlngs, or on appllcatlon made for thepurpose, gi.ant to(a) Any party to an l11egaI eontraet,. or(b) Any party to a contract who 1s d1s-quaIlfled fror:n enforclng 1t by reason of
the commlsslon of an i1lega1 act 1n the
course of 1ts performanee; or(c) Any person clalning through or under any
such party
such rel1ef by way of restltutlon, compens-
at1on, varlatlon of the contract, valldatlon
of the contract in whole or part or for anypartlcular purposer or otherwlse howsoever asthe Court 1n lts dlscretlon thlnks Just"(2) An appllcatlon under subsectlon (1) ofthls sectlon may be macle by(a) Any person to whom the Court may grant
relief pursuant to subsectlon (1) ofthls sectlo;r: or(b) Any other person where lt ls materlalfor that person to know whether rellef
w111 be granted under that subseetlon.
( 3) In conslderlng whether to grant rellef
under subsectlon (1) of thls sectlon theCourt shal1 have regard to(a) The conduct of the partles: &ncl(b) In the case of a brbach of an enactment,the obJect of the enactment and thegravlty of the penalty expressly pro-
vlded for any breach thereof; end(c) Such other matters as lt thlnks proper;
but shall not grant re1lef 1f 1t consldersthat to do so would not be 1n the pub11c
lnteres t .(4) The Court may make an order under sub-
sectlon (1) of thls sectlon notwlthstandlnEthat the person granted rel1ef entered lntothe contract or commltted an unlawful act or
unlawfully omltted to do an act wlth know*ledge of the facts or law g1v1ng rlse to the'1llegaIlty, but the Court shall take such
knowledge lnto account 1n exerclslng 1tsdlscretlon under that subsectlon.
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"(5) The Court may by any order made under
subsectlon (l) of thls sectlon vest anyproperty that vras the subJect of, or the
whole or part of the conslderatlon for, an11lega} contract 1n any party to the pro-
ceedlngs or may dlrect any such party totransfer or asslgn any such property to any
other party to the proceedlngs.(6) Any order nade under sulrsectlon (1) ofthls sectlon, or any provlslon of any such
order-" may be made upon and subJect to suchterms and condltlons as the Court thlnksf1b.(7) SubJect to the express pnovlslons of any
other enactment, no Court shall, in respectof any lllegaI contract, grant rellef tb anyperson otherwlse than 1n aecordance wlth theprovlslons of thls Act.'t
These provlslons have been applled 1n a nurnber of
cases slnce the statute was enacted and whll-st s.5
has eaused llttle dlfflcurty two maln lssues have
arlsen ln the construetlon of s.?. The flrst was
perhaos predlctable 1n that lt relates to the matters
the court should have regard to 1n exerclslng 1ts
dlseretlon under s.7(l) to grant re11ef to a party
to a contract rendered of no effect by s.6: ihe
second relates to the constructlon to be applled
to the words irbut subJeet to the express provlslons
of any other enactmenttr 1n subsectlon (1) of s.Z.
As the seeond lssue has lmportant ramlflcatlons for
the appllcatlon of the IllegaI Contracts Act to
gamlng and wagerlng contraets tt wlrl be convenlent
to deal wlth each ln turn under separate headi.ngs.
t6. otr l
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The Scope of the Dlscretlonary ReLlef Avallable
under the Act
As W1ld C.J observedr 1n Comblned Taxls Co-oper-
atlve Soclety Ltd. v. SLobbe2 the power glven to the
courts to grant rel1ef from the consequences of
1llegal1ty lmposed by s.5 of the Act 'r1s of the
most plenary eharacterlr.3 And the nature of the
re11ef avallable extends beyond varlatlon or valld-
atlon of the eontract ln whole or 1n part ln that 1t
may be for any partlcular purpose tror othenwlse
howsoever as the Court ln lts dlscretlon thlnks
f1t". I The rellef avallable 1s exceptlonally wlde.
But the power to grant rellef 1s quallfted 1n sub-
sectlon (3) by a number of factors whlch must be
eonsldered by the Courts, The flrst 1s the conduct
of the partles.s In thls regard the fact that the
partles have acted ln perfect good falth and were
1. In nesponse to a submlsslon by Counsel fon thePIalntlff.
Itg7zl N.2.L.R.354.
Ibld., at p.362,
S.7(1) of the Aet.
5. In {organ v. Beck and Pcpg (Unreported Judgnent.of Qffiam JIETIETfi@on, 2nd September 1974)
a plea by a non-party to an lllegaL contraet that
an app11catlon, for vaLldatlon of a contnact,
should have been made by the plalntlff to over-
eome the consequences of an 1l1ega11ty arlslngfron the non-partyrs negllgence was reJected.
Qulll1am J sald: r'... I am not prepared to saythat the prospects of a successful appllcatlon
were such as to mean that the Plalntlff, ln the
exerclse of hls duty to mltlgate hls loss, should
have embarked upon such an unpromlslng venturerl(at p.I0).
2.
3.
4.
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not eonsclous of any lnfrlngement of the law has been
held materlal.6 Slm11arly, where the lllegallty has
arlsen as an admlnlstratlve overslght or through the
negllgence of the party I s professlonal advlser, the
Courts have granted rellef agalnst the operatlon of
s.5.7 The motlve of the party seeklng refuge ln the
appllcatlon of s.7 ls also of partlcular relevance.
In one case the appllcant fa1led because to grant
rellef woul-d have resulted 1n the success of an
arrangement whlch was adopted. as ran lngenlous devlce
to defeat the operatlon of the Regulatlons for ...
proflt'.8 And there has also been a manked reactlon
agalnst partles who, havlng entered lnto a contract
of sale or glven an optlon to punchase, then seek to
lnvalldate the agreement 1n order to obtaln the bene-
5. Per W11d C.J. ln Comblned Taxls Co-operatlve
Soclety Ltd. v. SRlDffita. v]BFd-rcadrands Rentals Ltd. t19751fT;f[;E-.30'4 tne of the
1llega11ty (ne adopted a devlce to defeat the
operatlon of the regulatlon ln lssue) operated
agalnst hlm; wh1lst the plalnt1ff, €ut runsophls-tlcated lndlvldual [who] ... d.ld not know that thetransactlon was lllegalrr succeeded (at p.309);
and see Dreadon v. Fletcher Development Co.Ltd.
t 1974 l aT'zf,-. n. rtls belng breached does not dlsbar from rellef,
see subs.4.
Dneadon v. Fletcher Developggnt 9o.Ltd., note 6;Ffr?i6FE'on v f Beattief,-fnaforual-unaated, ref .A. No .18/75) ; and see
also Teh v. Fraser (Unreported Judgnent of SpelghtJ, at-'iil['angaElJecember l?th 19?4), where thls
eourse was not avallable for other reasons;
Coburn v. Hardlng (Unreported Judgment of W1Id6.fTr AuETEfrdl 23ra bcrober 1974).
R.D. Bull Ltd.
aT p.30'f
7.
8. v. Broadlands Rentals Ltd., note 6
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that the plalntlff had contravened the provlslons of
the l{oneylenders Aet 1908. The consequenee of
that breaeh was that the contract of loan was
11lega1.2 The plalntlff sought rellef from the
llIegallty under, lnter alla, s.7 of the Illegal
Contracts Act ]-970 and, 1n that context, ldlld
C.J. rnade the followlng observatlon coneernlng
the lntroductory words to s.7(1):
"... the power glven by s.7(1) ls tsubJeetto the express provlslons of any other
enactment ? . The enactment relevant herels . . , the lloneylenders Act 1908 and lts
amendments. ff that Act expressly declared
a eontract of the klnd here 1n lssue to be
111ega1 or vold the l,tords Just quoted would,1n rny oplnlon, preclude the Court from
exerclslng the power glven by s.7(1) to enant
rel1ef by way of valldatlng 1t. But the
Moneylenders Act 1908 contalns no expressprovlslon that a contract rnade by an unre(q-lstered moneylender 1s l1lega1 or vo1d.
That consequence 1s Judge-nade law.
AccordlnglV, 1n my Judgnqnt tlre Court nay
val1d.ate thls contract. '' 5
VJhen the case vrent on appeal to the Cour:t of Appeala
that Court d1d not flnd 1t necessary to express any
coneluded vlew of the Chlef Justlce I s oplnlon on
1. The lnterest rate was 5.1/2fr per annum f1at.Thls r4epresented a true lnterest rate of over
LO% and under the Monevlenders Act 1908 theplalntlff, who carrled on the buslness of lendlng
money was requlred to be llcensed. The absenee
of a Moneylenders llcenee rendered the contractlIlegal and vold; Anq{qr4 v. New Plymouth Flnance
c-e,!!q. [1933] N:zffi;Uog ap
aE p.3gg.
Note 1, at p.360.
t1973l 2 N.2.L.R.651.
3.
4.
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thls matters but one conmentator was moved to
suggest:
"ft ls to be hoped that thls dlctum w111be reconsldered by the courts as lt
appears to have been the lntentlon of the
Aet that the powers 1n s.7 would only be
abrldged 1f the lnvalldat1ng provlslon
actually speclfles the consequences oflllega]lty or avoldance 1n the partlcular
CaSe-tt 6 -
Thls vlew was also shared by McMu1l1n J a few months
later 1n Dreadon v. Eletcher DeveLoprnent Co.Ltd.7
In that case s.25(4) of the Land Settlement Promotlon
and Land Acqulsltlon Act 1952 was under consld.eratlon.
That sectlon provlded that certaln transactlons whlch
contravened or d1d not comply wlth the requlrements
of that Act, rtshall be deemed to be unlawful and
shal-l have no effect. " f t was argued that the
effect of the use of these words by the Leglslature
vtas that s.7 of the lllega1 Contraets Act I?TO
dld not apply to valldate transactlons under the
Land Settlement Promotlon and Land Acqulsltlon
Aet 1952. In support of that contentlon the
passage quoted above from the Judgment of Wl1d
C.J. 1n Comblned Taxls Co-operative Soelety Ltd.
v. Slobbe8 was relled upon. But McMullln J was
of the vlew that lf the words tsubJect to the express
provlslons of any other enactmentt ln s.T(1)
5.
6.
Ibld. ,
t19731
Irgzrr ]
Note I.
at p.652.
1 Aust.Bus.L.R. 94, 95.
2 N. Z.L.R. 11.T.
8.
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were glven that constructlon the remedlal effects
of the provlslon would be largely lost 1n that lts
appllcatlon would be conflned to those contracts
whleh are 111egal at comnon law.s Iie later
concluded:
irsectlon 6 provldes that every 1l1ega1
contract shall be rof no effectr and s.7provldes tha'c, notwlthstandlng the expressprovlslons of s.5, the Court nay grant
rellef 1n the case of an llIegal eontract,lnter a11a, by 1ts valldatlon ln whole or
1n part. In my respectful oplnlon, the
words tsubJect to the express provlslons
of any other enactmentr in s.7 of thefllegal Contract [s1c] Aet do no more than
recognlse the rlght of the Leglslature 1n
the enactment of a oartlcular statute totreat the contravenffrA-T-ffi'at s tatute as
belng wlthout remedy so as to preclude the
lnvocatlon of the benevolenee of s.7, but
they do not otherrrlse prevent lts appllcatj-o;r"
unless there 1s a sDeclflc dlrectlon to the
contrary. tt ro
Thus, 1n the flrst two reported cases 1n whlch
the courts were called upon to construe the phrase
rsubJect to the express provlstons of any other
enactmentf qulte dlfferent concluslons were rea.ched.
tsut wh1lst the construction preferred by 1^111d C.J.
1n Slobbets case was conslderably narrower than that
adopted by Melvlullln J, lt was not, perhaps , os narrow
ae the latter suggested. The effect of the Chlef
9. Note 7, at p.19. The remedlal effects of theIllegal Contracts Act L97A wou1d, he consldered,be largely lost because the obJect of the Aet
was the other woy, 1.€., to nelleve the conse*
quences of statutory 1l1egal1ty rather than
conmon law ll1egaI1ty. tsut see lnfra.
10 . Ibld. , at pp . 19.-20 .
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Justleers constructlon dld not slnply conflne the
operatlon of s.7(1) to contraets ll1egal at common
law. fndeed Slobbers case 1tself ralsed statutory
111egal1ty, not cornmon law 1]1egal1ty and s.7(f )
was held to be appllcable. It depends, of course,
on what one means by rstatutoryt and tcommon lawl
1llegal1ty. In Slobbers case the 1llega11ty arose
from a breach of the Moneylender"s Act 1908. And,
although that consequenee was, as tl1ld C.J.
observed., a product of t'Judge nade 1r*;tlr (and d1d
not oecun as the expressed lntentlon of the statute),
1t r.',tas an example of the type of statutory 1Ilega1lty
the Contracts and Commerclal Law Reform Commlttee
spec1f1ca1Iy had 1n nlnd to provlde rellef agalnst.
In lts regort, u the Commlttee placecl contracts
111ega1 at common law and contracts lIlegal by
statute lnto two separate categorles and deall wlth
each ln turn. Under a sectlon headed rContracts
Illegal at Common Lawr 13 lt acknowledged a category
of common law 1I1egal1ty arlslng from contracts to
corunlt 11legal acts, 
- 
whlch lncludes, of course,
acts 11lega1 under statute law. But 1n a separate
sectlon headed rContracts Illegal by Statutefh the
clrcumstances ln whlch statutory lIlegallty can arlse
are ldentlfled, and attract the forlowlng observatlons
11. Note 1, at p.360.
J.2. Report of the Contracts
Reform Conmlttee on theContnacts, 24.10.59.
13. Ib1d., at p.5.
14. Note L2, at p.6.
and Commerclal Law
Law Governlng ll1egal
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rrThe type of lllegality whlch today glves
most eause for concern* @
statutes, regulatlons
and bylaws. The trend in modern tlmes
towards lncreaslng the degree of control
exerclsed by the State and 1ocal government
over the everyday concerns of the communlty
has led to a wlde prollferatlon of posslble
offences and a consequent growth 1n the
number of ways 1n whlch, potentlally,
contracts may be effected Isic] b:y 1l1ega11ty.lteasures to control dlsposltions of land,
safety on the hlghways, the constructlon of
bu11d1n5s, the sale of such eommodltles
as food, tobacco and fertlllzers and theloadlng of ocean-go1ng vessels have all had
the effect of renderlng contracts 1l1ega1.o'rs
fn the examples clted 1n thls passage the l1legal1ty
arlses fron a breach of a statute, regulatlon or
bylaw but 1t ls elear that the Conmlttee speclfi-
ca11y had 1n mlnd cases such as Carey v. Hastle.
Thls vlew is supported by the Comnlttee?s reference
earLler 1n the report, ln a sectlon headed tThe
Need for Reforn']6 to cases such as Grlfflths v.
E1I1sr17 Berrett v. Sm1th,18 Fenton v. Scottyts Car
Sa1es Ltd.le and Dromorne Llnen Co, Ltd. v. Wand.20
These cases were all 1n the Carey v. Hastle mould,
belngthat ls, the contracts were unenforceable as
* My emphasls
15. Ib1d., para.f, p.5.
16. Note 12, at pp.L-4.
17 , [1958] N.2.L.R.840.
18. [1955] ll.2.L.R.460.
19. Irgee] N. z.L. R. 929 ,
20 . t196 3I lr .2.L. R. 614.
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vold or 11Lega1 under the comrnon law because of a
breach of a statute, regulatlon or byla.w.
ft ls submltted that the optnlon expressed by
hl1ld C.J. ln Slobbers case does not necessarlly
result ln the remedlal effects of s.7(1) Uelng
t largely lostr as l4c!vlu111n J suggested ln Dreadonz
But 1n a later cases the Chlef Justlee changed h1s
posltlon on the matter and adopted the vlew of
l4cMu111n J. He felt obllged to do so because of
support for }lcMul11n Jrs vlew expressed by Chl1we11
J 1n R.D, BulI Ltd. v. Broadlands Rentals. a In
that case tire lssue luas rrlhether regulatlon 10 of
the Hlre Purchase and Credlt Sales Stab1l1sat1on
Regulatlons W5fftr,f.r, nendered transactlons entered
lnto 1n vlolat1on of the regulatlons vo1d, was an
express provlslon that vrould exelude the operatlon of
s.7(1) of tlre lllegal Contracts Act 1970. Chllwell
J heId, lnter alla:
ttln Dreadonf s case ltleMullln J held that the
aadtffii--6F-Efre words 'and shall have noeffectt followlng the word runLawfulr ln
s.25(4) of the Land Settlement Promotlon and
Land Acqulsltlon Act l-952 d1d not preclude
the appllcatlon of s.7 to the contraventlon
of that statute. In my respectful oplnlonthat Judgnent 1s clearly rlght, For the
sane reasons whleh persuaded Mcl'lull1n J [fnthe passage quoted supral 1t 1s my Judgmentthat the use of the word rvoldr 1n reg.10
2L, Supra.
22. Supr"a,
23. Cobunn v. ilardlqg. Unreported Judgment,
E[6Efand, Z3:I0l-4.
24. lj.g75l r ig.z,L,R.3o4.
24a.S.R. 1957/L70, reprlnted S .R.L97\/246.
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"does nob preclude the Court from applylng
s,7 of the ll1ega1 Contracts Act 1970
1n the present case. '25
The phrase tshal1 be deemed to be unlawful and shall
have no effectr ln s.25(4) of the Land Settlement
Promotlon and Land Acqulsltlon Act 1952 was also
agaln before the Court 1n Teh v. Fra.zet6 and Spelght
J, wh11st expresslng some reservatlons2T about the
appllcatton of s.7(1) of the I11egal Contraets Act
1970 to transactlons lnvalldated by s.25(4), dealt
wlth the case on the assunptlon that rellef under
the latter Act was avallable. And, 1f a seal of
aoproval was necessary for the approach adopted ln
Preadon, lt was provlcied by Beattle J 1n Henderson
v. Rossr2s a further case lnvolv1nE s.25(4) of the
Land settlernent Promotlon and Land Acqulsltlon Act
1952. There the Judge expressly approved of and
adopted 1'1cl{u111n Jts reasonlng and eoncluslon and
then went on to saY:
tt. 
.. Mr Tompklns urged that the meanlng of
f sub.lect to the express provlslons of any
other enactment I must be regarded agalnst
the whole of s.7. Thus read, lt ls sub-
mltted that the Court may grant reIlef
subJect to an express provlslon to the
contrary agalnst the Srqntlng of-- fellef .It does seem that looked at 1n thl-s hlay,
the parts fall lnto p1ace, and there 1s no
corllslon between s'7(1) and s '25(u) uecause
25. Ibld,, at p.308.
26 . Unreported Judgrrrent , '.^Ihangarel , L7 .I2.7 4.
27. At p.6, dlscussed lnfra.
28. Unreported, Rotorua, February 1976.
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'rthe latter sectlon places no restrictlon on
the grantlng of reIlef. The words fshal1
have no effectt 1n s.25(4) fall short of
11m1t1ng tlie grant of rellef . Tll1s lnter*pretatlon ln my oplnlon flts preclsely
wlthln the comments of Mcl4u111n J 1n
Dreadon?s case when he sald: runlessffierells-a sneclflc dlrectlon to the contraryeI respectfully adopt hls reasonlng and tire
approach of Ch11:v111 [s1c] J 1n Bu1lrs case
wirere he was prepared to grant rffiunless
there was an ex-oress provlslon precludlng
hlrn from dolnq so.ttB
Although the welght of Judlcial oplnlon 1s over-
whelnnlngly ln supoort of the view that a 'vo1d and
of no effeetr cLause 1n a partlcular enactment does
not excl-ude the appllcatlon of the rellef avallable
under s.7(1) of the fllegaI Contracts Act 1970 the
natter ls by no means concluded at thls polnt of
tlne. R.D. tsulI LtC. v. Broadlands Rentals Ltd., Coburn
v. Hardlng and ilenderson v. Ross are eurrently
under appeal to the Court of Appeal. It 1s respect-
ful1y suggested, however, that the oblter oplnlon
exFressed by the Chlef Justlce ln Slobbers ease 1s
preferable bo the approach that has found favour
wlth the maJorlty 1n the Supreme Court. A prlnclpal
weakness 1n the approach suggested by the Chlef
Justlce 1s, of course, that lt ls out of sympathy
wlbh the not lnfrequently exgressed desire of the
courts to be rld of the fonced, and consequently
often unJust, coneluslons that the 1llegallty tloctrine
has produeed. It has admlttedly 1n the past too
often worked lnJustlce, and would have done lf, for
example, 1t vras aopllecl 1n llenderson v. Ross. But
oceaslonally the leglslature has preferred that
29. Ibld. , at p.16.
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result and has spec1flcaIly lnvoked the 1llegal1by
doctrlne and more by lnsertlng rvold and of no
effectf clauses 1n partlcular enactments. Indeedo
thls was expressly recognlsed by the Contracts and
Conmerclal Law Reform Commlttee when 1t saldr otr the
last page of 1ts report:
tfAlthough the provlso to regulatlon 10 of
the Hlre Purchase and Credlt Sales Stab1l-lsatlon Regulattons l-95T probably does less
than Justlce betvreen the partles, 1ts
sninglng effect has the consequence that
these regulatlons are largely observed by
retallers and fltrance cornpanles^desplte
mlnfunal governmentai poIiclng.:t 30
The provlso to whlch the Cornmlttee referred enables
a buyer or hlrer of goods under an agreement rendered
vold by regulatlon 10, to recover all money pald and
the value of any conslderatlon glven by hlm under
the agreement; even where, as often 1s the caserhe
has enJoyed qulte extenslve use of the property
purportedly hlred or purchased, Thls ean' of course,
result 1n conslderable bss and hardshlp to the
vendor or ba11or, whllst at the same tlrne conferrl:-;
a qulte unmerltorlous w1ndfall on the purchaser or
ba1lee.3r In R.D. BulI Ltd. v. Broadlands Rentals
Ltd. Ch11we1l J held that the terms of the provlso
eonstltuted an express provlslon whlch barred the
grantlng of reI1ef under s.7(1) of the l1legal
Contracts Act 1970; but the regulatlon 1tself, 1o
avoldlng the contract, d1d not. 32 Wlth respect thls
30. Note 12, para.lJ.
3I. See e.R. CreClt Servlees Investments Ltd. v.
Evans lrg
32. Note 2\, at p.310.
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results ln a complete dlstortlon of what the legls-
lature lntended by those provlslons. The provlso
was enacted to provlde rellef for a purehaser or
ba1lee agalnst the consequences of voldablllty
enacted 1n ttre regulatlon ltseIf. Thls ls elear
from lts terms. There 1s no express provlslon 1n 1t
preventlng the appilcatlon of s.7(1) of the lllegal
Contracts Act 1974, lt 1s slmply a quaIlf1cat1on on
the voidness of any agreement entered 1.nto to whtci:
1t applles. 0r, to put lt anothen w&Vr lt s1mpl:/
I creates a somewhat drastle remedyt 33 1n the
purchaser or balleers favour, and operates to provlde
rellef agalnst the leglslatlvely expressed eonse-
quence of lllegallty under the regulatlon 1tse1f.
It ls, wlth respect, that expressed consequence that
bars the operatlon of s.7(1) of the Illega1 Conbracts
Act 1970, and not the terms of the provlso. Thls
constructlon 1s ln aecordance wlth the observatlon
of Rlchmond J 1n Grey v. Klngsway Autos Ltdl{ as bo
the tordlnary purposet of a provlso 1n a sectlon.
It 1s, he sald:
",. . to make further orovlslon of some klnd
as regards the same subJect natter as has
already been dealt wlth 1n the earller words
of the sectlon or regulatlon.tr$
The only further provlslon made ln the provlso'to regu-
latlon 10 1s to provlde one form of nellef for the brryer or
33. Per Rlchmond J 1nLtd. v. Evg,ns note Credlb Servlees Investments31, at p.b9b.
34. t19731 2 N. Z.L.R .525.
35. rb1d., at p.633,
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ba1lee under an agreement. There ls nothlng ln the
terms of the provlso to suggest that that 1s the only
rel1ef avalLable to h1m. Nor 1s there anythlng to
suggest, elther expressly or by 1mpl1cat1on' that
the ba11or or vendor ls to be deprlved of any other
form of rellef that rnay be avallable to htm under
any other enactment. For example, to al-low the
seller to reeover compensatlon for the use of a
vehlcle fron the purehaser under s.7(1) of the
I1lega1 Contracts Act 1970 would 1n no way contradlct
elther the sp1r1t or the express words of the provlso, -
under whlch the purchaser 1s permltted to recover any
money pald by hlm under the agreement of sale as a
debt due to h1m by the seller.
One hesltates to suggest that the courts have
arrlved at an absurd result by a process of statutory
lnterpretatlon, but at the very least, the con-
structlon applled to negulatlon l0 of the Hlre
Purchase and Credlt Sales Stablllsatlon Regulatlons
L957 and lts provlso has tended to heap lnJustlce
upon lnJustlce. There 1s, 1n addltlon, howeverr a
further and tndeed more serlous obJectlon to the
refusal of the Supreme Court to glve effect to the
express trvold and of no effeet'r clauses 1n partlcular
enactments. It 1s contalned ln the followlng reserva-
tlon of Spelght J ln leh v. Frazer concernlng the clause
ln s.25(4) of the Land Settlement Promotlon and Land
Acqulsltlon Act L952. He sald:
"I begln to query whether or not the lllega1Contracts Act does apply to eases of thls
sort. I am aware that MeMullan J ln Dreadon
v. Fletcher Devel-opment Co.Ltd. ... has
nel on an
argument relatlng to the use of the words
rand of no effeett. There 1s a questlon
[6 .05 ]
't1n nly rntnd whether or nst the llLegal.
Contraets Aet 1g a general statute and'
s.25 of the Land Settl.enent Act ls a speclalprovlsl,on provldlng parttcular rellef Ln 1ts
sp,eclal eategory of f deemed lllegalltyr 
-
and hence may be ran express provlston ln
another enactment,11
Thl.s, wlth respect, polnts to ah Lrueslst,!.b1e.
concluslon 1n regard to the neLatlonshXp between
'rtvold 4nd of ns effeetr! clauses arld the quatt'1,T1'ng
worde 1n s.?(1) of the trllegal Contracts Aet 1970.
A lange questlon mark presently hangs over the
eonstnuetlon of the words rsubJeet to the expresc
provlslons of antr1 othetr enaetmentt ln 8.7(I) of
the lllegal Contracts Aet L970r 4nd tt ls, unfort-
unately, 1n the eontext of thls uncert'a1ntL 'that
the nelatlonshtp between the Illegal Contracts
Act and the Oamlng Act 1908 must now be consldered.
35. Note 27.
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[6.06] The Appllcatlon of the Act to Gamlnf:: and 
"Jagerlngffi
It has prevlously been demonstrated that the
constructlon applled to the words I subJect to the
provlslons of any other enactmentt 1n s.7(1) of the
I11ega1 Constracts Act 1970 has caused serlous diffl'-
eultles when applled to regulatlon 10 of the Hlre
Purchase and Crecllt Sales Stablllsatlon Regulatlons
1957. Those d1ff1cultles, however, seem almost
trlvlal vrhen that sane constructlon is applled to
the statutory provlslons concernlng garning and
wagerlng contracts and relatecl transactlons. The
result ls absolute chaos
The only ease 1n whlch the relatlonshlp between
the Gamlng Aet l90B and the l11ega1 Contracts Act
1970 has been consldered 1s Harrlson & Others v.
Greymouth Trottlng CLub (Inc.) & Others.r In that
case Casey J made the followlng observatlon concernlng
the app]lcatlon of s.7(1) of ttre l1legal contracts
Act l97O to ganlng and wagerlng contraets:
;tI now turn to the request by the Plalntlffsfor an order valldatlng the contracts uncler
the provlslons of s.7 of the flIegaI ContractsAct 1970 to glve them the rlght to sue for a
share 1n the pool. Thls Act refers only to
'llIegalf transactlons and nay not apply tothose vrhlch have been slmply declared to beInull and voldt by the leglslature. I refer
to the comments of the learned edltor of
Cheshlre & Flfootts Law of Contract (llth
\Iew Zealand Edltlon) at p.286 where he con-
cl-udes that the Act does make and lntend a
Unreported, Supreme Court., Greymouth, 2Bth May
1975-, Dlscussed supra, chapter 4, para.3, and
chapter !, para.3.
1
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:rdlstlnetlon between those eontracts whlch are
111e9a1, and those whlch are merely vold and
unenforceable ancl I am 1ncl1ned to agree wlth
h1s v1ews. But assumlng that the lllega1
Contracts Act d1d apply, I would requlre far
more compelllng reasons than I have been glven
before exerclslng a dlscretlon under s.7 to
valldate transactlons dlscouraged by the GarningAct, havlng regard to s.7(3) and the over-
rlding proviso about pub11c lnterest.'i2
The wrlter cannot, wlth respeete agree wlth the learned
Judge?s observatlon that the transaction 1n question
was tdlseouraged by the Gamlng Actr:, even allowlng for
the fact that 1t mlght be sald that the raccumulator
Jackpotr l-n that case was talnted rvlth l11ega11ty.3
But even leavlng that matter aside, the statement
quoted frorn the Judgment contalns a generallsatlon
whlch 1s, on closer analysls, qulte unsupportable. The
dlstlnctlon between tvoldr and rlllegalf contracts
and the consequence of that disLlnctlon for the appli*
catlon of the lllegal Contracts Act 1970 ltself 1s not
dlssented from. q But what ls reJected 1s the ldea
that that dlstlnctlon necessarlly determlnes the
questlon of the appllcatlon of the ll1egal Contracts
Act 1970 to gamlng and wagerlng contracts. The fj-rst
error ln the statement 1s 1n lumplng garnlng contracts
?. Ibld. , at pp. B-9.
The partlcular Jackpot was run on the basls that
a termlnatlng Jackpot would oecur at a fu-turet1ne. In fact, of the tlme the Jackpot 1n questl.on
was he1d, the requlslte authorlty for the termln-
atlng Jackpot had not been obtalned. See p,2 ofthe Judgment.
But see, supra para.l and footnote 7 where thedlfflculty lnherent ln thls d{ stlnctlon ls recog-
nlsed: and ll975l Recent Law, pp.340-1 where the
appllcatlon of the Act to rvoldr as opposed tor1llegalr contnacts 1s further dlscussed.
3.
4.
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and l{agerlng eontracts together and speaklnq of them
as a s1ngle entlty. The relevance of that error
w111 emerge more elearly beloul ln the discusslon of
the second error (whlch arises ln consequence of the
flrst) ithlch relates speclflcally to the relatlonshlp
between the avoldlng provlslons 1n the Gamlng Act 1908
and the l}1ega1 Contracts Aet 1970.
In ss.69 and 70 of the Gamlng Act 1908 certaln
contracts are declared to be rnull and voldr and this
eoncept 1s followecl 1n those provlslons wlth the
further dec]aratlon that l-n respect to some contl':- :';s
Ino actlon shall be brought or malntalned in any
Court for recovenlng moneyt and etc.. Thls express
prohlbltlon on the brlnglng of actlons 1s also con'
talned 1n s.71. It is elear that the interpretatlon
glven to the words tsubJect to the express provlsions
ln any other enactmentf 1n s.7(1) of the lllegal
Contracts Act I97O would not operate to exclude the
rellef avallable under that provlslon from applylng to
ganlng and i'ragerlng contracts i'lhich are only declareci to
be fnull and voldr . s But what of the prohlbltlon
contained ln the phrase t no actl-on slrall be brought
or malntalned 1n any Coui'i for recoverlng moneyt anq
etc.? And, does 1t make any dlff'erence where that
prohlbltlon accompanles a declaratlon that bhe contract
1n questlon 1s tnull ancl voidr?
v. l{lckmanoIn Varney
avoldlng words and those
the relatlonshlp between the
prohlbltlng the brlngl-ng of
5.
6.
Dlscussed supra, para. 5.
(1847;, 5 c.B.27r; and see
2 Ex.22 .
l4oon v. Durden (1848)
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actlons 1n the Engllsh equlvalent of s.59 of the
Gamlng Act I90B (s.18." Gaming Act, 1845) were 1n
lssue, and Utaule J held:
tThe flrst branch of the sectlon declares the
contracb to be nulI and vold; the second
preve'nts the wlnner from brlnglng an actlon
to recover the antount of the bet from theloser It is certainly true that the secono
branch 1s lnvolved 1n the flrst; that 1s to
s&V , that, lf the sectlon had stopped at the
end of the first branch, i-t would have foIlow"
ed that no actlon could be brought to enforce
a contraet so declared to be vold. But I
apprehend there ls nothlng unusual 1n an Act
of Parllament statlng a legaI consequence in
that way. " 7
Thls vlew of the relatlonshlp between the two parts of
the sectlon found favour wlth the Court of Appeal 1n
D1ggle v. H1ggs.8 T'here Lord Calrns L.C. suggested
that thls constructlon made 'one member of the section
1n unlson wlth the otherr,e whl1st Bramwell L.J.
concluded that the words rno sult shall be brought for
recoverlng money won upon a wagert were unnecessary
and could have been left out of the statute. l0 The
consequenee of thls lnterpretatlon was 
' 
of eourse, to
render the second Ilmb of the sectlon taubologous.
Howeverr lo H111 v. i{1111am HlIt (Park Lane) Ltd.lr
the House of Lords took a dlfferent vlevr and held that 
"
7. Ib1d., at p.280.
8. (1877) 2 Ex. D,422; but Cockburn c.J. expressed
reservatlons about 1ts correctness (at p.4ZB).
See also Hyams- v. Stuart Klns [1908] 2 K.8.695.
9. Ibld. , at p ,428.
10. Note B, at p.429.
11. Irg4g] A.c.530.
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wh11st the second 11nrb of the sectl-on ls superfluous
1n relatlon to agreements rendered null and vold by
the flrst, the vrords of the second llmb:
'... are qulte general and when read lnthelr ordlnary meaning they extend to any
actlon to recover money alleged to be won
on a wager."12
Consequently, whilst the appllcatlon of the flrst
11mb of the sectlon ls conflned to renderlng the
wagerlng and, gamlng contract 1tse1f unenforceable,
the second I1mb operates to render unenforceable
subsequent agreements lnvolvlng dlfferent conslder-
atlons but whlcl: are, 1n substance, agreements to
recover money alleged to be won on a wager.
But whllst the llouse of Lords reJected Maule Jis
vlew that the second l1mb of the sectlon sald notiring
more than had already been provlded for ln the first
l1mb, 1t d1d. not dlssent from the slmple proposltlon
that, dt leasb In some cases, the words Ino aetlon
shall be brought or malntalned 1n a Courtr ldentlfled
a consequence of the declaration ln the flrst llmb
that rendered a contract tnull- and voldr.
Lord Greene sald:
For exampl€,
rrUnder the flrst branch the agreement ls a
null1ty before the race 1s run. The second
branch assumes the race to have been run and
the bet to have been 1ost. [tt ] It ls truethat the language of the second branch would
L2. Per Lord Greene, 1b1d.,
13. And a new and subsequent
to secure payment to the
owlng by the loser.
at p.552,
agreement entered lnto
wlnner of the amount
Io.oot
;rprohlblt the brlnglng of an actlon upon a
wager whlch had been won. To that extent I
agrue tha,t 1b covers ground al.ready adequately
c6'vered Uy the flrst 6ranch. " rf
Slnllar observatlons are to be found 1n the Judgments
of Vlscount Slmonrs and Lord. MacDermott.16 However,
for the maJorlty of the Law Lords the words prohlbit-
1ng the brlnglng of actlons were, ln that context,
rnerely statlng the procedural consequences of the
voldness 1n a contract the courts ald was sought to
enforce. But the prohlbltlon agalnst the actlon
and the consequence of voldness of the contract did
not necessarlly mean the same thlng. For, as Lord
t4acDermott sald:
". .. the expresslon tno sult shall be broughtor malntatnbor eonfronts the would-be sultor
wlth a hlgher obstacle than that whlch has
to be rnet by one whose clailn ls defectlve
only 1n that 1t 1s based on a transactlon
of no legal effect . " r?
The rhlgher obstacler ln the former case 1s pnesented
by-the 1egls1atlvely expressed prohlbltlon of the
aetlon, whlch may be contrasted wlth the consequences
of declarlng an lntended bargaln a nulllty 1n the
latter. The prohlbltlon of the actlon w111 apply
whether or not the contract 1s vold, but 1n the
absence of such a prohlbltlon the voldness of the
agreement ls fundamental to lts unenfonceablllty.
f4. Note L2.
15. Note 11,
16. Note 11,
17. Ib1d.
p.549 and P.55L,
p.577 
.
at
at
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T{rls dlstlnctlon 1s clearly lllustrated by the ear'ly
declslons on the Engllsh statute of Frauds,18 s.4
of that statute provided, lnter aI1a, that fno
actlon shall be broughtt upon certaln contraets'
In Carrlngton v. Rootsre Lord Ablnger held that the
effect of these words was to render a contract to
whlch they applled raltogether voldr'20 However 1n
Leroux v. Brown2l thls rlgorous lnterpretatlon was
abandoned and the words 1n questlon were conflned
to slmply lmposlng a proeedural l1m1tatlon on the
enforcement of the contract. Consequently' only
the enforceablllty and not the valldlty of the
contract was affected.2 AIso, although the
language of the sectlon 1n the Statute of Frauds
appears to lrnpose an express prohlbltlon on the
brlnglng of actlons thls 1s not sor as the procedural
barrlertoenforcementexlstsonlyforthedefend-
antts beneflt and he may walve 1t 1f he wlshes.23
In thls latber respect a dlfferenee exlsts between
18. ?9 Car.2, c.3 (1567).
19. (18371, 2 M. & W. 248.
?0. fb1d. , at P .255.
2L. (1852), L2 C.8.801.
22. See also Maddlson v. Alderson (1883)
E-lpp. c.tLrd:' t1945 I Ii .BT9-3;-
23,;" of Clvll Procedure, R.142; ^dlscussedln Cheshlre and Flfootrs Law of Contract'(4tn N.z. ed.), F.175.
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the constructlon applled to the Statute of Frauds and
that apptled to the avoldlng and unenforceablllty
provlslons of the gamlng Acts. In the case of the
latter the Courts have repeatedly held that the
barrler to enforcement exlsts whether or not the
defendant pleads 1t.2+ In thls sense the gamlng
Acts lmpose a thlgher obstacle t to enforcement than
the Statute of Frauds. Whether or not thls follows
as a consequence of the voldness of those contnacts
or from the express declaratlon of the leglslature
that Ino actlon shall be broughtr or tndeed
a comblnatlon of both - 1s not clear. The
nesolutlon of thls questlon 1s, however, cruclal'
For upon lt rests the resolutlon of the further
and all lmportant questlon as to whether the
garnlng Act provlslons ralse a thlgher obstacler
to the enforcement of the eontracts to whlch
they apply, than the eoncept of voldness ltself;
that 1s, a rhlgher obstaclet to enforcement
than that whlch the Supreme Court has presently
held to be lnsufflelent to exclude rellef under
s.7(1) of the lllegal Contracts Act 1970.2s The
answer to all thls rests largely on the nature and
extent of the relatlonshlp between the flrst and
second l1mbs of s.69 of the Gamlng Act f908 (s.18
of the Gamlng Act, 1845 (U.K.)) after H111 v'
WtLllam H111 (Park Lane) i,tA.
2\. Kershaw v. Slever (rgott) zr T.L.R.40; Luckett
v;TooA ( 1908f-2q T.L.R. 517 ;I,Iorl6-ii (1915) 34 N.2.L.R.745 : Economou v.Patterson
V.
ffiona1d .& Others , unreported Judstttent of@13.8.73.
25. For the reasons explalned ln para-5.
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I,lhen Ii1Il v. 111111am H111 (Park Lane) Ltd. ancl the
eases precedlng lt were declded lt was unnecessary to
dlstlngulsh and exclude from the operatlon of the
second l1nb of the ijngllsh egulvalent of s.69 of the
Gamlng Aet 1908 those transactlons whlch were rendered
nu1l and vold by the flrst. Consequently there 1s a
certaln looseness 1n the language of the Judgments
of those cases whlch is open to the lnterpretatlon
that the words exDressly prohlbltin6 the brlnglng of
actlons 1n the seetlon m4vr (albeit unnecessarlly)
apply to all contracts avolded by the fnull and voldr
clause. That is 1n addltlon to applylng to contracts
whlch are not thenselves gamlng and wagerlng contracts.
In Dlggle v. SigE1'3l.,ord Calrns L.C. sald.:
i'The sectlon [s.18 of the Gamlng Act, fE45(U.K.)l amounts to thls: all- contracts by
way of gamlng and wagerlng; are nu1l and votd;
and then, dealing wlth those contracts, 1t saysthat no aeti-on sha1l be brought wlth respectto them: that ls to s&V: all gamlng contracts
are vo1d, and the wlnner of the game or wafer
shall not malntaln a 
_suj-b agalnst hls antagonlstor the stakeholder. " -'
That statement ivas obiter, as was also the statement
quoted above from the Juclgrnent of Maule J in Varney v.
I{1clcman. 3ub 1t dld recel_ve approval from Vlscount
Jowltt L.C. tuand Lord Radc1iff" tt1., H111 v. 'rlil11am
H111 (Park Lane) Lta. 3r And aLthorruill*" noilr
26, Note 8.
27 , Ibld . , at pp .427.-8 ,
28. Note 11, at p.544.
29, ltrote 11, at p.580 .
30. Vlseount Jowltt L.C.Lord Oaksey dellveredand Loi"d Radcliffe wlthdlssentlng Judgments.
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Lords dlssented from thls vlew and held that the
second I1mb of s.69 eontalned language that extended
1ts operatlon beyond the contracts referred to 1n the
flrst Ilmb, 1t has not yet been declded whether the
language of the second l1mb embraces all contracts
falllng vrlthln the flrst l1mb. And, the questlon
st1ll renalns unanswered as to whether 1n adoptlng
the words rand no actlon shall be brought or malntalned
1n any Court t the leglslature lntended to place a
thlgher obstaclet (to use Lord MacDermottrs language)
agalnst the enforcement ltself of an agreement caught
by the second I1mb than that accorded contracts merel:r'
declared to be nu1l and vold.
It ls the wrlter?s contentlon that followlng the
deelslon 1n H111 v. \,l1I1iam H111 (Park Lane) Ltd.,
ln whlch the seeond l1mb of ttre sectlon was aceorded
a meanlng of lts own, 1t l-s no longer posslble to
ar€{ue that all contracts caught by the rnu1l and voldt
clause are also, a1be1t unnecessarlly (at least prlor
to the ll1egal Contracts Act 1970), unenforceable as
belng eontracts rarhlch the leglslature has dlrectly
prohlblted actlons upon. OnIy those whlch are
expressly wlthln the language of that prohlbltlon are
1n that pos1t1on,: and, 1r thls regard, lt 1s clear
that the language of the second l1mb of the sectlon
does not apply to garnlng eontracts per se. But does
thls have any slgnlfleance? The answer to that
questlon depends upon the nature of the obstacle
presented to an lntended lltlgant by the words Ino
actlon shal1 be brought or malntalned 1n any Court t
etc.. That 1s, 1t depends uDon whether or not those
$rords constltute an exDress provlslon whlch would
exclude the ava11ab1I1ty of re11ef under the l1lega1
Contracts Act 1970. It ls contended 1t does not.
Prlor to H111 v. !t1111am H1II (Park Lane) Ltd.
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tire construetlon nonlleri, to s.1;i tenderl to ren'ler tnr:
seconcl llnb of tlre sectlon su;rerfluous unless sone
ad<lecl obstacle to enforcensllt Der se could be foun-l
ln 1ts terns. T:re eourts preferrerl t:re construetlotr
',rhlcr rantlerecl ti:e seconcl Llnh teutologous!. AnC ln
the liouse of tor'Js declslon ltself tl:e 'nrort,ls of tlre
second llnb are not lnternretec]. as 1:lrroslnc any
thl.rlter obstaclet to enforcenent tlran tlte flrst lltnb
beyonrl encon.oassln,' a 'slrler rnn.e of contracts.
Inc'leeC the declslon 1tse1f " and the 1an'1uage throu-'ir -
out the maJorlt:.' .Jurl:'nents sulrDortr gire pronosltlon
that tne Le.nlslature lntendor{., bl tire laniua-re of
the seconcl l1rib" to an?ly the sane '{eqree of unenforcc'.-
abll1ty as t'ret lmposei, b-/ the f1rst.3l '"'i11s enerles
clear"ltr fron the fol1o,,:1n. observatlon of Lorc]- .:ornlanC.
vlhen he safui:
ftThe l)ur"ose of thLo, ra.rt of s.1.1 [tha seconc]llrnb] 1s not to strll;e a seeond and an unnec'
essary blor at contracts anlt ai'reenents
alread.y strlclcen rrltn iru11lt/ [fr',7 ttre flrst11nb]. but to strll':e at any sult for recovel?-.
1ng rnoney or valuir.cles llon b'r ','rarerln;. The
Ian1:uare 1s ani:rorrlate for t'rat purDoge ancl.1t 1s a puri)ose rrirletr 1s a lo.r'1cal se.1uel a-nc
relnforcenent of the flrst branclr of the
sectlon. The le-lsLature cannot llave been
unmln4ful that a. .nrovlslon ma.l.ilnr garclnl an.l
vra4erlnr" contra.cts and ac"neernents nu11 and vo1c1
nl;ht be ren,lered nurator7 bz adaltlonalprovntses or eovenents 
'-lven or enterecl lntofor securlt''r or ln satlsfactlon of money lost
by 1amlnr and ',,ra1erlnf . The preanble to theAct of f345 shots that sucir su,colenrentarypronlses and eovenants '{ere fardllar toParllarnent . 's
3f.::otes
3?. l.lote
anrl 16.
.5F,5.
14
11,
1q
atD
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Thts observatlon ls conslstent wlth what was sald by
Lush J ln Halgh v. Town Councll of Sheffleld$
concernlng the poltcy behlnd the Engllsh enactment.
rt was, that leanned Judge explalned, to treat bettlng
and wagerlng as a thlng of neutral character, not to
be encouraged, but on the other hand, not to be
absolutely forbldden, and:
'r1t left an ordlnary bet a mere debt ofhonour, depnlvlng 1t of all,.legal obllgatlon,but not maklng 1t lIlegaI."-
In s.70 of the Gamlng Aet 1908 the prohlbltlon
agalnst the brlnglng of actlons ls expressly applled
to eontracts rendened Inull and voldr also. But that
provlslon was enacted ln 1894 when the constructlon
applled to s.18 of the Engllsh Act was to s1ml1ar effect.
It 1s suggested therefore that 1n relatlon to both
ss.?o and 7l of the Gamlng Act 1908 the same construc-
tlon ls to be applled to words g1v1ng rlse to unenfoPC€-
ablltty, os are applled to those to the same effect ln
s.69. Consequently, the express prohlbltton agalnst
brlnglng or malntalnlng actlons expressed 1n
ss.59, 70 and ?1 of the Gamlng Act 1908 do no
more than render the agreements to whleh each refers
unenforceable and do not constltute an expressed
lntentlon by the legtslature to exclude the rellef
avallable under s.7(1) of the lllegal Contracts Act
19?0. Or, to use the language of Beattle J ln
Henderson v. Rosss there ls rno express provlslon
33. (1875), L.R.l0-Q.8. 102; dlscussed supra'
ehapt.2, para.6.
34. Ibld., at p.I09.
35. Quoted supra, Para.5.
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agalnst the gnantlng of rellefr 1n these provlslons
of the Gamlng Act 190E.
In l{arrlson & Others v. Greymouth Trottlng Club(Inc.) & Others$ casey J referred to gamlng and
wagerlng contracts as belng transaetlons that had
been tslmply declareci to be nuIl and voldt3T as
opposed to belng f11Iesa1?. It has prevlously been
conceded.* that 1f that was the case the lllegat
Contracts Act I97C vrould not apply to 6lanlng and
wagerlng contracbs. I{owever, although ss.69 and T0
of the Gamlng Act 1908 do no more than declare the
eontracts referred to ln those provlslons nuIl and
vold and unenforceable., the effect of a number of
other enactments 1s to render most gamlng contracts
and many bettlng contracts 1llega1. For example s.9
of the Gamlng Act 1908 declares certaln Chlnese games
to be games of ehance and by s.1C games of chance are
declared to be unlawful games. Provlslons outlawlng
common gamlng houses are to slmlIar effect and there
are many provlslons 1n the Act whleh talnt certaln
bettlng contracts wlth l1IegaI1ty. For example s.26
creates offences relatlng to bettlng on sports grounds,
s,2T punlshes certaln bets made ln factorles; the
Ganlng Amendment Act 1910, s.2, creabes the offence
of street betttng; and the Amendment Act of 1920
makes 1t an offence to bet wlth a bookmaker. Ttrese
represent only a sample of the many provlslons 1n the
Act ltseIf whlch talnt gamlng and wagerlng contracts
wlth l1Iegal1ty. But there are other compllcatlons.
36.
37.
38.
Note
Note
1.
2.
Supra.
16 . tb't
The framers of the Engllsh Gamtng Act, 1845 were
careful to repeal the Aet of 33 I{en.VIII , c.9 (}541)
whlch had the effect of declarlng most games, even of
sk1II unlarcful, whereas the framers of the itlew Zealand
Aet dld not. 3J It 1s arguable rhat that Aet ls st11I
1n force 1n New Zealand. i0 'lrlorse still , Ehe provlslons
of the Acts of Anne (r7ro) uand Charles II (1554)q2 are
clearly 1n force 1n l'lew Zealandqi' and, if the vlews
expressed ln Applegarth v. Colley,tuggl.t* t.
Hutchlnson*s and Th-orpe v. 
-gotenanuu are corcect, then
contracts avolded by those enactnents are lllegal
as well as vold.kT Consequently, games for 810 or
more tat any tlme or sittlngr or bets on rthe sldes
or hands of sueh as do play t fs are ll1ega1, and rellef
under s.7(1) of the I1lega1 Contracts Act I9T0 may be
ava1lab1e to partles to such contracts (unless the
publlc lnterest other"r,rlse requlres ) . But games or
bets on games for less than that amount are not
ll1ega1 and. therefore do not satlsfy the baslc requtre-
ment for the appllcatlon of the lllegal Contraets Acb
39. Dlscussed supra, chapteF 1, para.3.
40. lf the tests ldentlfled 1n chapter 3 a.re
satis f1ed.
41.. 9 Anne, c.14.
\2. 16 car.rI, c.7.
43. Dlscussed chapter 3, and chapter 5, para.5.
41 . ( 1842 ) , 10 t4. & r,,t. 723 .
Ir5. (1942), 10 M. & W. 85.
45. (r8l51, 1 c.B. 990.
\7. Dlscussed supra, chapter 1, para.4.
qB. s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710).
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1970. That result 1s, of course, a eomplete dlstor-
tion ^- and even reversal - of what the leglslature
lntended when enactlng the Acts of 1664 and 1710.
But there are further compllcatlons, and perhaps a
savlng provlslon. S.2 of the Act of Anne (1710)
only anplles where the }oss on the game of $10 or
more 1s pald or dellvered to the wlnner' The
provlslon then goes on to provld.e that the loser ma:r:
'rsue for ardrecover the money or goods solost, and pald or dellvered, or any part
thereof, from the wlnner wlth costs
of sult, by action of debt founded on thls
act...;
The slrnllarity between the language 1n thls provlslon
and that contalned ln the provlso to regulatlon 10
of the Hlre Purchase and credlt sales stabll1sat10n
Regulatlons 1957 1s unmlstakable and 1t ls dlfflcult
to avold the concluslon that the reasonlng 1n R'D' BuIl
Ltd. V. Broadlands Rentals Ltg.rtg tloUld apply ln such a
case to exclude the courts t poruer to lnvoke the bene-
volence of s.7(1) of the lllegal Contracts Act 1970
1n elther partyts favour. The consequence of thls ls
absolute chaos ' Ganes for amounts 1n excess of g'100
for wh1ch, for examPl€, a promlssory note or credlt ls
glven by the Loser to the wlnner' are 1l1ega1 under
the Act of charles II (1664).u0 But s.2 of the Act of
Anne (f7fO) does not apply because the noney lost 1s
not pald down at the tlme. The wlnner could there-
fore sue on the gamlng contract to recover hls wlnnlngs
\9. Dlscussed suPra' Para.5.
50 . Beeause bY s.I
note 1s deerned
conslderatlon.
of the Gamlng Act, 1835to have been glven for
See supra, chaPter 1.
(U.K. ) the
an llleEa1
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under s.7(1) of the Illegal Contracts Aet 1970' But
1f the money ls pald down at the tlme he ls llabIe to
the loser for the amount pald, plus treble the value
thereof and cannot seek relief under the Il1egal
Contracts Act. 5l The only savlngagalnst thls absurd
result 1s the provlslon 1n s.7(3)(c) of the Illegal
Contracts Aet 1970 whlch excludes rellef where to
grant lt rwould not be 1n the pub11c lnterestr '
Aga1n, 1f the loser glves a cheque for the amount
lost 1n the above example and subsequently pays any
part of the money secured to any asstgnee or lndorsee 
'
under s.2 of the Garnlng Act, IB35 (U.K.) he may re'-
cover that amount as ra debt due and owlngt frorn the
payee. Consequently the reasonlng ln R'D'BuIl Ltd'
v. Broadlands Rentals Ltd. would ptobably operate to
prevent the appllcatlon of s.7(1) of the Illegal
Contracts Act 1970, To add to, but by no means
complete, the dlfflcul-ttes lnvolved ln abtemptlng to
apply the lllegal Contracts Act 1970 to thls myrlad
of provlslons concerned wlth gamlng and wagerlng are
the quallflcatlons on the appllcatlon of the Acts of
1664 and 1710. They only apply to games and wagers
on games, and 1n addltlon operate only where the
amounts ln questlon are lost at any one tlrne or
s1tt1ng.
A basls for dlstlngulshlng betv,reen bhe provlslons
of the provlso to s.10 of the Hlre Purchase and Credlt
sales stab1llsatlon Regulatlons L957 ancl s.2 of the
Gamlng Aet, 1835 (U.K. ) may be found 1n the fact that
5I. S.2. of the Act of Anne (1710)
[5,06 ]
whereas the former establlshes the debt ln favour of,
for example, the purchaser under an agreement at the
tlme lt 1s entered lnto, s.2 of the latter Act requlres
somethlng further to be done and the debt arlses from
nelther the gamlng eontract nor" the securlty' It
arlses ln favour of the drawer of the securlty only
aften he has nade a payment ln disci:arge of the
obllgatlons he has lncurred by lt. Thls can glve
rlse to a strange result 1f the reasonlng ln R.D.Bu]1
Ltd. v. BroadlandlRentals Ltd. 1s applled to s'2'
For example where the drawer of a eheque does not
pay money to a subsequent holder 1n satlsfactlon of
a securlty glven to the wlnner of a game (w1th1n the
Acts of 1664 and 1?10) ft ts arguable that s'2 would
not operate to preclude the wlnner from sulng on the
secunlty beeause, of the tlme the actlon 1s brought
the loser has not made a payment such as would enable
s.2 of the Act of 1835 to apply. He could, of
course, make such a payment after the proceedlngs
are conmenced but before they are concluded, ln whlch
event he would then have a good eause of actlon
agalnst the wtnner under that sectlon to recover the
amount pa1d. That result may compel a dlstlnctlon
to be drawn between these two provlslons. ThlS Same
dlstlnctlon cannot, however, be drawn between the
terms of the provlso to regulatlon 10 of the Hlre
Purchase and Credlt Sales Stab1l1sat1on Regulatloris
lrg57 and s.38 of the Gamlng Act 1906'o The terms
of thls provlslon are on all foUrs Wlth the former
and would therefore exclude the appllcatlon of rel1ef
under the Iltegal Contracts Act ].97O from the bettlnfl
transactlons to whlch 1t refers. Perhaps lron1eal1y,
52. Dlscussed supna, chapter 5, para.4.
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the partners 1n a bettlng agency whlch offends
agalnst s.3? of the Gamlng Act 1908 are not excluded
from seeklng re11ef from the consequences of 111ega}-'
ltyunderthelllegalContractsActlgT0lnrespect
to obllgatlons arlslng between the partners ' but
reLlef ls excluded as between the partnershlp and
1ts c11ents. The ob.1ect of ss'37 and 38 would
cLearlv have been to deny rel1ef 1n bcth clrcumstances'
Vtrorsestl]l,lftheagencylsnotoperatlngcontrary
to s.37 of the Act, re11ef under s'7(1) of the
IllegalContractsAct}9701sava1lableasbetween
the agency and a cIlent because the terms of s ' 70
of the Gamlng Act 1908 do not expressly exclude lt.
[6.07 ] Concluslo4
TheappllcatlonoftheIllegalContractsAct19T0
to transactlons wlthln the scope of the gamlng laws
remalns eomplleated and uncertaln' It would lndeed
have been better 1f the opportunlty for the appllc-
atlonofthatstatutetosuehlawshadneverbeen
presented ln the flrst place' It ls to be hoped that
someofthesedlfflcultleswlllberesolvedrvhenthe
trllogyofcasesreferredtoearllerreachtheCourt
ofAppeal.Inthemeantlme,ltwouldbefutlletodo
more than ldentlfy the problems assoclated wlth the
appllcatlonofthelllegalContractsActL9Totothe
gamlng and. wagerlng leglslatlon. The problem ls' of
course, one of statutory lnterpretatlon' But ln each
case all the statutes must be carefully consldered anci
broad generallsatlons such as that contalned 1n Casey
Jts JudgTnent tn Harylson & Others v. Greymouth Trottlry
Club(Inc)&Olherstarerwtthrespect,qulteunhelpful'
1. SuDra.
t7.0rl
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C}IAPTIR 7
REFOtrT
Introductlon
The hlstory of the Engllsh experlence demonstrates
that lrhllst gamlnr: and wagerlng each do have some
soc1al and recreatlonal vaIue, they are also procuct-
1ve of rnuch rnlschlef 1f a110wed to be carrled to
excess. Indeed, 1f hlstory provlcles any guldance
aS to future neecls enactntents on ramlng and wagerlrrg
w111 be wlth us for rnany centunles to eome ' The
exlstenee of an lnfatuatlon wlth speculatlon 1n the
characters of many coupled wlth the lnabj.I1ty of
some to reslst the ternptatlon to exploit lt, wll1
contlnue to provlde the necessarv Justlflcatlon for
these laws, The law of garnlne anC wagerlng contracts
ls a snall, but lmportant part of thls bociy of Iaw.
And, 1t exlsts for a purpose whlch requlres that 1t
can be readlly seen as an lntegrated part of the
whole. That purpose and the extent to ruhlch thls
lntegratlon has been achleved have been dlscussed
1n the precedlng chaoters. centaln weal<nesses t
partlcularly ln the llew Zealand Iegts1atlon, whlch
polnt to a need for 1e51s1at1ve clar1flcatlon and
amendment have been revealed. In t[1s chapter those
weaknesses w111 be brlefLv aLluded to agaln 1n the
context of a summary of proposals for reform'
I.Iggerlng Contracts and Securltles
[7. oz ]
t7 .02) Tire Unenforceablllty Doctrlqe '- Ggnln and
Prlor to the enactment of s.IB of the Gamln6i Act,
16q5 (U.K.) the laws affectlnsi the enforceablllty
of sanrlng ancl wagerlng contracts, and securltles
glven for gamlng, lacked a conslstent ool1cy basls'
There 1s a strong element of paternallsm behlnd the
Acts of charles II (1664) and Anne (r7ro) and thls
ls couplecl wlth a concern for publlc morals' Ti:e
eourts 
" 
on the other hand, often based thelr reluct-
allce to enforce wagerlng contracts on conslderatlons
of Jurilelal convenlence and, 1n some cases, slmple
moral outrage. S.18 of the Gamlng Act 1845
lntroCuced coherence as well as ratlonallty lnto
thls area of the lars by adoptlng a concept of un-'
enforceablllty that was able to aecommod,ate each of
these concerns, wlthout necessarlly belng ldentlfled
or Justlfled by any one of then' A strong element
of paternallsm remalned, however, wlth ttre retentlon
1n Encland of the Gamlng Act, 1835' But that
element too, was slgntflcantly re<luced, by flre
repeal of s.2 of the latter Act ln 1922'
The case for the retentlon of the operatlon of an
unenforceabllltv doctrlne 1n thls area of the law has '
lt ls submltted, been clearly made out by the hlstor:'r
of samlng and wagerlng canvassed earller 1n thls worlt.
But to avolcl lnconslstency and achleve clarlty ln the
lavr 1t should be applled for lts own sake and lts
appllcatlon should, 1n add1t1on, be conftned to
transactlons arlslng frorn gamlng and nagerlng' Thls
second contentlon vrlll be exannlned later ln para'
graphs three and four" bhe flrst calls for further
analysls here.
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The provlslons of the Acts of 1664, 1710 and
1835 were deslgned to dlscourage excesslve ganlng bv
placlnStireiulnnerinaposltlonoftotallnsecurlty
ln relatlon to noney won or securltles obtalned 1n
consequence of such actlvlty. But, havlng regard
to the extent cf the ganbllnr'-.' anc. bettlng that occurr'-
edlnEnglandafterthoseActscanelntoforcethe
onlyconeluslonopenlsthattheyfalledtoachleve
thelr declared obJectlves. The po11cy behlnd s'18
oftheEngllshActofls45dlfferedrnarkedlyfrom
that behlnd the Acts lrhlch prececled lt ' For whllst
the coneept of unenforceabllltv was adrnlttedly lnvoked
by the leglslature 1n the Acts of 1664 and 1710'the
latter Act had concentrated on provldinq rel1ef by
penal actlons, ancl aetlons by the loser agalnst the
wlnner to recover hls losses rather than on the
prlnclp1e of unenforceablllty per se ' And thls vlas
contlnued even 1n the 1835 Act ln s.2, the prlnclpal
obJect of wh1ch, lt has been suggestedrl was to maln-'
taln conslstency wlth s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710).
The Act of 1845, hovlever, was eoncerned only to remove
the elernent of legal obllgatlon from gamlnq and
rvagerlng contra.ets. That 1s , the lntentlon behlnd
that Act was to contlnue the earller po11cy of d1s -
couraglng gamlng and wagerlng by lnvoklng the doctrlne
of unenforceablllty a]one. But lt 1s probably true'
as the Judgrnent of liaule J 1n Varney v' glgl<mirn,t
suggests, that when enactlng s.18 of bhe 1845 Act the
leqlslature sal'I the lnplementatlon of the prlnclpIe
of unenforceablllty prlnelpatly, and probably solely'
1. Supra, chaPt.5,
Dlseussecl suPrat
para.5.
chapt .6 , para.6 -2
fn 4\')-lL | . Ji' i
1n terms of the voldab111ty of the gamlng and
wagerlng contract 1tself.
The tendency that thls constructlon had to l1m1t
the scope of the unenforceablllty concept 1s demon-
strateC by the case of Hyams v. Stuart Klnfrl Tfrere
a bookmaker luho t"ras lndebted to another bool<maicer
as a consequence of certaln bettlng transactlons ltas
unable to pay h1s debts. But he subsequently agreed
to pay them 1n conslderatlon that the other silould
refraln from lnJurlne hls buslness by deelarlng hlrn
a defaultor. Although thls subsequent agreennent
was, 1n substanee, merely a repetltlon of the ob116-
atlon arlslng from the rvagerlng contnact, tile court
of Apceal held that 1t was not a wagerobut was a nell
eontract deslgned to avold the consequences of tire
vold contraet I and , as such , lvas enforceab Ie 'f But
ln the later case of 1111 v. i,trl$1am H11] (Park Lane)
Ltdrt the unenforceablllty doctrlne emerged as a much
rlcher concept ln the eontext of s.l$ of the 1B4l Act.
There on rnaterlally slmllar facts tire contract was
held unenforceable. The House of Lords held that the
language of the flrst braneh of the sectlon was
entlrely dlfferent to the second braneh whlch was
concerned. to prevent recovery not only of money won
on a wager but also, the recovery of money ''alIeged
to be won on a wa65er". And 1n deternlnlng whether
3.
4.
IlgoB] 2 K.8.696.
But see the strong dlssent of Fletcher l4oultonL.J. (p.?11 et seq.) a vlew vrhlch subsequentlyprevalled ln the ilouse of Lords 1n H111 v.fiiririm H:.rL ( Farrr rane ) lta. t 1949JT-J - 5 30 .
Ibld.. dlscussed supra, chapt.6. para.6.5.
f d | ^-L I . v. J
there 1s nerely additlonal promlses to pay money ovrlng
underagamlngorwagerlngcontracbthecourtwlll
Iook to the 'reallty of the transactlon and come to a
flndlng as to what the true lntentlon [Uenlnd the
agreement] was''.6 In that regard, 1t 1s relevant to
enqulre whether, 1f the pronlse tras fu1f1lled' "the
debt of honour ls to be regarded as dlsehargedt ,: a
questlon, the resolutlon of wiilch r^I111 depend on
clreumstances as varlable as the faets of each
partlcular ease.7
The i{ouse of Lords 1n ii11l v. t,.Jt111am H111 (Park
Lqlgl- Ltq. took the doctrlne of unenforceablllty ln
the context of the gamlng Acts to 1ts extreme limits:8
an<l apolled lt for 1ts oi\tn sake, as dlstlnct from
applylns tt as a eonsequence of a flndlng on the
nlcetles of the law of gamlng and wagerlng eontracts.
Thls was a slgnlflcant change of ernphasls, and althouqn
the groundwork for lt rras la1d foyty years earlier ln
the powerful dlssentlng Judgment of Fleteher [{ou]'ton
L.J. 1n Hy?ms v. Stuart K1nF, lrt vlet^l of the approaen
of the nraJorlty 1n }lyarns v. 9_tuar!._lttng and the pre'
cedlng cases, lt 1s perhaps not going too far to
sugEest that wlth thls change ln ernphasls emerged a
new pol1cy base to the law of gamlng and wagerlng
h
a
Per Lord MacDermott, note 4 , at p .574.
rb1d.
But, as Lorrl Greene observed, a't P,559, even the
appileatlon of the very broad test proposed 1ntirbt case ivould not ensure that every such
agrreement woulc1 be unenforceable. Obvlous
evaslons would " bub see Cheshlre and FlfootsLaw of Contract ( 4tn i{. Z " ed. 1975 ) , at p.273-U
where the problens lnherent 1n applylng thetest are dlscussed.
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contracts ltself. It has been susge$ted that the
fallure of the draftsm.an of the f845 Act to repeal
s.2 of the Act of 1835 wltn s.2 of the Act of Anne
( 17]0 ) created lnconslstency bet:t'een s ' 2 of the Act
of 1335 and s.13 of the Gamlng Act, 1845' But that
lnconslstency exlstecl because tne concept of unenforce -
ablIlty, as unclerstooo prlor to the c1ec1slon 1n ll1l1
v. l'tlt11an ii1ll (Pa.rk Larli)--.,td., i^Ias too narrow to
permlt the rational co .exlstence of the two orovlslons '
It ls the r"rrlterts thesls, ho',{ever, that 1f fhe
conceot of unenforceablllty per se ls accepted as .!ne.
pollcy basis of the lait of Srarrrlng and vragerlng
contracts, those provlslons can stand together "'rlthout
s.2 of the Act of Anne (1710).
The sa:tne concept of unerrforceablllt:l should' 1t
1s submltted, be applled to securltles ilven for Samltie
and wager"lng debts. Consequently, where a ganlng
or waEerlng aebt 1s discharqed by the payment of mone.v'
that 1s a complete dlscharge of ihe debtorrs }lab111ty
and no further llab1l1ty or obllgatlon is lncurred-
byhlm.Thus,thedoctrlneofunenforceablllty
r,loulcl precIu.Je or perlraps nore aceurately not
requlre.-anyredressbythedebtoragalnsttire
wlnnerr and lndeed, the exlstence of the rlght of
recovery provlded at present ln irlew Sealand by s'2
of the Act of Anne (f7fo) itoulC confllct rvlth tlrat
pr1nc1ple. It should therefore be repeaLed. ijut
the glvlng of securltles 1n dlscharge of gamlng and-
wagerlnfi debts glves rlse to ne.,'t llab111tles and
obllgatlons whlch a reclplent mlqht requlre the asslst-'
ance of the laiq to enforce. For exampleu there may
be lnsufflelent funds 1n the account of t:re drawer to
meet h1s eheque or he may renege on or dlspute the
asslgnment by deed of mortgage. To enable the wlnnlng
payee on mortgagee , &s the case maY b€, to enforr:e
L I ...r,: I
the securltv by an actlon ln the courts ls, ln
substance, to allow hl::r to enforce the garnlng or
i"iagerlng debt 1n respeet of whlch the securlty i'ras
glven, Anci because that could arlse ln the case
of some securltles, (or perhaps more aecurately ln
partleular cases) all securltles rnust faIl t't1th1n
the amblt of the unenforceablllty doetrlne 1f
conslstency 1s to be achleved.
It ls, however, too easy to move fron the
concept of unenforceablllty to a conslcleratlon of
questlons of Justlce ancl morallty. And lt ls
lmportant therefore to recoPnlse that the unenforce-
ab1l1t-v doctrlne rests solely on the prlnc1pIe bhai
the la'r' 'v1ll not lencl 1ts asslstance to the wlnner
to enforce the or1g1nal debt, rather than because
of any felt need to protect the loserrs estate frorn
belnq disslnated by exeesslve ganlng and trragerln.q'
(as l"ras tire pollcy bealnd the Acts of Charles (1651r)
anC Lnne (1710) ). Applylng thls pure concePt of
unenforceablllty to the Ae! of 1835 "rhat emerges 1n
relatlon to s.1 ls that tfle obllEatlons ano llab1l1t -
1es establlshed by a securlty glven or executed by
tire loser of a game or bet on a game are extlngulshef.
lnter pa.rtes by the conslderatlon for the securlty
belng declared lIlegal. But on the other hand the
conpllcated web of lega1 rlghts that mlght arlse by
t5e subsequent possesslon of, of asslgnments to
lnnocent thlrd pantles are preserved. And then,
any aclvantage that the wlnner nlght enJoSr as a
consequence only of the necesslty to preserve the
rlghts of lnnocent thlrd partles 1s removed by
allovrtns the losen to recover under s - 2 only what he,
the loser, has been obllged to pay ln the dlscharge
of hls ob1-lgatlons under the secunlty.
To glve effeet to thls eoncept of unenforeeab'| 1{-'-.,
3.
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the fol1ow1ng changes to the 1aw are reeonmended:
1. That the Engllsh gamlng and wagerlng statutes ln
force 1n New Zealand be repealed.
?. That ss. l and 2 of the Gamlng Act, 1835 (U.K.)
be enacted 1n a New Zealand statute on gamlng and
wagerlng, but wlth the followlng modlflcatlons,
namely:
(a) That the language of those provlslons be
modernlsed, and
(b) Ttrat they be extended to apply to securltles
glven for all gamlng and wagerlng contracts'
That s.69 of the Gamlng Act 1908 be repealed and
substltuted by a provlslon 1n the followlng terms;
namely:
69(1) nff contracts or agreements, whether by parol
or ln wrltlng, by way of gamlng or wagerlng shal1
be null and vo1d.
(2) No actlon shall be brought or malntalned
1n any court for recoverlng any sum of money
or valuable thlng alleged to be won upon any
game or wagerr or whlch has been deposlted 1n
the hands of any person to ablde the event of
any game, or the event on whlch any wager has
been made.
( 3) In determlnlng whether an actlon brought 1s
to recover a sum of money or valuable thlng allegei
to have been won on any gane or upon any wager
under subsectlon (2) of thls sectlon the court
shall have regard to the lntentlon of the partles
E7 ,a27
aE dlscloeed by, the clncuutstances of the gase
and any arrangemgnte , agree.ments on under-
taklngs ente-red" lnto on glven by them,
whether between the partles thenselvesr of
betrreen the pantles or any one of them and.
any other person.
tlqte: Tl,re reforms necessltated by the
Illegal. Contracts Act a970 w111
be dl.scussed 1n paragraph 5 lnfra.
t7.031
[7.03] fhe UnenforceabllltY Doctrlne -
Totallsator Bettlng
To deny legal recognltlon to 1eglslat1ve1y
}egltlmlsed gambllng 1n the form of totallsator
bettlng 1s, today, qulte unreallstlc. Horse raclng,
the totallsator and the Totallsator Agency Board are
now part of the New Zealand way of l1fe. They are
a part of our cu]ture, lndeed, a part of our lnherlted
culture. And as such, they, by vlrtue of the stand
taken agalnst totallsator bettlng ln i{ew Zealand,
have been denled recognltlon by our courts vrlthout
any good reason for dolng so. But the totallsator
has been partlcularly sensltlve to erltlclsm and
has fallen easy prey to the hlgh mlnded sentlments
expressed agalnst lt 1n both the Courts and Iegls-
lature. Reason requlresr however, that we return
to reallty and accord lega1 reeognltlon to contracts
arlslng out of bettlng by means of llcensed total-
lsators. To do thls leglslatlve actlon w111 be
requlred. But 1t ls necessary lf r,'ie are to avold
1n the future, the spectacle of, for example, an
$8tf ,55\.70 cla1m belng dlsmlssed wlth this sort of
Judlclal apology:
rrThls declslon w1ll be a dlsappolntment to theplalntlff and the other members of the Para-
mount syndleate. One ean only hope that lt
w111 be some consolatlon to them to reflect
that they are Jolnlng, a1be1t 1n a rather
spectacular way, the ranks of countless
followers of the Turf who must have been
deprlved of wlnnlngs over the centurles by the
relults of protestS."r
Per Cooke J 1n Economouts
dlscussed supral-ZTa
case
para.
at p.33,
8.
l.
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CoId confort lndeed, for those who look to the
ordlnary courts of the land for the resolutlon of
dlsputes arlslng out of lawful, and what must now
quallfy as soc1ally acceptable, actlvlty' Fortun-
ate1y, tll that case, the learned Judge demonstrated
humanlty and lessened the plalntlffts fruStratlon
by showlng that, 1n any event, the clalm falled on
the merlts.
In Offlclal Asslgnee v. Totallsator Agency Board2
after quotlng a passage from the Judgrnent of Dennlston
J ln lgllock v. Saundens3 Hutchlson J expressed the
vlew that the posltlon ln relatlon to totallsator
bettlng was now rf vastly dlfferent'r b aS regards trans-
actlone wlth the Totallsaton Agency Board' He sald'
of Dennlston Jfs remarks:
r'... the sentence rthe totallsator, though not
actually banned, 1s certalnly n9t blessedr ls
not appilcable in relatlon to the operatlons
of thl- Totallsator Agency Board, nor 1s the
eipnessfon ?tir1s haIF-contemptuous concesslon.'
It 1s not necessary for me to go 9o far as to
say that the provlslons of the 1949 amendlngAal (whlch cn-eated the T.A.B. ) lmplledly
r"puif ss.69 and ?0 of the Gamlng Aet so far
as concerns the operatlons of the Board' But,1f 1t should be sald that that would necess-
arlly be so 1f my r11ew were correct, I do not
shrlnk from that.;i "
2.
3.
4.
trg6ol N.2,L.R.1064; dlscussed supra, chapt '4,para.8.
(189?) 15 l{.2.L.R.581, 589-9q. Dlscussed and
quotea supra, chaPt.4, Para.8.
Note 2, at p.1086.
Note 2, at P.f087.5.
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A dlstlnctlon between on-course totallsator betflng,
and bettlng through the Board, 1s lmpllclt ln the
learned Judgers remarks. But he was conslderlng tlre
matter 1n legal termsr l.€. hlS Vlew was based on a
conslderatlon of the terms of the 19q9 arnendlng Act ' 5
But consldered !n soc1a1 and economlc terms, whV draw
the dlstlnctlon? Although the vlew of Hutchlson J
stands alone among those expressed by hls brother
Judges lt ls, wlth respect, one whlch accol4ds wlth
reaIltY.
Butachangelnthelawlsunllke}ytobeeaslly
achleved. In 1971 the Leglslature placed the seal of
approvalonthevlewthathasfoundfavourwlththe
maJortty of the Judlclary by enactlng s'103 of the
Raclng Act. ? That provlslon provldes, lnter alla,
that no actlon sha1l be brought or malntalned to
recover any money won, lost or bet on any llcensed
totallsator.
In 1844, the Select Commlttee on Gamlng 1n England"
after recognlslng that gamlng laws generally had falled
to keep pace wlth "the hablts e manners, and oplnlons
of the present dayt'I reeommended qulte substantlal
ehanges. And whllst wagerlng eontracts were lncluded
1n the commlttee rs category of thlngs requlrlng change.
1t was of the oplnlon that the lmposltlon of penaltles
5.
7.
The Gamlng Anendment Act 1949 by wll-cft !h"Totallsator Ageney Board was establlshed'
The Raelng Act 1971 replaced those provlslons 1n
the Gaurln! Act 1908 relatlng to raclng, 
-total-lsators ana tfre Total'lsator Agency Board'
8. Report of the Select Commlttee on Gamlng'
20th May 1844 P'v.
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for wagerlng was qulte repugnant to the general
feellngs of Engllshmen and would be looked upon "as
an arbltrary lnterference wlth the freedom of prlvate
lLfet'. e The Conmlttee was of the vlew that wagerlng
ln general should be free and subJect to no penalty,
1t d1d not conslder that 1t was a matter whlch ought
to be adJudlcated upon by the Courts. But thls was
not Just a subJectlve vlew lnvo1v1ng elements of
sentlment and emotlon agalnst gamlng and wagerlng.
It was based upon more substanttal grounds. The
Commlttee sald, lnter alla: ro
trlf prlvate lnd1v1duals choose to make
ivageis wlth each other, there seems to be
no good reason why they should be prevented
from dolng so, or why they should be punlshedfor so doing; but nelther, on the other hand,
does there seem to be any sufflclent reason
why the valuable tlme of the Courts of Law
should be consumed by adJudlcatlng dlsputes
rvhlch may arlse between lndlvlduaLs 1n conse"-
quence of such wagers. Such dlsputes appear
to be of the nature of prlvate dlfferences,
whlch, not turnlng upon the constructlon of
any Liw or Statute, are matters for prlvate
settlement rather than for Iegal adJudlcatlon:
and such dlsputes must fnequently lnvolve the
statement of a varlety of trlfIlng detalls,
11tt1e sulted to the dlgnlty of a Court of
Law, and as to whlch such Court eould have nope"uUar competence to Judge." ll
Thls observatlon of the Select Commlttee on Garnlng
on the nature of wagers must now be quallfled by the
one hundred and thlrty yeans of hlstory that have
lnfluenced and altered thabltsr mannersr and oplnlons'
9. rbld.
I0. Dlscussed
1I. Note B, at
further supra, chapt.2, Para.5.
p .V-VI.
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from then to the present day. Can 1t now be sald
that wagers on horse races per medlun of llcensed
totallsators are sponslones ludlcrae; that they may
glve rlse to dlfferences whlch do not turn upon the
constructlon of any Iaw or statute; or that they are
sfunply matters for prlvate settlement lnvolvlng
statements of tr1fl1ng detalls as to whlch a Court
could have no pecullar competenee to Judge? Surely
not. In thls age of the photo flnlsh, and the multl-
tude of statutes, regu'latlons, rules and bodles whlch
control the practlcal detalls as vrell as the admlnl.-
stratlon of the raclng buslness 12 the resolutlon of
dlsputes 1s a matter of conslclerable 1ega1 eomplexlty
rather than personal opln1on.13 And raclng 1s no
longer domlnated by the hablts and vulgarltles of the
rude, the lgnorant, and the corrupt.rf In New Zealand
L2, The New Zealand Raclng Authorlty establlshed and
appolnted by the Raclng Act 1971 exerclses general
superlntendence over raclng ln i\lew Zealand. The
Raclng Conference, the Trottlng Conference and the
Greyhound Raclng Assoclatlon (Inc. ) are also glven
statutory recognltlon and status under that Act
whlch, 1n add1tlon, reeonstltuted the Totallsator
Agency Board. A purvlew of the functlons and
authorlty of these bodles 1s beyond the scope ofthls work bub sufflce to say they domlnate an est-
abllshed hlerarehy that controls every deta1l of
raclng and the bettlng buslness (on and off course)ln New Zealand today,
13.See e.g. the flrst part of Cooke Jfs Judgment 1n
Economouts case, note 1, where he adJudlcated uponffiIC' of the pla1ni1f f 's claim, and contrastthls wlth the Judgment of Rlchmond J 1n Dqnk v.Island Bay Park Raclng Co. (1885) 4 n.2.8ffi301,
14. Raclng 1n the 19th century d1d, of eourse, have a
respeetable followlng, lneludlng Royalty. But ii..
raclng buslness frequently convulsed wlth seandals
arlslng fron the actlvltles of shanpers, dlshonest
owners and Jockeys and the extravagances of the
nlch and poon allke. Dlscussed, J.Rlce, Hlstory
of the Brltlsh Turf, Part I (t8791.
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1t ls the domaln of a lLmlted prlvate entenprlse that
1s domlnated by the State. Indeed prlvate enterprlse
enJoys a lesser role here than ln England, for the on-
course bookmaker cannot operate here and off-Course
bettlng ls monopollsed by the Totallsator Agency
Board. 15 The nelghbourhood bettlng shop ls unknown.
The lievr zealand reluctance to entertaln actlons
arlslng out of llcensed totallsator bettlng 1s a
product of sentlment and emotlon agalnst gamlng and
wagerlng. That was not the basls upon whlch the un-
enforceablllty concept appealed to the SeIect Commltt-
ee on Gamlng 1n l8l{4. 0n the grounds stated by the
Commlttee a general avoldance provlslon such as s.69
1s Justlfled. But ln clrcumstances where a denlal
of the rlght to 1egaI process cannot be so Justlfled
the Courts and the Leglslature are 
' 
wlth respect 
'
abdlcatlng thelr responslbllltles. Such 1s the
posltlon 1n New Zealand 1n regard to totallsator
bettlng and lt 1s aecordlngly recommended:
That s.103 of the Raclng Aet 1971 be repealed'
That totallsaton bettlng be expnessly deflned
l-n s. 2 of the Gamlng Act 1908 so as to
encompass bettlng on all llcensed totallsators 
'
whether dlrectly, oP through the agency of the
Totallsator Agency Board; and that that
deflnltlon be followed by a pnovlso declarlng
15. ImportantlV, bettlng on eredlt on the totallsatorls forbldd6n fn New-Zealand. See s.L00(2)(b)
Raclng Act 1971, but of course noney may b-e
borrowed or even stolen for the purpose of
maklng bets.
1.
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that bets on the totallsator do not eonstltute
garnlng or wagerlng contracts wlthln the meanlng
of the Act.
3. Ttrat the words ". o, or any sum of money won,
Iost, or staked 1n any bettlng transactlon
whatever'i be repealed from s.70 of the Gamlng
Act I908.
I'lote: The reform reeommended 1n ( 3) above effects
two remedles. Flrstly tt resolves the dlfflculty
alluded to ln chapter 4, paragraph 7 and chapter 5'
paragraoh 3, and secondly 1t prevents the reform
recommended 1n (2) above from belng frustrated by
a flndlng that total-lsator bettlng 1s caught by the
words ttany bettlng transactlon whatever" ln the
repealed phrase.
t7.Ott1 The Unenforceablllty Doctrlne .. and Plates and
Prlzes to be Awarded to the irllnners of Horseraces 
'
Games, Sports Pastlmes or Exerclses
S.71 of the Gamlng Aet 1908
whlch prevents aetlons from belng brought for reeover-
1ng any sum of money or valuable thlng al'leged to be
won by the wlnners of horse races r races r games t
sports or exerclses was dlscussed 1n detall 1n
chapters 4r and 5? It was suggested 1n chapter 5
Para. 9.
Para. 3.
1.
2.
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tz'05 1
that the promotlon of horse raclng and other lawful
sports and ganes ean be clearly dlstlngulshed from
gamlng and wagerlng and that by enacttng s.71 the
leglslature had moved outslde the area of concern,
and went beyond the phllosophy of the gamlng Acts '
Accordlngly, lt 1s reconmended that s.71 of the
Gamlng Aet 1908 be repealed, and 1n add1t1on, to
remove any doubts as to what was lntended, that the
provlso to s.18 of the Garnlng Act 1845 (U.K.) be
re-enacted3 wlth s.69 of the New Zealand Act.
The ll1ega1 Contracts Act 1970
ft has been demonstrated ln chapter slx that the
rellef avallable under s.7(1) of the Illegal Contracts
Act 1970 1s not avallable ln the case of contracts
whlch are merely vold. Thls belng so, an anomaly 1s
created lf that provlslon ls allowed to operate where
a gamlng or wagerlng contraet ls talnted wlth 111ega1-
1ty ln consequence of a contraventlon of one of the
penal provlslons of the gamlng Acts. Accordlngly 
'ln the l1ght of the uncertalnty exlstlng as to the
correct lnterpretatlon of s.7(f) of the IIlegaI
contracts Act 1970, 1t 1s recommended that the oper-
atlon of that provlslon be excluded from extendlng to
garnlng and wagerlng eontracts by an express provlslon
ln the Gamlng Act 1908. And, trr keeplng wlth the
proposed concept of unenforceablLlty ln paragraph one
3. It was repealed from that provlslon by the
Gamlng Act, 189q. See chapt.t, para.2.
t7.061
of thls chapter lt ls reconmended that that exeluslon
be expresslyr applled also to securltles the conslder-
atlon for whlch ls 11legaI under the terms of what 1s
now ss.L and 2 of the Gamlng Act 183S (U.K.;
[7.06] Concluslon
The amendments above excepted, lt ls reconmended
that the remalnlng portlons of ss,59 and 70 of the
Gamlng Act 1908 be retalned. The eonsequence of
th1s, of course, bavlng negard to the amendment
proposed 1n relatlon to totallsator bettlng, ls that
the New Zealand Act ls brought Largely lnto llne wlth
the Engllsh Aets of 1835, 1845 and 1892, (and the
deelslons of the Engllsh courts thereon).
Ttr1s, the wrlterts research eommends as the
most senslble so1utlon,
1. The wrtter acknowledges, howeverr that lt ls
arguable that s.2 of the Act of IE35 al-ready
has that effect. What ls requlred thereforels an excluslon eLause speelflcally ldentlfytng
s.7(1) of the l1legal Contracts Act 1970.
t7.061
of thls chapter lt 1s recommended that that excluslon
be expresslyl applled also to seeurltles the conslder-
atlon for whlch ls l}Iega} under the terms of what 1s
now ss.l and 2 of the Gamlng Act 1835 (U.K')
t7. 05 l Coneluslon
The amendments above excepted, 1t ls recommended
that the remalnlng portlons of ss.69 and 70 of the
Gamlng Act 1908 be retalned. The eonsequence of
ttrls, of coursen havlng regard to the amendment
proposed 1n relatlon to totallsator bettlng, 1s that
the New Zealand Act ls brought largely lnto l1ne wlth
the Engllsh Acts of 1835, 18q5 and 1892, (and the
declslons of the Engllsh courts thereon) '
Ttr1s, the wrlterts research cornmends, as the
most senslble solutlon.
The wrlter acknowledges, however, ^that 1t ls
arguable that s.2 of the Act of 1835 alreadyfral that effect. What ls requlred therefore
1s an excluslon clause speclflcally ldentlfylng
s.?(1) of the lllegal Contnacts Act 1970.
1.
